State v. Doe (In re Doe)
| Docket Number | 49496 |
| Decision Date | 25 May 2023 |
| Parties | In the Matter of the Hospitalization of: John Doe (2022-04). v. JOHN DOE (2022-04), Subject-Appellant. STATE OF IDAHO, Petitioner-Respondent, |
| Court | Idaho Court of Appeals |
Appeal from the District Court of the Fourth Judicial District State of Idaho, Ada County. Hon. Gerald F. Schroeder District Judge. Hon. James A. Schiller, Magistrate.
Appeal from decision of the district court, on intermediate appeal from the magistrate court, affirming order for commitment dismissed.
Anthony R. Geddes, Ada County Public Defender; Craig Cannon, Deputy Public Defender, Boise, for appellant. Craig Cannon argued.
Hon. Raul R. Labrador, Attorney General; Kenneth K. Jorgensen, Deputy Attorney General, Boise, for respondent. Kenneth K. Jorgensen argued.
John Doe (2022-04) appeals from a decision of the district court, on intermediate appeal from the magistrate court, affirming an order for commitment. For the reasons stated below, we dismiss the appeal as moot.
Believing Doe was gravely disabled due to mental illness, a physician reported that Doe was found weighing approximately ninety pounds, despite being over six feet tall, "with one leg swollen with maggots," and had not showered or removed his footwear in months at the direction of "voices." Subsequently, three designated examiners evaluated Doe, each certifying that schizophrenia gravely disabled Doe. Because Doe rejected hospitalization, the State filed a petition to involuntarily commit him to the custody of the Idaho Department of Health and Welfare. Following a hearing, the magistrate court entered an order involuntarily committing Doe to the Department's custody.
Doe appealed the order for commitment to the district court, arguing the magistrate court clearly erred by finding that he "refused medical treatment on a voluntary basis." Doe further argued that the magistrate court abused its discretion by refusing to allow him to make a closing argument and by not considering the "alternatives" and "exemptions" to involuntary commitment as required by statute. Approximately two weeks after Doe initiated the intermediate appeal, his involuntary commitment terminated. The district court determined that this rendered the issues Doe raised moot but concluded that the public interest exception to the mootness doctrine applied and addressed Doe's intermediate appeal on the merits. Ultimately, the district court affirmed the order for commitment, concluding that the magistrate court's unsupported finding that Doe voluntarily refused medical treatment was harmless and that Doe failed to show that the magistrate court otherwise abused its discretion. Doe again appeals.
For an appeal from the district court, sitting in its appellate capacity over a case from the magistrate court, we review the record to determine whether there is substantial and competent evidence to support the magistrate court's findings of fact and whether the magistrate court's conclusions of law follow from those findings. Pelayo v. Pelayo, 154 Idaho 855, 858-59, 303 P.2d 214, 217-18 (2013). However, as a matter of appellate procedure, our disposition of the appeal will affirm or reverse the decision of the district court. Id. Thus, we review the magistrate court's findings and conclusions, whether the district court affirmed or reversed the magistrate court and the basis therefor, and either affirm or reverse the district court.
Doe argues that the magistrate court's failure to "make a record of its reasoning" and refusal to "allow argument" violated due process. Doe further argues that the magistrate court's failure to show on the record that it considered alternatives and exemptions to involuntary commitment constitutes an abuse of discretion. The State responds that Doe's arguments are moot, unpreserved, and otherwise fail on the merits. We hold that the termination of Doe's involuntary commitment rendered the issues he raises on appeal moot. Because Doe has also failed to show that an exception to the mootness doctrine applies, we dismiss Doe's appeal.
The State argues Doe's appeal is moot because his involuntary commitment terminated before resolution of his intermediate appeal. The general rule of the mootness doctrine is that, to be justiciable, an issue must present a real and substantial controversy that is capable of resolution by a judicial decree of specific relief. Freeman v. Idaho Dep't of Corr., 138 Idaho 872, 875, 71 P.3d 471, 474 (Ct. App. 2003). In the context of an appeal, if the issues presented are no longer live at the time the appellate court hears oral argument and the parties lack a legally cognizable interest in the outcome, mootness precludes appellate review. Id. A party lacks a legally cognizable interest in the outcome when even a favorable judicial decision would not result in relief. Id. An otherwise moot issue, however, remains justiciable if it falls within one of three recognized exceptions to the mootness doctrine. Id. Those three exceptions are:
(1) when there is the possibility of collateral legal consequences imposed on the person raising the issue; (2) when the challenged conduct is likely to evade judicial review and thus is capable of repetition; and (3) when an otherwise moot issue raises concerns of substantial public interest.
