Jones v. Douglas County

• Decision Date: 08 July 1992
• Docket Number: No. S92A0413,S92A0413
• Citation: 262 Ga. 317,418 S.E.2d 19
• Parties: JONES et al. v. DOUGLAS COUNTY et al.
• Court: Georgia Supreme Court

Page 19

418 S.E.2d 19

262 Ga. 317

JONES et al. v. DOUGLAS COUNTY et al.

No. S92A0413.

Supreme Court of Georgia.

July 8, 1992.

Reconsideration Denied July 29, 1992.

Ezra B. Jones, III, Robert H. Stansfield, Summers & Jones, Atlanta, for Jones et al.

Robert B. Edwards, William J. Linkous, III, Edwards and McLeod, P.C., Douglasville, for Douglas County et al.

BELL, Presiding Justice.

This appeal presents issues concerning the validity of ordinances and resolutions pertaining to the establishment of street light districts in Douglas County, Georgia, pursuant to the authority of 1983 Ga. Const. Art. 9, Sec. 2, Para. 6. ¹ The appeal also presents issues concerning class certification. As we shall describe in this opinion, we conclude that the trial court erred in granting summary judgment against, and in denying summary judgment in favor of, the appellants on their claim for a declaration that the purported establishment by the Douglas County Board of Commissioners (the Board) of a Street Light District (SLD) and subsequently of a Street Light Tax District (SLTD) in appellants' residential subdivision, the Trail CreekSubdivision, ² is invalid because appellants were denied their right under the former Douglas County Street Light Ordinance, Douglas County Ordinances §§ 55-1101 to 55-1116 (hereafter, the Street Light ordinance), to notice of the public hearing at which the SLD was established. We further conclude that the trial court did not err in denying appellants' motion for class certification.

In 1985 the Board enacted the Street Light Ordinance, which established procedures whereby SLDs could be created under the authority of Art. 9, Sec. 2, Para. 6. One section, § 55-1107, prescribed that lot owners within a geographical area such as a residential subdivision could petition the Board to create such districts:

(a) Any lot owner in any unincorporated area of Douglas County may present a request for the creation of a street light district to the County Engineer. Upon receipt of the request, the County Engineer shall determine the appropriate boundaries for a street lighting district which will serve the lot owner presenting the request and neighboring lot owners. The County Engineer shall then prepare a plat showing this proposed street lighting district, and a petition for the creation of the proposed street lighting district shall then be circulated among the lot owners in the proposed district. If seventy-five (75%) percent of the lot owners in the proposed district sign the petition for the creation of a street lighting district, the petition shall be presented to the Douglas County Board of Commissioners. The Board of Commissioners shall conduct a public hearing for the purpose of determining whether or not to create the proposed street lighting district, giving consideration to safety and economic factors in making such determination. Unless one hundred (100%) percent of the lot owners have signed the petition, the public hearing shall be advertised one (1) time in the official organ of Douglas County, Georgia; and signs shall be posted in the proposed street lighting district giving notice of the hearing, at least ten (10) days before the public hearing. The number and size of the signs shall be such as is required by the Douglas County Zoning Ordinance for a request to rezone property.

(b) The petition for creation of the proposed street lighting district must be returned to the County Engineer within ninety (90) days after it is obtained from his office. The County Engineer, in his sole discretion, will verify the signatures on the petition prior to advertising the public hearing. [Emphasis supplied.]

After the enactment of the Street Light Ordinance, a petition to create an SLD in the Trail Creek Subdivision (Trail Creek) was returned to the County Engineer, ostensibly with the signatures of 100 per cent of the lot owners in Trail Creek. Pursuant to the language of § 55-1107(a) that permitted a public hearing without "advertising" ³ if 100 per cent of the lot owners signed the petition, the Board conducted a hearing in June 1985 and voted to designate Trail Creek as an SLD. ⁴ Street lights were installed and biannual assessments were sent to appellants, but they never paid any of the assessments.

