Jones v. Leslie

• Decision Date: 07 December 1910
• Citation: 61 Wash. 107,112 P. 81
• Parties: JONES v. LESLIE et al.
• Court: Washington Supreme Court

112 P. 81

61 Wash. 107

JONES v. LESLIE et al.

Supreme Court of Washington

December 7, 1910

Department 2. Appeal from Superior Court, King County; Wilson R. Gay Judge.

Action by C. R. Jones, by his guardian ad litem, against John C Leslie, the Leslie Power Company, L. S. Winans, and the Seattle Cracker & Candy Company. From a judgment for defendants, plaintiff appeals. Reversed and remanded.

John E Humphries and George B. Cole, for appellant.

Farrell Kane & Stratton, for respondents.

DUNBAR J.

C. R. Jones, by his guardian ad litem, John Jones, complains of the defendants John C. Leslie, Leslie Power Company, Incorporated, L. S. Winans, and Seattle Cracker & Candy Company, a corporation, and alleges, in substance, that on or about the 12th day of August, 1909, and long before said time, the plaintiff, C. H. Jones, was employed by the defendant Leslie Power Company as a teamster, and was driving a wagon and team for said defendant; that some time prior to the 12th day of August plaintiff made an oral contract and agreement with Steeves Bros., who were then in the teaming business in Seattle and who were employed as teamsters by the defendant cracker company, to work as a teamster for Steeves Bros. for a stipulated price for an indefinite period; that on or about the 12th day of August, 1909, the defendants J. C. Leslie and Leslie Power Company, Incorporated, notified the cracker company that, if the cracker company permitted Steeves Brothers to employ Jones, the Leslie Power Company would withdraw all its patronage from the cracker company, and refuse to trade with it further; that the cracker company, for the purpose of keeping the plaintiff from being employed by Steeves Bros., connived, confederated, and conspired together and notified Steeves Bros. that they must not employ this plaintiff as a teamster at all, and caused Steeves Bros. to refuse to employ the plaintiff as a teamster; that the said defendants then and there wrongfully and unlawfully, and against the rights of plaintiff, blacklisted the plaintiff with Steeves Bros.; that, by reason of the things aforesaid, the plaintiff was thrown out of employment, and remained idle from the 12th day of August, 1909, until the 27th day of September, 1909, and alleged specific damages. The answer of all the defendants was practically a denial. On motion a nonsuit was granted in favor of defendants L. S. Winans and the Seattle Cracker & Candy Company, and at the close of all the testimony the court sustained a motion of the defendants J. C. Leslie and the Leslie Power Company for judgment in their favor, and dismissed the case as to all the defendants, entering judgment in their favor and against the plaintiff. From this judgment, this appeal is taken.

The testimony in this case is somewhat conflicting. It will be necessary, therefore, to examine only the testimony of the appellant, plaintiff below, to determine whether or not the court erred in granting the motion of nonsuit. We may state here that we think there was no error of the court in granting the motion in favor of Winans and the Seattle Cracker & Candy Company, as there is no indication of any conspiracy in the case. It seems that the appellant, young Jones, was working for the Seattle Cracker Company and Steeves Bros.; that during the summer vacation he was laid off, so that some relative who was at home during the vacation could take the job, with the understanding that the appellant should have the advantage of the first opening. He then went to work for the respondent Leslie Power Company, and in time he was notified that he could have work again with Steeves Bros. or the cracker company. One of the employés of the respondent Leslie Power Company informed Mr. Leslie, the president and manager of that company, that Jones was going to quit. Mr. Leslie called him in and asked him about it, and he told him that he was going to quit, as he had a better job at more wages. Leslie wanted to know of him if he was going to leave him in the lurch, and the appellant told him that he could not give him any more time, that he would commence working for his new employer on Monday the 15th, whereupon Leslie told appellant that, if he left him in the lurch, he would see that he never got the job with the cracker company, and he immediately repaired to the telephone, and sent the following message to the cracker company: 'Q. State what he said over the telephone. A. He told him that he thought I didn't do him right. He said that he was a good customer there, and he said, 'You know it.' He said, 'If you hire him, I will certainly not buy any more crackers from you.'' Another witness testified to hearing substantially the same message, and there is some evidence from the guardian Jones and a man who was with him that Leslie admitted having tried to injure the appellant for the reason that he had tried to injure him, or, as he expressed it, 'had done him dirt.' The message which Leslie testifies to sending was of a different character, and would probably not be actionable. But the determination of the credibility of the witnesses was a matter resting entirely with the jury. It also appears from the testimony that the appellant was discharged by Steeves Bros. through the interposition of the cracker company, for the reason that they did not want to lose a good customer.

