Jones v. Grimes, 22289

• Decision Date: 22 January 1964
• Docket Number: No. 22289,22289
• Citation: 134 S.E.2d 790,219 Ga. 585
• Parties: Ashton Bryan JONES v. T. Ralph GRIMES, Sheriff.
• Court: Georgia Supreme Court

Page 790

134 S.E.2d 790

219 Ga. 585

Ashton Bryan JONES v. T. Ralph GRIMES, Sheriff.

No. 22289.

Supreme Court of Georgia.

Jan. 22, 1964.

Syllabus by the Court

1. (a) While in Georgia there is no constitutional right to bail in cases where conviction has been had, there is a statutory right to bail in such cases.

(b) Excessive bail is the equivalent of a refusal to grant bail, and in such case habeas corpus is an available and appropriate remedy for relief.

2. (a) The amount of bail to be assessed in each criminal case is left to the sound discretion of the trial judge, and in the absence of clear abuse of such discretionary power, his action will not be controlled.

(b) The bail of $20,000 assessed after conviction of the defendant of a misdemeanor is more than is necessary under all the facts and circumstances to reasonably assure the presence of the defendant to serve his sentence, and is excessive.

3. The judgment denying the writ of habeas corpus is affirmed on condition that the court fix bail in amount not to exceed $5,000; otherwise the judgment is reversed.

D.L.Hollowell, Howard Moore, Jr., Atlanta, for plaintiff in error.

William T. Boyd, Sol. Gen., J. Walter LeCraw, Asst. Sol. Gen., Chas. A. Williams, Atlanta, for defendant in error.

MOBLEY, Justice.

The exception is to the judgment of the trial court discharging the writ of habeas corpus and remanding the defendant to the custody of the sheriff.

The question presented, whether the bail fixed by the trial court in this case is excessive, arises from the following facts: The grand jury of Fulton County returned an indictment against Ashton Bryan Jones charging him with a misdemeanor (Code § 26-6901) in that he did interrupt and disturb a congregation of persons lawfully assembled at the First Baptist Church of Atlanta for divine service by loud talking, shouting, and by sitting on the floor of the church. He was tried and found guilty of the offense charged and was given the maximum misdemeanor sentence--12 months on the public works, six months in jail, and $1,000.00. The defendant made a motion for new trial, whereupon the court issued an order of supersedeas and fixed supersedeas bond at $20,000. Thereafter, the defendant filed a petition for the writ of habeas corpus alleging that he was being illegally detained for the reason that bail fixed by the court in the amount of $20,000 was excessive and unreasonable, and that the order of the court fixing excessive bail violates his rights under the due process clauses of the State (Code Ann. § 2-103, Const. art. 1, § 1, par. 3) and Federal Constitution (Code § 1-815) and the provisions of the State and Federal Constitutions forbidding excessive bail. The trial court denied the writ and the exception is to that judgment.

1. (a) Since excessive bail is expressly forbidden by the Constitution of Georgia (Code Ann. § 2-109, Const. art. 1, § 1, par. 9) and by the United States Constitution (Code § 1-808), a determination of whether these provisions have been violated will be determinative of the issue here, without ruling on whether other provisions of the State and Federal Constitutions have been violated.

While in Georgia, as in all other States other than Louisiana (8 C.J.S. Bail § 36(8), p. 85), there is no constitutional right to bail in cases where conviction has been had, there is a statutory right to bail after conviction of a misdemeanor in Georgia Code §§ 6-1006 and 6-1007, and Code § 27-901, and also Reid v. Perkerson, 207 Ga. 27(4), 60 S.E.2d 151. The constitutional prohibitions against excessive bail (cited above) apply in misdemeanor cases after conviction as well as before.

b. Excessive bail is the equivalent of a refusal to grant bail, and in such cases habeas corpus is an available and appropriate remedy for relief. Getting v. State, 166 Ga. 160, 142 S.E. 685; Reid v. Perkerson, 207 Ga. 27(4), 60 S.E.2d 151.

2. The amount of bail to be assessed in each criminal case is left to the sound discretion of the trial judge, and in the absence of clear abuse of such discretionary power, his action will not be controlled. Reid v. Perkerson, 207 Ga. 27(4), 60 S.E.2d 151; Sanders, next friend, v. Paschal, sheriff, 186 Ga. 837(2), 199 S.E. 153.

There are no hard and fast rules for determining what is reasonable bail and what is excessive bail. The question must be determined according to the circumstances of each case.

'The gist of the problem confronting a court in setting the amount of bail is to place the amount high enough to reasonably assure the presence of the defendant when it is required, and at the same time to avoid a figure higher than that reasonably calculated to fulfill this purpose, and therefore excessive.' 8 Am.Jur.2nd p. 824, § 70. Many factors are to be considered in fixing bail, some of which are ability of the defendant to give bail, the seriousness of the offense, penalty, character and reputation of the accused, health, probability of the defendant appearing to serve sentence, forfeiture of other bonds, and whether a fugitive. See 8 Am.Jur.2nd p. 824, § 71.

'In setting the amount of bail, the principal factor considered, to the determination of which most other factors are directed, is the probability of the appearance of the accused, or of his flight to avoid punishment.' See 8 AmJur.2nd p. 825, § 72.

Applying those factors here, what do we have? The defendant was convicted of disturbing divine worship, which though a misdemeanor, is a serious offense. The sentence of the court was 12 months on the public works, 6 months in jail, and...