It appears that at some point the Douglas County Street Light Ordinance, Douglas County Ordinances §§ 55-1101 to 55-1116, was redesignated as Douglas County Code Chap. 14, Art. II, §§ 14-20 to 14-35. In 1990 the Board revised the Street Light Ordinance by replacing the assessments for street lights with an annual ad valorem tax, and by converting the existing SLDs into SLTDs, § 14-21. ⁵ By a separate resolution the Board levied a $42 ad valorem tax for street light services on "each lot or lot resident within each Street Light Tax District." Notice was sent to appellants of an ad valorem tax for 1990 on their Trail Creek lot and dwelling, which included the $42 SLTD tax. Appellants tendered a tax payment in the amount of their tax bill less the $42, and when that tender was refused they filed suit in Douglas Superior Court against appellees. As amended, appellants' complaint indicated that they sought to assert a class action for a declaration that the street light ordinance in both its 1985 and 1990 versions was unconstitutional; a declaration that appellees' actions under color of the two ordinances were illegal; an order for the return of money collected under the two ordinances; ⁶ and attorney fees. The parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment, and appellants also moved to certify a class of plaintiffs. As amended, appellants' motion for certification specified a proposed class of

[a]ll individuals and entities who own real property in Douglas County and have been assessed an annual charge or tax for street lights during the years 1985 through 1990. Excluded from the Class are the Defendants, and any subdivision or agency of Douglas County and any other persons found culpable of wrong-doing in this action.

On October 15, 1991, the trial court entered an order denying class certification and an order granting summary judgment to appellees and (by implication) denying summary judgment to appellants. Appellants appeal both orders. ⁷

1. One of appellants' contentions is that the trial court erred regarding their claim for a declaration that the creation of an SLD for Trail Creek was nugatory. Appellants assert that in fact 100 per cent of the lot owners did not sign the petition, and therefore that the public hearing on the petition without notice to lot owners failed to comply with § 55-1107. Appellants further contend that, by extension, an SLTD for Trail Creek was not created in 1990 because no SLD for Trail Creek existed. We find merit in these contentions.

1(a). Before addressing the merits of appellants' contentions, we must consider appellees' contention that, because that appellants failed to file suit until the ad valorem tax for the SLTD was levied, laches bars appellants' claim for a declaration that the Trail Creek SLD and SLTD are invalid. We conclude that this argument has no merit, since "[l]aches is an equitable doctrine not applicable in a petition for declaratory judgment, which is an action at law. See Hobgood v. Black, 144 Ga.App. 448, 450 (241 SE2d 60) (1978)." City of Waycross v. Reid Rental Co., 186 Ga.App 452, 454, 367 S.E.2d 305 (1988). (Emphasis supplied.) ⁸

1 (b). One of the appellants testified by affidavit that appellants did not sign the petition for Trail Creek, and we find that there is no genuine issue as to this fact. The affiant further averred that on its face the petition purported to have the signatures of tenants of the appellants who were leasing appellants' lot and dwelling in Trail Creek during the period the petition was circulated, but that the signatures were not those of appellants' tenants. Appellees contend that appellants did not establish that the tenants did not sign the petition, and appear to further contend that if the tenants did sign, their signatures were sufficient.

We find it unnecessary to resolve whether the signatures were those of the tenants, since we conclude that, even assuming for the purposes of reviewing the summary judgment motions that the signatures were in fact affixed by the tenants, as a matter of law their signatures did not satisfy the requirement of § 55-1107(a) that the petition be signed by lot owners. ⁹

Statutes should be read according to the natural and most obvious import of the language, without resorting to subtle and forced constructions, for the purpose of either limiting or extending their operation. [Cit.] [Integon Indemnity Corp. v. Canal Insurance Co., 256 Ga. 692, 693, 353 S.E.2d 186 (1987).]

We have three reasons for concluding that the tenants' signatures did not suffice. First, Subsection (a) of § 55-1107 unequivocally stated that a petition would be signed by "lot owners," and in no way suggested that the signatures of tenants were sufficient. Second, extension of the term "lot owners" in § 55-1107(a) beyond its facial meaning would be inconsistent with the provision in Douglas County Ordinances § 55-1102 that "[t]he cost of providing and maintaining street light service as provided in this ordinance [the Street Light Ordinance] shall be borne by the owners of the property receiving that service." (Emphasis supplied.) There is no evidence that the Board intended the term "owners" to have two different meanings within the same ordinance. Third, inasmuch as owners, and not tenants, were obligated to pay assessments, it would be unreasonable to infer a legislative intent to cloak tenants with the authority to initiate the process that could result in such obligations. Accordingly, we hold that the signatures of appellants' tenants did not constitute the signatures of "lot owners" within the meaning of § 55-1107(a).

1(c). Appellees suggest (according to our understanding of their ...