Jones v. Estate of Jones

• Decision Date: 18 June 2002
• Docket Number: No. 01-1025.,01-1025.
• Parties: Mary Ann JONES, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. The ESTATE OF Robert G. JONES, Defendant, Lane JONES and Robert Jones, Individually and in their capacity as Co-Personal Representatives of the Estate of Robert G. Jones, deceased, Defendants-Respondents.
• Court: Wisconsin Supreme Court

253 Wis.2d 158

2002 WI 61

646 N.W.2d 280

Mary Ann JONES, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. The ESTATE OF Robert G. JONES, Defendant, Lane JONES and Robert Jones, Individually and in their capacity as Co-Personal Representatives of the Estate of Robert G. Jones, deceased, Defendants-Respondents.

No. 01-1025.

Supreme Court of Wisconsin.

Oral argument April 9, 2002.

Decided June 18, 2002.

For the plaintiff-appellant there were briefs by Dennis H. Milbrath, Robert J. Asti and Levy & Levy, S.C., Cedarburg, and oral argument by Dennis H. Milbrath.

For the defendants-respondents there was a brief (in the court of appeals) by Robert H. Halvorsen and Halvorsen Law Offices, S.C., Sheboygan, and oral argument by Robert H. Halvorsen.

¶ 1. N. PATRICK CROOKS, J

This case is before the court on certification from the Court of Appeals, District II, pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 809.61 (1999-2000). The parties dispute whether a spouse can waive the homestead protection in a premarital agreement. Mary Ann Jones (hereinafter Mary Ann) and Robert G. Jones (hereinafter Robert), in contemplation of marriage, signed a prenuptial agreement stating, among other things, that each party shall hold his or her solely owned property "free from all rights or claims therein by the other." During their marriage, Robert owned the home where they resided as individual property. In 1998, Robert deeded the home to Mary Ann, and on the same day, Mary Ann subsequently deeded the home to Robert's sons, her stepsons. Robert passed away, and Mary Ann now seeks to declare the second warranty deed invalid. Mary Ann claims that the home is homestead property, and Robert's failure to sign the second warranty deed makes it invalid under the statute of frauds, Wis. Stat. § 706.02 (1997-1998).¹

¶ 2. We first conclude that the property is home-stead property. However, we also conclude that pursuant to the premarital agreement, Mary Ann and Robert waived the homestead protection. Mary Ann, therefore, could transfer the property to Robert's sons without needing Robert's signature. Accordingly, we affirm the circuit court's order denying Mary Ann's motion seeking to declare the deed of transfer between Mary Ann and Robert's sons invalid.

I

¶ 3. The relevant facts are not in dispute. On August 3, 1978, before they were married, Mary Ann and Robert signed a premarital agreement. Among other things, the agreement specifically stated:

During their marriage each party shall hold all of his or her solely owned property, including real estate, whether now owned or hereafter acquired, free from all rights or claims therein by the other, with full power to sell, mortgage, transfer, assign, give or otherwise dispose of any interest in such property without the consent of the other.

During the course of their marriage, the agreement was modified on several occasions; however, none of the modifications affected this provision or the issues in this case.

¶ 4. Mary Ann and Robert were married later in 1978 and lived in a home that Robert had owned before the marriage. Robert later sold the home and purchased a new home located in the Village of Kohler, Wisconsin (hereinafter "the Woodlake home"). Robert and Mary Ann then lived in the Woodlake home.

¶ 5. On September 16, 1998, Robert transferred the Woodlake home to Mary Ann by Warranty Deed. The deed specifically identified the home as Robert's individual property, and as homestead property. On that same day, Mary Ann conveyed the Woodlake home by Warranty Deed to Robert's two sons, her stepsons, Robert A. Jones and Lance B. Jones (hereinafter "Robert's sons"). In the deed, Mary Ann reserved "the right to reside in the residence for the life of Robert G. Jones plus one year from the date of his death." Again, the deed identified the property as homestead property. Robert did not sign the deed by which Mary Ann transferred the Woodlake home to his sons. Furthermore, the two deeds were simultaneously recorded in the office of the Register of Deeds for Sheboygan County on October 27, 1998, as documents 1522214 and 1522215, respectively.

¶ 6. Robert died on March 13, 1999.

¶ 7. On June 29, 1999, Mary Ann filed suit in Sheboygan County Circuit Court, against the Estate of Robert G. Jones, and Lance B. Jones and Robert A. Jones, both individually and in their capacity as co-personal representatives of their deceased father. Among other things, Mary Ann sought a declaration of interest in the Woodlake home, as the homestead of Robert and herself. Mary Ann subsequently filed a motion for summary judgment, asking the court to find that the deed transferring the Woodlake home to Robert's sons was invalid as a matter of law under the statute of frauds. Specifically, Mary Ann claimed that the deed conveyed homestead property, which requires the signature of both spouses under Wis. Stat. § 706.02(1)(f). Mary Ann argued that since Robert did not sign the deed, the transfer was invalid. The circuit court, the Honorable John P. Murphy, denied the motion. Relying on language in the premarital agreement, the court concluded that the Woodlake home had never been classified as homestead property; therefore, the transfer to Robert's sons was valid.

