Jones v. Munn, 17055-PR

• Decision Date: 09 April 1984
• Docket Number: No. 17055-PR,17055-PR
• Citation: 681 P.2d 368,140 Ariz. 216
• Parties: David M. JONES and Cynthia Louis Jones, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. John MUNN and Theresa Marie Munn, husband and wife, Defendants-Appellees.
• Court: Arizona Supreme Court

Page 368

681 P.2d 368

140 Ariz. 216

David M. JONES and Cynthia Louis Jones, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. John MUNN and Theresa Marie Munn, husband and wife, Defendants-Appellees.

No. 17055-PR.

Supreme Court of Arizona, In Banc.

April 9, 1984.

Hofmann, Salcito, Stevens & Myers by Leroy W. Hofmann, Phoenix, for plaintiffs-appellants

Sorenson, Moore, Benham, Garrett & Julian by Theodore A. Julian and John S. Schaper, Phoenix, for defendants-appellees.

HAYS, Justice.

On March 1, 1975, an automobile driven by Theresa Munn collided with an automobile driven by Cynthia Jones; there were no passengers in either car. Jones suffered serious and permanent bodily injury. Jones sued Munn, but the jury found Munn was not liable.

Jones appealed to the court of appeals raising two issues. First, whether the trial court committed reversible error in giving the sudden emergency instruction for the benefit of Munn. Second, whether the trial court improperly commented on the evidence. The court of appeals held that giving the sudden emergency instruction was reversible error; the court of appeals relied on Woods v. Harker, 22 Ariz.App. 83, 523 P.2d 1320 (1974), to support its result. The court of appeals also concluded that the trial court improperly commented on the evidence. The court of appeals reversed the case and remanded it for trial. We accepted Munn's petition for review on both issues. We have jurisdiction pursuant to A.R.S. § 12-120.24, and 17A A.R.S., Rules of Civil Appellate Procedure, rule 23.

The record reveals that Munn was traveling south on Greenfield Road. Jones was traveling north on Greenfield Road. As Munn approached the intersection of University and Greenfield Roads she noticed the traffic light was green.

Munn testified she saw Jones' automobile twice. The first time was when Jones' Expert testimony established that Jones negligently turned left off of Greenfield and onto University. In so turning, her automobile momentarily occupied Munn's lane of traffic. Munn veered to the right without braking. Even though Munn testified she did not see Jones' automobile in her lane of traffic, the experts both testified that their reconstruction of the accident showed that Munn perceived the peril and her conduct (veering to the right) was a reaction to the presence of Jones' automobile in Munn's lane of traffic. Additional facts will be discussed as necessary.

automobile was on Greenfield heading north. The second time was at the moment of impact. Munn testified she did not at any time see Jones' automobile in her lane of traffic. Jones has no recollection of the accident.

SUDDEN EMERGENCY

The sudden emergency doctrine is designed to aid the factfinder "in determining the presence or absence of negligence ...." Fulton v. Johannsen, 3 Ariz.App. 562, 565, 416 P.2d 983, 986 (1966). The instruction is meant to inform the jury that the standard of care for an individual faced with a sudden emergency is that of a reasonable man faced with the same circumstances. See Petefish v. Dawe, 137 Ariz. 570, 575, 672 P.2d 914, 919 (1983); see also Prosser, Handbook of the Law of Torts, § 33, at 169 (4th ed. 1971) ("conduct required is still that of a reasonable man under the circumstances, as they would appear to one who was using proper care ...." (footnotes omitted)). Whether an individual's conduct conforms to the standard is to be viewed objectively. Id.

In Petefish, supra, at 573, 672 P.2d at 917 we said the rationale for the sudden emergency instruction is

"that the actor is left no time for thought, or is reasonably so disturbed or excited, that he cannot weigh alternative courses of action, and must make a speedy decision, based very largely upon impulse or guess. Under such conditions, the actor cannot reasonably be held to the same conduct as one who has had full opportunity to reflect, even though it later appears that he made the wrong decision, which no reasonable man could possibly have made after due deliberation. His choice 'may be mistaken and yet prudent.' "

(Quoting Prosser, supra, at 169 (footnotes omitted)).