Ameritel Inns, Inc. v. Greater Boise Auditorium Dist., 141 Idaho 849, 851-52, 119 P.3d 624, 626-27 (2005). If an exception applies, this Court has the discretion to consider an appeal despite the absence of a live controversy between the litigants. Selkirk Seed Co. v. Forney, 134 Idaho 98, 101, 996 P.2d 798, 801 (2000). The party asserting a case is moot bears the burden of establishing mootness, and the opposing party bears the burden of showing that an exception applies. See, e.g., Honeywell Int'l, Inc. v. Nuclear Regulatory Comm'n, 628 F.3d 568, 576 (D.C. Cir. 2010); Ramirez v. Sanchez Ramos, 438 F.3d 92, 100 (1st Cir. 2006).[1]
Doe does not challenge the magistrate court's finding that he is mentally ill. Rather, Doe challenges the decision to involuntarily commit him for treatment of that mental illness, arguing that alleged procedural defects relevant to that decision constitute reversible error. Because Doe's involuntary commitment has terminated, the mootness doctrine typically would bar consideration of his claims as no longer justiciable because even a favorable resolution of them could not produce any relief for him. However, Doe asserts that all three exceptions to mootness apply to this appeal. We address each exception in turn.
According to Doe, the district court correctly held that the public interest exception applies because involuntary commitments are an issue of substantial public interest. Notably, the district court concluded that the public interest exception applied to the issue of whether the magistrate court abused its discretion--not the due process issue that Doe raised for the first time in his reply brief.[2] To the contrary, the district court's decision on intermediate appeal does not address Doe's due process arguments. Regardless, we hold that the issues Doe raises do not warrant application of the public interest exception.
In support of applying the public interest exception, the district court cited Bradshaw v. State, 120 Idaho 429, 816 P.2d 986 (1991). In Bradshaw, the Idaho Supreme Court considered whether the termination of a patient's involuntary commitment rendered moot the appeal of an order for commitment. Despite holding that the appeal was moot, the opinion in Bradshaw concluded that "public interest concerns" "in the context of reviewing involuntary commitments" warranted review on the merits. Id. at 432, 816 P.2d at 989. In support of this conclusion, the Court cited cases from other jurisdictions "recogniz[ing] the social stigma and potential collateral consequences that may accompany an involuntary commitment." Id.
However, Bradshaw does not compel a categorical application of the public interest exception to all appeals from involuntary commitment orders that are otherwise moot. Despite referencing the social stigma and potential collateral consequences of involuntary commitment, a comprehensive reading of Bradshaw reveals that issues beyond social stigma and potential collateral consequences warranted a review of the merits.[3] For example, the opinion in Bradshaw expressly indicates it would consider the issue of "whether individuals will be required to receive medication against their will while committed" to provide "future direction and guidance." Id. The opinion holds that a finding that a patient lacks capacity to make informed decisions about treatment requires support from clear and convincing evidence, even though the statutory scheme governing involuntary commitment does not expressly require such. Id. at 433, 816 P.3d at 990. Additionally, Bradshaw holds that a trial court cannot consider certificates by designated examiners filed with the court but not formally admitted into evidence during a commitment hearing. Id. Authoritative determination of these issues provides useful guidance to participants in involuntary commitment proceedings.
As indicated, an appellate court provides future direction and guidance through the authoritative determination of issues presented by parties. Appellate court review, however, is generally limited to the evidence, theories, and arguments that were presented below. Obenchain v. McAlvain Const Inc., 143 Idaho 56, 57, 137 P.3d 443, 444 (2006). This limitation is also sometimes referred to as "error preservation." Ordinarily, an appellate court will not address an issue that is not properly preserved for...
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