Jones v. Jones

• Decision Date: 14 September 1966
• Parties: *Mary JONES, mother and guardian ad litem of *Helen Jones, Petitioner, v. *Jack JONES, Respondent. Family Court, City of New York, New York County
• Court: New York Family Court

Page 661

273 N.Y.S.2d 661

51 Misc.2d 610

In the Matter of a Proceeding for Support Under Article 4 of

the Family Court Act *Mary JONES, mother and guardian ad litem of *Helen Jones, Petitioner, v. *Jack JONES, Respondent.

Family Court, City of New York, New York County.

Sept. 14, 1966.

Charles, Trynin, New York City, for petitioner.

Lehman, Goldmark, Rohrlich & Solomon, New York City (Max Regov, New York City, of counsel), for respondent.

JACOB T. ZUKERMAN, Judge.

This case presents a novel question raised by the petitioner in response to the motion of the respondent to dismiss this petition for support of an adult child who is mentally disabled.

The motion to dismiss was made in accordance with the recently enacted Chapter 256, Laws of 1966 which amended, among other laws, Section 101, Social Welfare Law and Sections 413, 415 and 443, Family Court Act, effective April 30, 1966. These amendments eliminate the responsibility of a parent for the support of any child over the age of 21. The petitioner opposes the motion to dismiss on the grounds that such dismissal would be a deprivation of equal protection of the law and that it would deprive her of a vested right. The factual situation.

The petitioner, on behalf of her daughter, aged 24, petitioned this court on February 16, 1965 for an order for the support by the respondent of the daughter, in accordance with Aritcle 4, Family Court Act. Petitioner relied on Section 443, subdivision (b) and on Section 415, Family Court Act and on Section 101, Social Welfare Law.

Section 415, Family Court Act, at the time of filing of the petition, read as follows: (in part) 'The husband, wife, father, mother or child of a recipient of public assistance or care or of a person liable to become in need thereof, if of sufficient ability, is responsible for the support of such person.'

As a result of Chapter 256, Laws 1966, the same portion of Section 415 now reads:

'The spouse or parent of a recipient of public assistance or care or of a person liable to become in need thereof or of a patient an an institution of the department of mental hygiene, if of sufficient ability, is responsible for the support of such person or patient, Provided that a parent shall be responsible only for the support of his minor child.' (Italics for emphasis).

Section 443(b) Family Court Act provided as follows at the time of filing of this petition:

'(b) An order of support under this section may not run beyond the child's minority. The court, may, however, extend the duration of such an order beyond the child's minority if the child suffers physical or mental disabilities or if there are other exceptional circumstances that warrant such extension.'

Under Chapter 256 section (b) was eliminated. The full section 443 now reads:

'If the court finds after a hearing that the father is chargeable under section four hundred thirteen with the support of his Minor child and is possessed of sufficient means or able to earn such means, the court shall make an order requiring the father to pay weekly or at other fixed periods a fair and reasonable sum for or towards the support of Such child.'

Section 101, Social Welfare Law, in part, read at the time of filing as follows:

'1. The husband, wife, father, mother or child of a recipient of public assistance or care or of a person liable to become in need thereof shall, if of sufficient ability, be responsible for the support of such person. * * *' As a result of Chapter 256, Laws 1966, effective April 30, 1966, the same portion of Section 101 now reads:

'1. The spouse or parent of a recipient of public assistance or care or of a person liable to become in need thereof shall, if of sufficient ability, be responsible for the support of such person, Provided that a parent shall be responsible only for the support of a minor child.' (Italics for emphasis).

On June 11, 1965, an order of support was made directing the respondent to make certain monthly payments 'to and including the payment due January 1st, 1966, when the payments under this order shall automatically terminate'. It was further ordered 'that if the petitioner and/or *Helen Jones feel that a support order beyond January 1st, 1966 is required and necessary, they, or either of them, may after December 1st, 1965 request that the case be rescheduled for a hearing on any available date after January 1st, 1966 for a reevaluation of the necessity of continued support. At such hearing the petitioner has the burden of clearly establishing such continued need and the extent thereof'.

By notice, dated December 30th, 1965, petitioner requested 'that the case be rescheduled for a hearing on an available date after January 1st, 1966 for a reevaluation of the necessity of continued support of *Helen Jones by the respondent'.

The rescheduled hearing on January 18, 1966 was adjourned pending an examination of ^* Helen Jones by a court appointed psychiatrist. Respondent at such hearing informed the court that he would continue voluntary temporary payments to the petitioner, without prejudice, until such time as there was a final determination by this court. At the adjourned hearing on June 20, 1966 the matter was set down for further hearing on September 9th, 1966 with the right of respondent to move for a dismissal of the petition before such date.

On July 12th, 1966, the respondent moved to dismiss on the basis of Chapter 256, Laws of 1966.

The petitioner contends that 'such dismissal would deprive her of the equal protection of the laws and would be violative of the Federal and New York State Constitutions. Objection is also made based on the due process clauses of these constitutions, amplified by Sections 93 and 94 of the New York General Construction Law, which preclude the application of said Chapter 256 to destroy rights vested in petitioner by the filing of the petition and the judgment made herein on June 11th, 1965 * * *.'

The matter of 'equal protection of the law'.

In support of her contention, petitioner points out that Chapter 256 did not repeal, amend, modify or otherwise affect Section 115(c), Family Court Act or Article 3--A (Uniform Support of Dependents Law) Domestic Relations Law. She argues that since, under the Uniform Support of Dependents Law, a disabled child over 21 living in another state would be entitled to support from a father living in New York, while under Chapter 256, Laws 1966, a similar child living in New York would no longer be entitled to such support, this would deny the equal protection of the law to the petitioner herein.

I hold that the equal protection of the law to the petitioner would not be violated. It would appear to me that the failure to also amend Article 3A, Domestic Relations Law, was one of omission rather than an intention to preserve this responsibility. Elimination of responsibility of parents for an adult child who is disabled was clearly intended as a matter of public policy. Governor Rockefeller in asking for the enactment of the law (McKinney's Session Law News, 1966, p. A215, at A216) stated:

'* * * The legislation I have submitted * * * limits the class of relatives responsible for such support by eliminating the financial responsibility of a parent for an adult child who is blind or disabled. Furthermore, these limitations are applied not only to the new medical assistance program, but to all public welfare assistance programs, and to cases where care is provided pursuant to the Mental Hygiene Law.

'These far reaching limitations on the financial responsibility of relatives for support of the needy will lift an often heavy burden on those obligated to pay for assistance under existing State Laws. Experience has shown that the financial responsibility of a broad class of relatives, imposed by statute, is more often a destructive, rather than cohesive, factor in family unity * * *'.

There is no reason to assume that the legislature intended to hold a New York parent responsible for his adult child's support in another state in the light of its decision to eliminate such responsibility for similar children living within the state.

Furthermore, I believe that the listing of 'Persons legally liable for support of dependents' in Article 3--A, Section 32, Domestic Relations Law, is just that--a restatement of the law of responsibility for support of dependents, based on other sections of the Domestic Relations Law. This statement was undoubtedly included within Article 3--a, for the purpose of assisting in the interstate administration of the reciprocal support statutes of the various states.

For purposes of clarity, it would be most helpful if the state legislature did specifically amend Section 32, Domestic Relations Law, to eliminate subdivision 4 and also Section 31, Domestic Relations Law to modify subdivision 3, in accordance with the expressed intent of Chapter 256, Laws 1966.

It should be noted, too, that Chapter 256, in eliminating responsibility of the parent to support a disabled child over 21, places responsibility upon the state to provide support for such a...