Jones v. Golden

• Decision Date: 01 October 2015
• Docket Number: No. SC13–2536.,SC13–2536.
• Citation: 176 So.3d 242
• Parties: Carol Ann JONES, etc., Petitioner, v. Edward I. GOLDEN, etc., Respondent.
• Court: Florida Supreme Court

176 So.3d 242

Carol Ann JONES, etc., Petitioner,

v.Edward I. GOLDEN, etc., Respondent.

No. SC13–2536.

Supreme Court of Florida.

Oct. 1, 2015.

Robin Felicity Hazelof Hazel Law, P.A., Pembroke Pines, FL, for Petitioner.

William H. Glaskoof Golden Glasko & Associates, P.A., Miami, FL, for Respondent.

Gerald Barnette Cope, Jr.of Akerman LLP, Miami, FL; Kenneth Bradley Belland John Wesley Little, IIIof Gunster, West Palm Beach, FL; and Robert W. Goldmanof Goldman Felcoski & Stone, Naples, FL, for Amicus Curiae The Real Property, Probate & Trust Law Section of The Florida Bar.

Opinion

CANADY, J.

In this case we consider the timeliness of a creditor's claim against an estate under Chapter 733, Florida Statutes. In particular, we address whether the claim of a creditor who is not served with a copy of the notice to creditors but whose claim is known or reasonably ascertainable is barred under section 733.702(1), Florida Statutes (2006), if not filed within three months after the first publication of the notice to creditors absent an extension, or whether the claim is timely if filed within two years of the decedent's death under section 733.710, Florida Statutes (2006). We have for review Golden v. Jones,126 So.3d 390, 390 (Fla. 4th DCA 2013), in which the Fourth District Court of Appeal held “that if a known or reasonably ascertainable creditor is never served with a copy of the notice to creditors, the statute of limitations set forth in section 733.702(1), Florida Statutes, never begins to run and the creditor's claim is timely if it is filed within two years of the decedent's death.” The Fourth District certified that its decision is in direct conflict with the decisions of the First and Second District Courts of Appeal in Morgenthau v. Andzel,26 So.3d 628 (Fla. 1st DCA 2009), and Lubee v. Adams,77 So.3d 882 (Fla. 2d DCA 2012), which held that even a reasonably ascertainable creditor who was not served with a copy of the notice to creditors is required to file a claim within three months after the first publication of the notice, unless the creditor files a motion for an extension of time under section 733.702(3)within the two-year period of repose set forth in section 733.710. We have jurisdiction. Seeart. V, § 3(b)(4), Fla. Const.

Because we conclude that the limitations periods prescribed in section 733.702(1)are not applicable to known or reasonably ascertainable creditors who are never served with a copy of the notice to creditors and that the claims of such creditors are timely if filed within two years of the decedent's death under section 733.710, we approve the decision of the Fourth District in Goldenand disapprove the decisions of the First and Second Districts in Morgenthauand Lubee.

I. BACKGROUND

Harry Jones died in February 2007 and his estate was opened in April 2007. In June 2007, a notice to creditors was published as required by section 733.2121, Florida Statutes (2006), but neither Harry's ex-wife, Katherine Jones, nor her guardian¹were ever served with a copy of the notice. In January 2009, however, less than two years after Harry's death, the guardian of Katherine Jones filed a statement of claim in the probate court. The statement of claim asserted that Harry's estate owed Katherine money based on a marital settlement agreement executed in 2002. After Katherine died in 2010, Edward Golden was appointed as the curator of her estate.

In 2012, Golden filed in the probate court a “Petition for Order Declaring Statement of Claim Timely Filed and/or For Enlargement of Time to File Statement of Claim, Nunc Pro Tunc.” Essentially, Golden claimed that Katherine's guardianship was a known or reasonably ascertainable creditor of Harry's estate. Carol Jones, the personal representative of Harry's estate and the Petitioner before this Court, filed a response to Golden's petition asserting that Katherine was not a reasonably ascertainable creditor of Harry's estate and that her guardian's claim was time-barred under sections 733.702and 733.710. After a hearing on the petition, the probate court entered an order striking the guardian's 2009 claim as untimely under sections 733.702, 733.710, on the authority of the decisions of the First and Second District Courts in Morgenthauand Lubee.

