Jones v. Mould

• Decision Date: 05 July 1911
• Citation: 132 N.W. 45,151 Iowa 599
• Parties: JOHN H. JONES, Plaintiff, v. DAVID MOULD, Judge of the District Court of Iowa in and for the FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT and H. H. SAWYER, Defendants
• Court: Iowa Supreme Court

132 N.W. 45

151 Iowa 599

JOHN H. JONES, Plaintiff, v. DAVID MOULD, Judge of the District Court of Iowa in and for the FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT and H. H. SAWYER, Defendants

Supreme Court of Iowa, Des Moines

July 5, 1911

Certiorari from Woodbury District Court.--HON. DAVID MOULD Judge.

Writ of certiorari dismissed.

George G. Yeaman, for plaintiff.

John H Joseph, for defendants.

OPINION

THE opinion states the case.--Dismissed.

WEAVER J.

By decree of the district court of Woodbury County the plaintiff herein, John H. Jones, was duly enjoined from the unlawful sale and keeping for sale of intoxicating liquors. Thereafter complaint was made to said court, charging him with a violation of the injunction, and he was cited to appear and answer concerning the alleged contempt. On the hearing the trial court found the evidence insufficient to sustain the charge, and dismissed the complaint. Thereupon the informant obtained a writ of certiorari from this court, directed to the trial court or judge, for a review of said proceedings, and upon an examination and consideration of the record the order dismissing the contempt proceedings was set aside and annulled, and the cause remanded to the trial court for further proceedings in harmony with that decision. Sawyer v. Hutchinson, Judge, 149 Iowa 93.

After the remand had been made, the trial court again cited said Jones to appear and show cause why he should not be punished for contempt. Thereupon the accused appeared and answered, pleading the former hearing and dismissal in bar of further trial or punishment on said charge. He further pleaded that the certiorari proceedings in which the order for his dismissal was set aside was void, and without force and effect against him, because he was not made a party thereto and no notice thereof was served on him, and that he did not waive such notice by appearance or otherwise. Further answering, he alleged the unconstitutionality of the statute under which he is sought to be punished, on grounds the statement of which we quote from his pleading as follows:

For further defense in this above-entitled cause, this defendant says that section 4468 of the Code of Iowa under which the Supreme Court of the state of Iowa attempted to review and annul the judgment of the district court, in acquitting this defendant, John H. Jones, in this proceeding, in an action entitled H. H. Sawyer v. William Hutchinson, Judge, and to which action this defendant was not made a party, is unconstitutional and void for the following reasons: (1) Under such statute, one who has been acquitted of violating an injunction in contempt proceedings charging such violation may, in violation of both state and federal Constitutions, again be put in jeopardy for the same offense, and on such retrial be convicted and punished. (2) Under said statute, one who has been acquitted of contempt for violating an injunction may be arraigned for punishment, and an attempt made to punish him, because his acquittal has been annulled in a proceeding to which he was not made a party, and in which he did not appear. (3) Said statute violates section 1, article 1, of the Constitution of Iowa in that it interferes with the right guaranteed in said constitutional provision, including the right to acquire, possess, and protect property. (4) Said statute is repugnant to and in violation of section 9, article 1, of the Constitution of Iowa in that it deprives the defendant of his property and liberty without due process of law. (5) That said statute is in violation of section 6, article 1, of the Constitution of Iowa which required that the laws of a general nature shall have uniform operation. (6) Said statute is void for the reason that it deprives the defendant of the equal protection of the laws, in violation of the Constitution of Iowa and the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States. (7) Said statute is repugnant to section 2, article 4, of the Constitution of the United States, which provides that the citizens of each state shall be entitled to all privileges and immunities of citizens in the several states. (8) Said statute is repugnant to the fourteenth amendment to the Constitution of the United States, which provides that no state shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of the citizens of the United States, nor shall any state deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law, nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the law.

These objections were overruled by the trial court, and upon the showing made judgment was entered, finding the accused guilty of contempt and assessing a penalty therefor. It is for the review of this record that the present certiorari proceeding has been instituted.

In support of the claim that the judgment assessing a fine against the plaintiff is void, his counsel advances two propositions: (1) That this court has no jurisdiction to review and annul the judgment of a trial court dismissing a charge of contempt; and (2) that section 4468 of the Code is void as depriving a person so accused of liberty and property without due process of law, in violation of the fourteenth amendment to the Constitution of the United States, as well as section 9 of article 1 of the Constitution of Iowa.

I. In argument counsel narrows the first proposition stated by him, urging, not so much that this court is wholly without power to review on certiorari the orders of the trial court in contempt proceedings, but that to bind the accused or to affect his right to rely upon the dismissal of the charge of contempt, he must be made a party to the certiorari proceedings, or at least be given timely notice of its pendency. This question was before us in the recent case of Brown & Bennett v. Powers, 146 Iowa 729, where we overruled a like objection, saying: "The statutory proceedings for the review of the judgment of the lower court are essentially a part of the original proceedings, regardless of the particular form of such proceedings. Being statutory, all parties have notice in advance, and are charged with the burden of ascertaining the status of their case in all its stages. Whether formal notice should be given for the purpose of obtaining a review is a question of legislative discretion. In regular appeals such notice is provided for. But such notice is not essential to the constitutionality of the statute conferring the right of appeal." We are still of the opinion thus expressed. It is true, as counsel argue, that "due process of law" requires notice to a party and opportunity to defend, before he can be rightfully deprived of life, liberty, or property; but, notice having once been duly given of the institution of any legal proceeding, the constitutional requirement is satisfied, and in the absence of any statute requiring further notice every party thereto will be treated as in court at each successive stage of the case from its inception until its final disposition, whether in the court of first instance or in the court of last resort, to which it may be carried in the manner provided by law.

II. It is said, however, that the certiorari proceeding being entitled against the trial judge or trial court only it is in effect a new and independent proceeding of which the accused is under no obligation to take notice, but this can not be admitted. Certiorari is essentially a phase of appellate jurisdiction. While neither a technical appeal, nor yet a technical writ of error, it is still a method by which the court undertakes to review a certain class of errors, and to affirm or annual certain orders, rulings, and judgments. While the trial court or judge is designated as the respondent in such proceeding, he is not made a defendant in any proper sense of the word, nor is he expected to appear and defend; but he is made respondent simply as the proper person or...