Jones v. Commonwealth
| Decision Date | 16 May 2023 |
| Docket Number | 0586-22-3 |
| Parties | JZHAREY LEQUANTE JONES v. COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA |
| Court | Virginia Court of Appeals |
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF PITTSYLVANIA COUNTY Stacey W. Moreau Judge
Carlos A. Hutcherson for appellant.
Ken J Baldassari, Assistant Attorney General (Jason S. Miyares Attorney General, on brief), for appellee.
Present: Judges Friedman, Callins and White Argued by videoconference.
FRANK K. FRIEDMAN JUDGE.
Following a bench trial, the trial court convicted Jzharey Lequante Jones of strangulation and domestic assault and battery.[1] Jones contends that the trial court erred in denying his motions to set aside the verdict and award him a new trial because the trial court should have allowed him to use prior inconsistent statements to impeach the victim as an adverse witness at trial. In addition, Jones argues that the evidence was insufficient to convict him of strangulation and domestic assault and battery. For the following reasons, we affirm the trial court's judgment.
Olivia Overstreet and Jones have a child together. On June 14, 2021, Overstreet and her child spent the night at Jones's house. During an argument while in bed, Jones "got physical" with Overstreet and began to choke her. Jones got "over top of [her]" on the bed and "choked [her] with both hands" around her neck. Overstreet could not breathe and "felt like [she] was going to pass out." When Jones eventually "stopped" choking her, Overstreet had no "visible injuries" on her neck but it felt "kind of sore." After the attack, she and Jones "made up" and went to sleep.
The next morning, Jones became upset and threw a plastic baby bottle at Overstreet's eye, which began to swell. Jones then took Overstreet's car keys, placed them on a dresser, and told her that she "was not leaving." Overstreet grabbed the keys when Jones left the room; when he returned, Overstreet refused to watch a movie with him and went into the living room with their child.
Fearing that Jones would prevent her from leaving, Overstreet snuck out the back door with her child and got into her car. Jones came outside and tried to enter her car, but she locked the doors. Standing in front of her car, Jones cracked the windshield with a rock. As Overstreet drove away, Jones threw another rock at the driver's side window, shattering the glass. The glass shards cut their child.
After the incident, Overstreet saw a nurse for treatment but left because she "didn't want to be there." Overstreet also reported the incident to police and filed a written complaint at the magistrate's office.
At trial, during the Commonwealth's case-in-chief, Jones cross-examined Overstreet about the incident[2] but did not ask whether she had made any prior statements that were inconsistent with her trial testimony.
After the Commonwealth rested, Jones called Overstreet as a defense witness. During Overstreet's direct examination, the Commonwealth objected to Jones asking Overstreet to authenticate her written complaint to the magistrate, asserting that Jones was improperly attempting to impeach his own witness with a prior inconsistent statement. The trial court allowed Jones to continue examining Overstreet, but cautioned, Overstreet authenticated the complaint, and Jones again attempted to introduce it into evidence. The trial court excluded the exhibit, ruling that the complaint was irrelevant except to impeach Overstreet.
Jones moved the trial court to declare a mistrial. He argued that he did not seek to introduce Overstreet's complaint to impeach her and the trial court was preventing him from "present[ing] a defense." The trial court ruled that the complaint was irrelevant, and it denied the motion for mistrial.
Resuming direct examination, Jones asked Overstreet a series of questions concerning whether she made prior inconsistent statements or omissions to police or the magistrate regarding the incident.[3] The trial court sustained the Commonwealth's objection to each question on the same grounds as it previously ruled.[4] The trial court also refused Jones's request to "deem [Overstreet] to be adverse based upon answers to questions at this time."[5] Harold Jones, Jr. (Harold), Jones's uncle, testified that he lived with Jones and did not hear "any noises" on the night of the incident "as if there were a confrontation or some tussling going on." Harold was unaware that Overstreet was in the residence, and he did not enter Jones's bedroom during the assault.
Testifying on his own behalf, Jones denied strangling Overstreet or throwing the baby bottle at her. Jones admitted that he threw rocks at Overstreet's car, but maintained that he did so because "she almost hit [him] with the car."
