Jones v. Grinnell Corporation

• Decision Date: 04 January 2001
• Docket Number: No. 99-10402,99-10402
• Citation: 235 F.3d 972
• Parties: (5th Cir. 2001) SHERMAN WALLACE JONES, Plaintiff-Appellant-Cross-Appellee, v. GRINNELL CORPORATION, Defendant-Appellee-Cross-Appellant
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Fifth Circuit

Page 972

235 F.3d 972 (5th Cir. 2001)

SHERMAN WALLACE JONES, Plaintiff-Appellant-Cross-Appellee, v. GRINNELL CORPORATION, Defendant-Appellee-Cross-Appellant.

No. 99-10402

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS, FIFTH CIRCUIT

January 4, 2001

Appeals from the United States District Court For the Northern District of Texas.

Before JOLLY, HIGGINBOTHAM, and EMILIO M. GARZA, Circuit Judges.

EMILIO M. GARZA, Circuit Judge:

Sherman Wallace Jones ("Jones") sued Grinnell Corporation ("Grinnell"), alleging that it had dismissed him in violation of the Texas Commission on Human Rights Act, Tex. Lab. Code Ann. § 21.001, et seq ("Texas Human Rights Act"). A jury ruled in favor of Jones. Grinnell now cross-appeals the district court's denial of its motion for judgment as a matter of law in regards to liability. We vacate the judgment below, finding that Jones' failure to exhaust state administrative remedies precluded the district court from asserting jurisdiction.

Jones had worked as a warehouse manager and supervisor at Grinnell for nine years. On January 31, 1997, Grinnell informed Jones, fifty-seven years old at the time, that it would eliminate his position as part of the company's reorganization plan. Jones filed an age discrimination complaint with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission on February 20.

Under a Worksharing Agreement between the Texas Commission on Human Rights ("TCHR") and the EEOC, an aggrieved employee can initiate the administrative process of both agencies by lodging a charge of discrimination with only the EEOC.¹ Significantly, while Jones addressed the EEOC complaint to both agencies, he failed to check a box in the bottom of the form stating that he wanted the charge to be "filed with both the EEOC and the State or local agency." Jones also did not cite to any state law violated; he only mentioned the federal Age Discrimination in Employment Act. The EEOC apparently did not forward the charge of discrimination to the TCHR. It is unclear from the record if the EEOC merely overlooked forwarding the complaint, or if it interpreted Jones's complaint as not demanding a dual-agency filing.

The EEOC issued a "right to sue" letter on April 27. About two weeks later, Jones filed a lawsuit in state court alleging a violation of the Texas Human Rights Act, a state-based analogue of federal anti-discriminatory statutes. At the time Jones filed his civil action, he had not received a right to sue letter from the TCHR. Grinnell later removed the case to federal court on diversity grounds.

A jury found that Grinnell had dismissed Jones in violation of the Texas Human Rights Act, and awarded him damages. Following the adverse jury verdict, Grinnell filed a motion for judgment as a matter of law ("JMOL"). The magistrate judge denied Grinnell's JMOL motion as to liability, finding, among other things, that the court had subject matter jurisdiction. On the damages issue, the magistrate judge granted Grinnell's JMOL motion and significantly reduced the damages. Jones filed this appeal to dispute the damages decision, while Grinnell cross-appealed the district court's denial of its JMOL motion as to liability.

We review the district court's jurisdictional ruling de novo. See Pederson v. La. State Univ., 23 F.3d 858, 869 (5th Cir. 2000).

This case presents an issue of first impression of whether an EEOC right to sue letter is interchangeable with a TCHR right to sue letter for purposes of filing a civil action.² We hold that it is not. The district court did not have subject matter jurisdiction over the Texas Human Rights Act claim because Jones had not received a right to sue letter from the TCHR or exhausted all state administrative remedies. The Texas Human Rights Act requires the exhaustion of state remedies as a jurisdictional prerequisite. See Schroeder v. Texas Iron Works, Inc., 813 S.W.2d 483, 485 (Tex. 1991) (holding that a complainant "must first exhaust the [Texas Human Rights Act's] administrative remedies prior to bringing a civil action").

The district court erroneously assumed that it could hear a Texas Human Rights Act claim on equitable grounds, despite Jones's failure to exhaust state administrative remedies. That is not the case. If a complainant fails to exhaust his state administrative remedies, the Texas Human Rights Act jurisdictionally bars this court from hearing the case——regardless of equitable and policy concerns. See Zevator v. Methodist Hosp. of Houston, No. CIV.A.94-859, 1995 WL 500637, *2 (S.D. Tex. March 30, 1995) ("TCHR's administrative and procedural requirements [are] jurisdictional and mandatory"); Ridgway's, Inc. v. Payne, 853 S.W.2d 659, 663 (Tex. Ct. App. 1993) ("Failure to exhaust administrative remedies set forth in the Texas Commission of Human Rights Act [citations omitted] constitutes a jurisdictional bar to bringing suit under the Act").

Under the Texas Human Rights Act, a complainant must first exhaust his state administrative remedies and request a right to sue letter from the TCHR before filing a civil action. The exhaustion requirement can be met only two ways: (1) the TCHR does not find reasonable cause and dismisses the complaint; or (2) the TCHR cannot resolve the complaint within 180 days. See Tex. Lab. Code. Ann. § 21.208.³ Jones neither received a right to sue letter from the TCHR nor waited 180 days for the TCHR to resolve his complaint. His failure to exhaust state remedies precludes this civil action.

Furthermore, the EEOC's right to sue letter cannot substitute for a TCHR right to sue letter. Admittedly, under the Worksharing Agreement, the EEOC and the TCHR "designate [each] other as its agent for the purpose of receiving and drafting charges." But the federal-state cooperation does not extend to the exhaustion of administrative remedies. Cf. Housing Auth. v. Valdez, 841 S.W.2d 850, 866 (Tex. Ct. App. 1992) (noting the difference between "filing and pursuing a complaint with the Commission").

Indeed, the Worksharing Agreement expressly...