Tsuji v. Fleet

• Docket Number: SC2021-1255
• Decision Date: 29 June 2023
• Parties: SAMANTHA ELAINE TSUJI, et al., Petitioners, v. H. BART FLEET, etc., et al., Respondents.
• Court: Florida Supreme Court

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SAMANTHA ELAINE TSUJI, et al., Petitioners,
v.
H. BART FLEET, etc., et al., Respondents.

No. SC2021-1255

Supreme Court of Florida

June 29, 2023

First District - Case No. 1D20-901 (Escambia County)

Bryan S. Gowdy of Creed &Gowdy, P.A., Jacksonville, Florida; and Coy H. Browning of Browning Law Firm, P.A., Fort Walton Beach, Florida, for Petitioners Charles Wiggins and Terrie L. Didier of Beggs & Lane, RLLP, Pensacola, Florida, for Respondents

John S. Mills of Bishop &Mills, PLLC, Jacksonville, Florida, and Courtney Brewer of Bishop & Mills, PLLC, Tallahassee, Florida, for Amici Curiae Probate Attorneys, Sean F. Bogle, John P. Cole, Robert D. Hines, Matthew H. Hinson, Christopher D. Russo, and Kathryn E. Stanfill

Philip M. Burlington of Burlington & Rockenbach, P.A., West Palm Beach, Florida, for Amicus Curiae Florida Justice Association

COURIEL, J.

In the end-often a good place to start-this is a negligence case against a man that was filed more than three years after he died. Section 733.710(1), Florida Statutes (2013), tells us that is too late by over a year. The First District Court of Appeal affirmed the judgment of a trial court saying as much. Tsuji v. Fleet, 326 So.3d 143, 145 (Fla. 1st DCA 2021). It did so notwithstanding a contrary decision of the Fourth District Court of Appeal that had found in another law, section 733.702(4)(b), Florida Statutes (1995), a reason to disregard section 733.710(1)'s prohibition where, as

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here, a plaintiff in a negligence action sought money damages from the decedent's insurer rather than from the decedent himself (or from his estate, his personal representative, or his beneficiaries). Pezzi v. Brown, 697 So.2d 883, 886 (Fla. 4th DCA 1997).^[1]

The First District is correct. Section 733.710(1) extinguishes the claim at issue in this case. That statute is, as we have said before, a "jurisdictional statute of nonclaim" or "statute of repose." That means it "bar[s] actions by setting a time limit within which an action must be filed as measured from a specified act, after which time the cause of action is extinguished." Merkle v. Robinson, 737 So.2d 540, 542 n.6 (Fla. 1999); see also Jones v. Golden, 176 So.3d 242, 248 (Fla. 2015). It follows from this conclusion, the First District also correctly decided, that the decedent's employer was exonerated from vicarious liability claims based on the decedent's negligence. We therefore approve the First District's decision below and disapprove the Fourth District's decision in Pezzi.

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I

On June 11, 2014, Thomas E. Morton Jr. injured the petitioners, Samantha Tsuji and Crystal Williams, in a car accident. At the time of the accident, Morton was working for the Lewis Bear Company (LBC) and driving a company-owned car within the course of his employment. More than three years later, on February 6, 2018, the petitioners sought redress. They sued Morton for negligently operating the car and LBC for vicarious liability under the doctrines of respondeat superior and dangerous instrumentality. But the petitioners soon learned that Morton had died of unrelated causes only weeks after the accident, on June 28, 2014. So the petitioners substituted the personal representative of Morton's estate, H. Bart Fleet, for Morton himself, and reduced their request for damages against the estate to the limits of Morton's casualty insurance coverage.^[2]

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LBC moved for summary judgment. It argued that section 733.710(1) barred the petitioners' claims against the estate because the statute required the petitioners to bring claims within two years of the decedent's death-something the petitioners failed to do. Additionally, LBC, citing Buettner v. Cellular One, Inc., 700 So.2d 48 (Fla. 1st DCA 1997), asserted that because section 733.710(1) exonerated the estate from liability, so too was LBC exonerated from vicarious liability for Morton's negligence.

In response, the petitioners cited Pezzi, 697 So.2d at 886, and this Court's statements approving that decision in May v. Illinois National Insurance Co., 771 So.2d 1143 (Fla. 2000).^[3] The

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petitioners argued that a plaintiff-under section 733.702(4)(b)- can bring claims against a decedent's estate over two years after the decedent's death if the plaintiff seeks recovery from only the decedent's casualty insurance.

