Jones v. IC Bus, LLC

Citation626 S.W.3d 661
Decision Date09 October 2020
Docket Number NO. 2018-CA-1443-MR,NO. 2018-CA-1440-MR, NO. 2018-CA-1442-MR, NO. 2018-CA-1446-MR, NO. 2018-CA-1444-MR, NO. 2018-CA-1445-MR,2018-CA-1440-MR
CourtCourt of Appeals of Kentucky
Parties Brayden Michael JONES, a Minor, BY AND THROUGH His Mother and Duly Appointed Conservator, Bobbie Jean JONES, Appellant v. IC BUS, LLC; Ron Deitz and Kelly Deitz, Individually, and as Co -Administrators for the Estate of Ryder Deitz; Chris Tuttle and Stacy Tuttle, Individually, and as Co -Administrators for the Estate of Caroline Tuttle; Veronica Landa and Miguel Landa, Individually, and as Parents and Guardians of Jose M. Ardon-Landa, a Minor; Samantha Robles, as Parent and Guardian of Mariah Robles, a Minor; Tina Gividen; Tanya Faulkner, Individually, and as Guardian for Jordan Raisor, a Minor; and Kentucky Employers Mutual Insurance Company, Appellees Chris Tuttle and Stacy Tuttle, Individually, and as Co -Administrators for the Estate of Caroline Tuttle, Appellants v. IC Bus, LLC, Appellee Ron Deitz and Kelly Deitz, Individually, and as Co -Administrators for the Estate of Ryder Deitz, Appellants v. IC Bus, LLC, Appellee Tanya Faulkner, Individually, and as Guardian for Jordan Raisor, a Minor, Appellant v. IC Bus, LLC, Appellee Veronica Landa and Miguel Landa, Individually, and as Parents and Guardians of Jose M. Ardon-Landa, a Minor, Appellants v. IC Bus, LLC, Appellee Samantha Robles, as Parent and Guardian of Mariah Robles, a Minor, Appellant v. IC Bus, LLC, Appellee

BRIEFS FOR APPELLANT BRAYDEN MICHAEL JONES, A MINOR, BY AND THROUGH HIS MOTHER AND DULY APPOINTED CONSERVATOR, BOBBIE JEAN JONES: Marcus S. Carey, Erlanger, Kentucky.

BRIEFS FOR APPELLANTS CHRIS TUTTLE AND STACY TUTTLE, INDIVIDUALLY, AND AS CO-ADMINISTRATORS FOR THE ESTATE OF CAROLINE TUTTLE; RON DEITZ AND KELLY DEITZ, INDIVIDUALLY, AND AS CO-ADMINISTRATORS FOR THE ESTATE OF RYDER DEITZ; TANYA FAULKNER, INDIVIDUALLY, AND AS GUARDIAN FOR JORDAN RAISOR, A MINOR; VERONICA LANDA AND MIGUEL LANDA, INDIVIDUALLY, AND AS PARENTS AND GUARDIANS OF JOSE M. ARDON-LANDA, A MINOR; AND SAMANTHA ROBLES, AS PARENT AND GUARDIAN OF MARIAH ROBLES: Gary R. Hillerich, Kevin C. Burke, Jamie K. Neal, Lawrence Young, T.J. Smith, Louisville, Kentucky, Dwight Preston, Elizabethtown, Kentucky.

BRIEFS FOR APPELLEE: Elaine M. Stoll, Douglas W. Rennie, Gregory A. Kendall, Timothy C. Ammer, Matthew E. Stubbs, Lindsay M. Upton, Cincinnati, Ohio.

BEFORE: CLAYTON, CHIEF JUDGE; ACREE AND DIXON, JUDGES.

OPINION

DIXON, JUDGE:

Brayden Michael Jones, a minor, by and through his mother and duly appointed conservator, Bobbie Jean Jones; Chris Tuttle and Stacy Tuttle, individually, and as co-administrators of the estate of Caroline Tuttle; Ron Deitz and Kelly Deitz, individually, and as co-administrators of the estate of Ryder Deitz; Tanya Faulkner, individually, and as guardian for Jordan Raisor, a minor; Veronica Landa and Miguel Landa, individually, and as parents and guardians of Jose M. Ardon-Landa, a minor; and Samantha Robles, as parent and guardian of Mariah Robles, a minor (collectively "Appellants"), appeal various orders and judgments entered by the Carroll Circuit Court. Following review of the record, briefs, and law, we affirm in part, reverse in part, vacate in part, and remand.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

This action arises from a tragic school bus accident occurring on October 29, 2012, involving a bus manufactured by IC Bus, LLC. On that date, the school bus driver inexplicably left the roadway, overcorrected, and careened off the road, causing the bus to turn on its side and strike a large tree. The impact collapsed the roof nearly to the floor in a v-shape, crushing and killing two of its preschool occupants and injuring several others.

