Jones v. Melvin
| Decision Date | 02 January 1936 |
| Citation | 199 N.E. 392,293 Mass. 9 |
| Parties | JONES v. MELVIN. |
| Court | United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
Exceptions from Superior Court, Suffolk County; Sisk, Judge.
Action of tort by Aida E. Jones against Judson A. Melvin. There was verdict in superior court for the plaintiff in the sum of $1,500, and both parties saved exceptions.
Plaintiff's exceptions waived, and defendant's exceptions overruled.E. O. Proctor, of Boston, for plaintiff.
J. J. Mulcahy, of Boston, for defendant.
The plaintiff and her husband were invited by the defendant to take a ride in his automobile which he operated while the plaintiff and her husband rode in the rumble seat. It was proceeding westerly on Beacon street, Brookline, about half past nine in the evening when a police officer signalled the defendant to slow down, jumped upon the running board and told the defendant to ‘Chase that car,’ indicating an automobile which had come out from an intersecting street at the right, crossed the car tracks in the center of the street, then turned to its left and was proceeding easterly down Beacon street. The defendant immediately turned and followed. A third automobile joined in the chase and passed the defendant's automobile. There was no evidence of other traffic in the street. The three automobiles continued on Beacon street to Regent Circle, an intersecting private way running north and south, into which the pursued automobile turned and the other two followed. There was evidence that while in Regent Circle, the defendant's automobile came in contract with the curbstone and the plaintiff was injured.
The first count of the plaintiff's declaration alleged negligence of the defendant and the second count gross negligence. At the close of the evidence at the trial in the Superior Court the judge directed a verdict for the defendant on the first count and denied a motion of the defendant for a directed verdict on the second count. The jury returned a verdict for the plaintiff on the second count. The case is before us on the defendant's exception to the failure of the judge to grant his motion for a directed verdict on the second count and on the plaintiff's exceptions to the direction of a verdict for the defendant on the first count and to the failure of the judge to grant certain rulings requested by the plaintiff.
The evidence was conflicting as to the manner in which the defendant operated his automobile and as to the manner of the receipt of injury by the plaintiff. There was evidence which, if believed, warranted the jury in finding the facts to be as here related. The officer testified that the automobile he desired to pursue had entered Beacon street, a designated ‘through way,’ without stopping as required by law (G.L.[Ter Ed.] c. 85, § 2, c. 89, § 9) and that the driver at tempted to run him down. He did not then know but later learned that the automobile had been stolen. He did not tell the defendant and the defendant did not know why the automobile was being pursued. Yet after starting in pursuit of the other automobile the defendant drove his automobile down Beacon street at the rate of fifty miles an hour, with the police officer on the running board blowing his whistle. As the defendant approached a street intersection where a red traffic light appeared the officer told the defendant to continue through the intersection. The defendant did so at undiminished speed, the automobile ‘careening, swaying across the road from one side to the other.’ From the time the pursuit started the plaintiff screamed intermittently to be let out of the automobile. A window back of the driver's seat was open and there was evidence which justified the conclusion that the plaintiff's screams could have been heard by the defendant. As the automobile went around corners it swerved and slewed. The road in Regent Circle where the chase led was thirty feet wide at its Beacon street end and for some distance, up to a point where the road divided at a circular area covered with shrubs, referred to in the record as an ‘island.’ A sign was there displayed directing traffic to go to the right. Automobiles were parked in Regent Circle on both roadways and only a narrow strip of road was left on each, for the passage of other automobiles. It was raining and the streets were very slippery. At the fork of the roadway the defendant turned to the left, where the sign directed traffic to go to the right, and drove along the narrow lane of slippery road available for passage, with his automobile swaying from one side to the other at the rate of forty-five miles an hour. Beyond the circular area or ‘island’ the divided roadways united again into a single road. Having traversed the left hand roadway around the...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
Federal Aviation Administration-Federal Bureau of Investigation-Air Transportation Security
...individual assisting a law enforcement officer is still required to exercise the due care appropriate to the circumstances.[15] Thus, in Jones v. Melvin, was held that a driver engaged in pursuit under the direction of a police officer was [ 222] negligent because he operated the vehicle at......
-
Balinovic v. Evening Star Newspaper Co.
...106 Ala. 63, 17 So. 393; Babington v. Yellow Taxi Corporation, 1928, 250 N.Y. 14, 164 N.E. 726, 727, 61 A.L. R. 1354. 5 Jones v. Melvin, 1936, 293 Mass. 9, 199 N.E. 392; cf. Manwaring v. Geisler, 1921, 191 Ky. 532, 230 S.W. 918, 18 A.L. R. 192; Notes, 1922, 18 A.L.R. 197; 1925, 39 A.L.R. 13......
-
Com. v. Morrissey
...exceeding his authority so long as the assister does not know or have reason to know of the lack of authority"). Cf. Jones v. Melvin, 293 Mass. 9, 13, 199 N.E. 392 (1935) (where defendant failed to argue that he was privileged under G.L. c. 268, § 24, it was "not necessary to decide ... to ......
-
Keri v. Coates
...appearing to afford a basis for such conclusion if the combination of circumstances warrants such finding. Jones v. Melvin, 293 Mass. 9, 199 N.E. 392, 393, 394. See, also, Lefeave v. Ascher, 292 Mass. 336, 198 N.E. 251; Szemkus v. Petrila, 299 Mass. 551, 13 N.E.2d In our opinion the jury co......