During closing argument, Jones contended that the evidence failed to prove that he strangled Overstreet because his testimony contradicted Overstreet's and no physical evidence corroborated her alleged injuries. The trial court found Jones guilty of strangulation and domestic assault and battery.
Jones moved the trial court to set aside the verdict and award him a new trial. Jones asserted that the trial court erred in denying his motion for mistrial because it should have permitted him to impeach Overstreet as an adverse witness using prior inconsistent statements. He also argued that the evidence was insufficient to sustain his convictions. The trial court found that Jones "chose not to cross-examine" Overstreet during the Commonwealth's case-in-chief, "and then chose to call" her as his own witness "for the sole purpose of impeachment." In addition, the trial court found that Overstreet "was not proven to be adverse." Finally, the trial court ruled that the evidence was sufficient to prove strangulation and domestic assault and battery. Accordingly, it denied the motion to set aside the verdict and award a new trial. Jones appeals.
Jones argues that the trial court erred in denying his motion to set aside the verdict and grant a new trial because the trial court refused to allow him to impeach Overstreet as an adverse witness using her prior inconsistent statements. Jones contends that Overstreet "proved adverse" because "her story related to whether she suffered any injuries from the alleged choking changed from her prior statements of there being 'no injury.'" In addition, he asserts that Overstreet was "an adverse witness" because "she was an opposing party and had a personal interest in the outcome of the case." Finally, Jones argues that because "Overstreet's testimony substantiated" his claim that he did not abduct her, Jones did not call Overstreet as a witness solely to impeach her. We disagree.
Appellate courts review a trial court's ruling denying a motion to set aside the verdict or a motion for new trial for abuse of discretion. Gross v. Stuart, 297 Va. 769, 774 (2019). "[T]he determination of the admissibility of relevant evidence is within the sound discretion of the trial court subject to the test of abuse of that discretion." Johnson v. Commonwealth, 70 Va.App. 45, 49 (2019) (quoting Henderson v. Commonwealth, 285 Va. 318, 329 (2013)). When evaluating whether a trial court has abused its discretion, this Court does not substitute its judgment for that of the trial court. Rather, this Court considers "only whether the record fairly supports the trial court's action." Grattan v. Commonwealth 278 Va. 602, 620 (2009) (quoting Beck v. Commonwealth, 253 Va. 373, 385 (1997)). An abuse of discretion occurs only when reasonable jurists could not differ. Wynnycky v. Kozel, 71 Va.App. 177, 193 (2019). "[B]y definition," however, a trial court "abuses its discretion when it makes an error of law." Coffman v. Commonwealth, 67 Va.App. 163, 166 (2017) (quoting Commonwealth v. Greer, 63 Va.App. 561, 568 (2014)).
"As a general rule at common law, a party was not allowed to impeach its own witness." Maxey v. Commonwealth, 26 Va.App. 514, 518 (1998). "A party calling a witness was considered to have vouched for the witness' credibility and was not allowed to prove that the witness was unworthy of belief, even if the witness spoke against the party in some respects." Id.
Nonetheless, "Virginia has enacted two statutes that impact the common law rule." Id. "Code § 8.01-403 permits the impeachment of a witness who 'proves adverse,'" meaning "a witness whose testimony is 'injurious or damaging to the case of the party who called the witness.'" Id. (quoting Ragland v. Commonwealth, 16 Va.App. 913, 920 (1990)). "Code § 8.01-403 allows a party to impeach his or her own witness by prior inconsistent statements only when the witness whom the party expected to testify favorably has suddenly given unexpected, adverse testimony on the stand." Id. at 519-20. By contrast, Code § 8.01-401(A) allows such impeachment of a witness "having an adverse interest"-i.e., an "opposing party or a nonparty witness who has a financial or other personal interest in the outcome of the case." Id. at 520 (). But even if a witness has proven adverse or has an adverse interest, a party may not call that witness "solely for the purpose of impeaching her with her prior statements." Id. at 521 (emphasis omitted).
The record here supports the trial court's finding that Jones called Overstreet solely to impeach her. At trial, Jones had the opportunity to cross-examine Overstreet during the Commonwealth's case concerning any prior inconsistent statements she...
To continue reading
Request your trial