¶ 8. Mary Ann appealed the circuit court's decision, and the Court of Appeals, District II, certified the case to this court.²

II

[1]

¶ 9. Whether spouses can waive the homestead protection in a premarital agreement is an issue of first impression in Wisconsin. It poses a question of statutory interpretation and contract interpretation, which we review de novo, but benefiting from the circuit court's analysis. Weber v. Weber, 176 Wis. 2d 1085, 1090, 501 N.W.2d 413 (1993).

[2]

¶ 10. Before we can answer the first certified question, we must determine whether the Woodlake home is homestead property. Wisconsin Stat. § 706.01(7) defines "homestead" as "the dwelling, and so much of the land surrounding it as is reasonably necessary for use of the dwelling as a home, but not less than one-fourth acre (if available) and not exceeding 40 acres." All of the parties in this case, before this court, concede that the Woodlake home was homestead property.³ The circuit court, however, relying on the language of the premarital agreement, concluded that the Woodlake home was not homestead property. We disagree with the circuit court's conclusion. The warranty deed conveying the property from Robert to Mary Ann, and the warranty deed conveying the property from Mary Ann to Robert's sons, both on their face state that the property is homestead property. Both deeds specifically state, "This is homestead property." Further, the Woodlake home is "the dwelling" that Robert and Mary Ann used as their home. Based on the facts, the parties' positions that the Woodlake home is homestead property, and the plain language in both deeds, we, therefore, conclude that the property in question is homestead property.

¶ 11. We now turn to the issue of first impression—whether spouses can waive the homestead protection in a premarital agreement. Wisconsin Stat. § 706.02(1), otherwise referred to as the statute of frauds, provides that a conveyance of real property is not valid unless it complies with the statutory requirements. Section 706.02(1)(f) specifically addresses the conveyance of homestead property and requires that the conveyance "[i]s signed, or joined in by separate conveyance, by or on behalf of each spouse, if the conveyance alienates any interest of a married person in a homestead under s. 706.01(7) except conveyances between spouses . . . ."

¶ 12. Mary Ann argues that because Robert did not sign the warranty deed conveying the Woodlake home to the sons, the deed is invalid for not conforming with the requirements of Wis. Stat. § 706.02(1)(f).⁴ Mary Ann contends that the Marital Property Act, Chapter 766, relates only to ownership and classification and that the statute of frauds relates only to conveyances of property. She claims that even though a premarital agreement conveys sole ownership of a homestead to one spouse, this does not eliminate the need to comply with the statute of frauds, which requires both spouses to sign a subsequent conveyance of the property. Mary Ann argues that the Marital Property Act, or a premarital agreement, cannot trump the statute of frauds requirements, nor can the parties use a premarital agreement to opt out of the statute of frauds. According to Mary Ann, § 706.02 creates an "absolute veto" for one spouse upon the other spouse's power to alienate or transfer the homestead. See Wangen v. Leum, 46 Wis. 2d 60, 63, 174 N.W.2d 266 (1970) (citing Cumps v. Kiyo, 104 Wis. 656, 661, 80 N.W. 937 (1899)). Finally, Mary Ann appeals to public policy, arguing that strict compliance with the statute of frauds protects "the roof over the family's heads" as well as innocent third parties.

¶ 13. We first acknowledge that Mary Ann and Robert's premarital agreement predated the Marital Property Act, so the Act does not directly govern the outcome in this case. Wisconsin Stat. § 766.58(12)(a), however, recognizes that a premarital agreement predating the Act, "is enforceable . . . without reference to this chapter . . . ." Mary Ann's reliance on various provisions of the Marital Property Act is therefore questionable, since the Act does not directly apply. Nonetheless, we discuss the Act because this decision will undoubtedly influence future decisions regarding a premarital agreement governed by the Act.

¶ 14. As noted earlier, whether spouses can waive the homestead protection in a premarital agreement is a question of first impression in Wisconsin. While we have addressed issues involving the homestead protection on several occasions,⁵ we have addressed issues related to this case only twice, in Jones v. First National Bank & Trust Co. of Racine, 254 Wis. 258, 36 N.W.2d 95 (1949), and Weber v. Weber, 176 Wis. 2d 1085, 501 N.W.2d 413 (1993). Although both cases provide guidance, we...