This presents a case here which is purely a question of law. It would be well to remember in the beginning that it is fundamental that a man has a right to be protected in his property. This was the doctrine of the common law, is, and always has been, the law in every civilized nation. It is of necessity one of the fundamental principles of government, the protection of property being largely one of the objects of government. For the protection of life, liberty, and property, men have yielded up their natural rights and established governments. Is, then, the right of employment in a laboring man property? That it is we think cannot be questioned. The property of the capitalist is his gold and silver, his bonds, credit, etc., for in these he deals and makes his living. For the same reason, the property of the merchant is his goods. And every man's trade or profession is his property, because it is his means of livelihood, because, through its agency, he maintains himself and family, and is enabled to add his share towards the expenses of maintaining the government. Can it be said with any degree of sense or justice that the property which a man has in his labor which is the foundation of all property and which is the only capital of so large a majority of the citizens of our country is not property; or, at least, not that character of property which can demand the boon of protection from the government? We think not. To destroy this property, or to prevent one from contracting it or exchanging it for the necessities of life, is not only an invasion of a private right, but is an injury to the public, for it tends to produce pauperism and crime. This relief has been granted to employers in many forms. Workmen have been enjoined from collecting about the employer's place of business for the purpose of ridiculing his employés with a view of causing them to stop work; and many other demonstrations of the same character and purpose have been enjoined, of course, on the theory that it was an unlawful act. To deny the same relief to the employé under similar circumstances would be a reproach to the law. It is true that in many cases the element of conspiracy existed, but the principle is the same. Nor have the courts refused this protection to employés, but in a vast majority of cases of the kind it has been held that a legal right had been invaded, and the law imposed a liability.

There are a few cases that might possibly sustain the respondents' contention. Those which they have cited however, we think are clearly not in point, or are easily distinguished from the case at bar. Benjamin v. Wheeler, 8 Gray (Mass.) 409, and Randall v. Hazelton, 12 Allen (Mass.) 415, do not deal in any way with the principle under discussion here. In Heywood v. Tillson, 75 Me. 225, 46 Am. Rep. 373, it was held that an employer had a right to refuse to employ, or to retain in his service, any person renting certain specified premises; and the owner of such premises had no cause of action against him for the exercise of such right, though such refusal was through malice or ill will to the owner. An examination of that case shows that there were conditions which the defendant had a right to take into consideration in employing men, and which no one else had a right to question; that if his employés remained in the house, the rent of which was the subject of controversy, the renting of the house being the business of an enemy of the employer, it was liable to affect the character of the workmen and their attitude towards their employer. So many other questions entered into the consideration of that case that it seems to us it has no bearing on the case at bar. Raycroft v. Tayntor, 68 Vt. 219, 35 A. 53. 33 L. R. A. 225, 54 Am. St. Rep. 882, was another case of somewhat the same character. There a superintendent of a quarry refused to permit another to take stone therefrom unless the latter discharged a certain employé, and it was held that he was not liable for causing such discharge. But, whether the court wisely decided this case on the circumstances controlling it, it was evident that the court proceeded upon the theory that there was no lawful right invaded in that particular case, and that, where the lawful right was invaded, an action would...