The trial court agreed with LBC and ruled that section 733.710(1) barred the petitioners' action against the estate because the petitioners failed to file the claims within two years of Morton's death. And because the petitioners could not file suit to hold the estate liable, LBC also could not be held vicariously liable. The petitioners moved for rehearing, arguing that the trial court overlooked section 733.702(4)(b)'s casualty insurance exception and this Court's decision in May, 771 So.2d at 1157 n.13, 1159. The trial court denied that motion. Tsuji v. Fleet, No. 2018-CA-000218, 2020 WL 3527555 (Fla. 1st Cir. Ct. Feb. 21, 2020).

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On appeal, the First District affirmed, holding that section 733.710(1) bars the petitioners from bringing claims based on Morton's negligence against the estate beyond the two-year time limit, and because of this, the petitioners also could not hold LBC vicariously liable for Morton's negligence. Tsuji, 326 So.3d at 14749.^[4] The petitioners then sought review from this Court.

II

We first address whether section 733.710, Florida Statutes, bars the petitioners' claims against Fleet, the personal representative of Morton's estate.^[5] It does. In reaching that conclusion, we consider the petitioners' arguments about how section 733.702 informs our reading of section 733.710.

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A

When we construe statutes, "our first (and often only) step . . . is to ask what the Legislature actually said in the statute, based upon the common meaning of the words used" when the statute was enacted. Shepard v. State, 259 So.3d 701, 705 (Fla 2018) (quoting Schoeff v RJ Reynolds Tobacco Co, 232 So.3d 294, 313 (Fla 2017) (Lawson, J, concurring in part and dissenting in part)). To derive this common meaning, we must "be mindful of the 'fundamental principle of statutory construction (and, indeed, of language itself) that the meaning of a word cannot be determined in isolation, but must be drawn from the context in which it is used.'" Lab'y Corp. of Am. v. Davis, 339 So.3d 318, 324 (Fla. 2022) (quoting Deal v. United States, 508 U.S. 129, 132 (1993)). And in cases that task us with interpreting multiple provisions, where possible, we "must give full effect to all statutory provisions and construe related statutory provisions in harmony with one another." Forsythe v. Longboat Key Beach Erosion Control Dist., 604 So.2d 452, 455 (Fla. 1992).

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B

Part VII of chapter 733 of the Florida Probate Code has two sets of limits that, together, bring order to creditors' claims against estates: one resides in section 733.702 and the other in section 733.710.

Section 733.702 "fixes the basic time frame for filing of claims in decedent's estates being probated in Florida." May, 771 So.2d at 1155 (quoting Comerica Bank &Tr., F.S.B. v. SDI Operating Partners, L.P., 673 So.2d 163, 165 (Fla. 4th DCA 1996)). It says, at subsection (1):

If not barred by s. 733.710, no claim or demand against the decedent's estate that arose before the death of the decedent . . . and no claim for damages, including, but not limited to, an action founded on fraud or another wrongful act or omission of the decedent, is binding on the estate, on the personal representative, or on any beneficiary unless filed in the probate proceeding on or before the later of the date that is 3 months after the time of the first publication of the notice to creditors or, as to any creditor required to be served with a copy of the notice to creditors, 30 days after the date of service on the creditor ....

§ 733.702(1), Fla. Stat. We have described this as a statute of limitations, May, 771 So.2d at 1150, and it bars untimely claims even if "no objection to the claim is filed." § 733.702(3), Fla. Stat.

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The statute of limitations can be extended only in three circumstances: "fraud, estoppel, or insufficient notice of the claims period." Id.

In subsection (2), the statute provides:

No cause of action, including, but not limited to, an action founded upon fraud or other wrongful act or omission, shall survive the death of the person against whom the claim may be made, whether or not an action is pending at the death of the person, unless a claim is filed within the time periods set forth in this part.

§ 733.702(2), Fla. Stat. This provision sweeps more broadly than subsections (1) and (3), as it incorporates not only the periods outlined in section 733.702, but also those elsewhere in part VII of chapter 733 of the Florida Statutes, such as section 733.710(1).

Subsection (4) then enumerates three exceptions to the limitations found in subsections (1), (2), and (3). Of relevance to this case, the Legislature provided that: "[n]othing in [section 733.702] affects or prevents[,] . . . [t]o the limits of casualty insurance protection only, any proceeding to establish liability that is protected by the casualty insurance." § 733.702(4)(b), Fla. Stat.^[6]

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Importantly, however, subsection (5) makes clear that: "Nothing in [section 733.702] shall extend the limitations period set forth in s. 733.710." § 733.702(5), Fla. Stat.

So we come to subsection (1) of section 733.710, which provides:

Notwithstanding any other provision of the code, 2 years after the death of a person, neither the decedent's estate, the personal representative, if any, nor the beneficiaries shall be liable for any claim or cause of action against the decedent, whether or not letters of administration have been issued, except as provided in this section.

§ 733.710(1), Fla. Stat.

There are only two exceptions to this statute of repose or...