The procedural history of this case is lengthy and complex; therefore, we will only discuss the pertinent portions herein. Litigation began two weeks after the crash when the parents of two of the children injured, Cruz and Hollingsworth (who did not join in this appeal), sued Laura Reed, the driver of the bus, and various school officials. Thereafter, in the summer of 2013, the Tuttles and Deitzes, parents of the two children killed in the crash, and Robles and the Landas, parents of two of the children injured, each separately filed suit for negligence only against Reed. Reed subsequently filed a third-party complaint against IC Bus and later moved to consolidate all of the separate actions brought against her. The trial court granted the motion "for discovery purposes." Raisor later filed an intervening complaint in the consolidated action. Eventually, all of the parties filed amended complaints, suing IC Bus for various claims in strict liability, breach of implied warranties, failure to warn of inherent dangers, and negligence.

In March 2014, Reed moved the trial court to join Jones, maintaining he was a necessary party pursuant to Kentucky Rules of Civil Procedure (CR) 19.01. On June 9, 2014, after the matter was fully briefed, the trial court ordered Jones to file an intervening complaint.

Prior to trial, all claims against all defendants except IC Bus were resolved. A jury trial then commenced on Appellants’ claims against IC Bus on April 23, 2018.

At trial, Appellants called three witnesses to support their design defect and failure to warn claims: Dr. Tyler Kress, P.E., an expert in engineering safety; Erin Shipp, P.E., a bus design engineer; and Dr. David Porta, a forensic trauma consultant and trauma reconstructionist. At the close of Appellants’ proof, IC Bus moved for directed verdict, which the trial court granted on all issues except Appellants’ product liability claim for defective bus clips. At the end of the two-and-a-half-week trial, the jury returned a defense verdict and the trial court entered judgment consistent therewith. Additionally, the court ordered that Appellants pay IC Bus's costs.

Subsequently, Appellants moved the trial court for a new trial and for judgment notwithstanding the verdict, alleging various trial court errors. Appellants’ motion was denied, and these appeals followed. Because Jones's appeal and the remaining appeals require separate analysis, we begin our review with Jones.

I. JONES'S APPEAL

Jones asserts the trial court erred by joining him as a party to this action and by ordering him to file an intervening complaint. This issue appears to be one of first impression in our Commonwealth.1

As previously noted, Jones was joined as a party to the litigation upon Reed's CR 19.01 motion. This rule permits joinder of additional parties to a lawsuit under certain limited circumstances. However, if the party sought to be joined refuses, as Jones attempted to do herein, the rule permits the trial court to join that party as a defendant, if necessary and if feasible.

The trial court initially merely joined Jones as a party under the rule. ROA2 at 2976. Thereafter, Reed's counsel sent a letter to Jones's counsel informing him of the court's order joining Jones as a party to the litigation. However, he went on to state, "[i]f you intend to file a Complaint ... we request you do so in the next twenty (20) days. Otherwise, we plan to move for default judgment...." ROA at 3264 (emphasis added). Jones then moved the court, without submitting to its jurisdiction, to clarify its order "to specifically address what, if any, obligations [Jones] has, which defendants he is required to sue, what facts he is entitled to rely upon in order to justify that suit and which claims he must make" so as to comply with the requirements of CR 11.3 In response, Reed asked the trial court to compel Jones's participation in the case by filing a complaint , if any, within thirty days. ROA at 3252. After hearing the parties’ arguments, the trial court denied Jones's motion, granted Reed's motion, and ordered Jones to file his complaint within forty days. ROA at 3316. Jones appealed that order, but his appeal was dismissed as interlocutory. Therefore, in compliance with the trial court's order, on September 15, 2014, Jones filed his complaint against Reed and IC Bus. However, Jones continued to dispute his joinder throughout the litigation.

The issues now before us are: (1) under what circumstances may a trial court join a non-party, against their will, in pending litigation; (2) in what capacity may they be joined; and (3) how the infancy of the party sought to be joined might affect these decisions.

As to joinder, we are mindful:

The decision as to necessary or indispensable parties rests within the sound authority of the trial judge in order to effectuate the objectives of the rule. The exercise of discretion by the trial judge should be on a case-by-case basis rather than on arbitrary considerations and such a decision should not be reversed unless it is clearly erroneous or affects the substantial rights of the parties.

Commonwealth, Dep't of Fish & Wildlife Res. v. Garner , 896 S.W.2d 10, 14 (Ky. 1995) (quoting West v. Goldstein , 830 S.W.2d 379 (Ky. 1992) ).

Resolving Jones's argument of error requires us to correctly interpret joinder under CR 19.01, entitled "Persons to be joined if feasible." The rule provides:

A person who is subject to service of process, either personal or constructive, shall be joined as a party in the action if (a) in his absence complete relief cannot be accorded among those already parties, or (b) he claims an interest relating to the subject of the action and is so situated that the disposition of the action in his absence may (i) as a practical matter impair or impede his ability to protect that interest or (ii) leave any of the persons already parties subject to a substantial risk of incurring double, multiple, or otherwise inconsistent obligations by reason of his claimed interest. If he has not been so joined, the court shall order that he be made a party. If he should join as a plaintiff but refuses to do so, he may be made a defendant, or, in a proper case
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