On appeal, Golden argued that because the notice to creditors was not properly served on Katherine, a known or reasonably ascertainable creditor, the three-month limitations period set forth in section 733.702(1)never began to run, and the claims of Katherine's guardianship could only be barred by the two-year statute of repose in section 733.710. The Fourth District agreed with Golden, concluding that the probate court erred “in determining that the claim was untimely without first determining whether Katherine was a known or reasonably ascertainable creditor.” Golden,126 So.3d at 391, 393–94. The district court reversed and remanded the case to the probate court to determine whether Katherine or her guardianship was a known or reasonably ascertainable creditor. Id.at 394. The district court further instructed that if the probate court determined that Katherine or her guardianship was indeed a known or reasonably ascertainable creditor, then the “claim was timely, as it was filed prior to the earlier of 30 days after service of notice to creditors (which never occurred) or two years after the decedent's death.” Id.at 393–94. The Fourth District recognized that the decisions of the First District in Lubeeand the Second District in Morgenthauboth reached contrary conclusions and certified conflict with those cases. Id.

II. ANALYSIS

The question before the Court is one of statutory interpretation, which is subject to de novo review. BellSouth Telecommunications, Inc. v. Meeks,863 So.2d 287, 289 (Fla.2003). In the analysis that follows, we examine the relevant statutes and discuss the conflicting district court decisions. We then resolve the conflict by approving the reasoning of the Fourth District in Goldenand concluding that claims of known or reasonably ascertainable creditors of an estate who were not served with a copy of the notice to creditors are timely if filed within two years of the decedent's death.

A. Relevant Statutes

Three sections of the Florida Probate Code are relevant to our resolution of the conflict presented. Section 733.2121outlines the duty of a personal representative to publish a notice to creditors of the pending administration of an estate and to serve a copy of the notice to creditors on known or reasonably ascertainable creditors. It provides, in relevant part:

(1) Unless creditors' claims are otherwise barred by s. 733.710, the personal representative shall promptly publish a notice to creditors. The notice shall contain the name of the decedent, the file number of the estate, the designation and address of the court in which the proceedings are pending, the name and address of the personal representative, the name and address of the personal representative's attorney, and the date of first publication. The notice shall state that creditors must file claims against the estate with the court during the time periods set forth in s. 733.702, or be forever barred.

(2) Publication shall be once a week for 2 consecutive weeks, in a newspaper published in the county where the estate is administered or, if there is no newspaper published in the county, in a newspaper of general circulation in that county.

(3)(a) The personal representative shall promptly make a diligent search to determine the names and addresses of creditors of the decedent who are reasonably ascertainable, even if the claims are unmatured, contingent, or unliquidated, and shall promptly serve a copy of the notice on those creditors. Impracticable and extended searches are not required. Service is not required on any creditor who has filed a claim as provided in this part, whose claim has been paid in full, or whose claim is listed in a personal representative's timely filed proof of claim.

....

(4) Claims are barred as provided in ss. 733.702and 733.710. § 733.2121, Fla. Stat. (2006); see alsoFla. Prob. R. 5.241(a)(“[T]he personal representative shall promptly publish a notice to creditors and serve a copy of the notice on all creditors of the decedent who are reasonably ascertainable.”).

Section 773.702 provides, in relevant part:

(1) [N]o claim or demand against the decedent's estate ... is binding on the estate ... unless filed in the probate proceeding on or before the later of the date that is 3 months after the time of the first publication of the notice to creditors or, as to any creditor required to be served with a copy of the notice to creditors, 30 days after the date of service on the creditor....

....

(3) Any claim not timely filed as provided in this section is barred even though no objection to the claim is filed unless the court extends the time in which the claim may be filed. An extension may be granted only upon grounds of fraud, estoppel, or insufficient notice of the claims period.

....

(6) Nothing in this section shall extend the limitations period set forth in s. 733.710.

§ 733.702, Fla. Stat. (2006)(emphasis added).

Section 733.710provides, in relevant part:

(1) Notwithstanding any other provision of the code, 2 years after the death of a person, neither the decedent's estate, the personal representative, if any, nor the beneficiaries shall be liable for any claim or cause of action against the decedent, whether or not letters of administration have been issued, except as provided in this section.

(2) This section shall not apply to a creditor who has filed a claim pursuant to s. 733.702within 2 years after the person's death, and whose claim has not been paid or otherwise disposed of pursuant to s. 733.705.

§ 733.710, Fla. Stat. (2006).

We have held that section 733.702is a statute of limitations and that section 733.710is a jurisdictional statute of nonclaim, which cannot be waived or extended. May v. Illinois Nat. Ins. Co.,771 So.2d...