When a jury instruction is challenged, we must view the evidence in a light most favorable to the party who requested the instruction. See Tansy v. Morgan, 124 Ariz. 362, 604 P.2d 626 (1979). In this case Munn requested the instruction. (We note that the party who requests the sudden emergency instruction need not be the actor who experienced the event, as the party to the lawsuit may be a representative of the actor, who is either deceased or otherwise unable to testify. See infra discussion at 370-371.)

In Arizona, a party is entitled to have the sudden emergency instruction given if she produces sufficient evidence to show the actor was suddenly confronted with imminent peril, Tansy, supra, at 364, 604 P.2d at 628, or the actor reasonably believed she was suddenly confronted with imminent peril, Petefish, supra, 137 Ariz. at 574, 672 P.2d at 918 (1983), provided the actor did not cause the sudden emergency through her own negligence, Tansy, supra, 124 Ariz. at 364, 604 P.2d at 628, and the actor "reacted to the emergency, even though that reactive conduct might be quite impulsive ...." Petefish, supra, 137 Ariz. at 573, 672 P.2d at 917.

Jones argues, and the court of appeals ruled, that Munn did not show she was aware of the peril. Jones concludes that Munn did not satisfy the third requirement set forth above and the sudden emergency instruction was therefore unwarranted. Munn argues that although she testified she did not see Jones' automobile in her lane of traffic, the testimony of the experts establishes that she was aware of and reacted to the peril. Munn concludes the instruction was warranted by the evidence.

The question presented in this case is: can the sudden emergency instruction be given when there is evidence to support a finding that the actor was aware of the peril but the actor denies she was aware of the peril. Before we answer this question, we must first state that we agree with the statement in Woods v. Harker, 22 Ariz.App. 83, 85, 523 P.2d 1320, 1322 (1974), that the actor must be aware of the sudden peril or the rationale underlying the rule is not served. The instant case calls into question the assertion in Woods, supra, that "[i]f the actor denies that he perceived any danger, then his actions cannot be the product of the emergency situation, and hence an instruction on sudden peril is not warranted." Id.

In Fulton, supra, the party who sought the instruction was the surviving widow of Arnold Johannsen, who lost his life in the accident out of which the lawsuit arose. The court of appeals said that "there could be no evidence as to the state of mind of the deceased," id. 3 Ariz.App. at 565, 416 P.2d at 986, but in upholding the award in favor of the surviving spouse the court implicitly recognized that an actor's testimony concerning his awareness of the peril was not the only method by which the actor's awareness of the peril could be proved. In City of Tucson v. Wondergem, 105 Ariz. 429, 431, 466 P.2d 383, 385 (1970) (the sudden peril caused decedent's death and the instruction was sought by decedent's surviving spouse) we implicitly recognized that evidence other than the actor's testimony could support a finding that the instruction was warranted. Thus, in Arizona, when the actor who experienced the sudden peril is no longer able to testify, other evidence may be introduced to prove the actor was aware of the peril. See id.; Fulton, supra.

But the precise issue we must resolve is not covered by the above cases. Munn is able to testify and she denies seeing Jones' automobile in her lane. This case would seem to be controlled by Woods, supra; however, in Woods the actor testified that she was unaware of the sudden peril and there was no other evidence on the issue. Thus, there was no evidence she was aware of the peril and the result in Woods is correct. However, we think the language in Woods indicating that the sudden emergency instruction may not be given whenever the actor denies awareness of the peril is legally incorrect. Simply because the actor denies seeing the peril does not mean that she was not aware of it.

The trial court found Woods, supra, "doesn't fit the situation I have here. While there was a denial by Mrs. Munn of the peril there is testimony that she did react and that she did react at a point where there was available to her several choices." We think the trial court properly distinguished Woods.

We hold that a party may have a sudden emergency instruction given even though the actor denies she was aware of the peril, if there is other sufficient evidence to show the actor was aware of the peril. Awareness of the peril need not be an act of cognition; all that is required is that the actor perceived the peril. In this case, the evidence dealing with awareness of the peril is inconsistent, but there is sufficient evidence from which the jury could infer that Munn was aware of the peril and her otherwise imprudent conduct was a response to the peril. Thus, applying the instruction in this case is consistent with the rationale for the rule.

We are aware of the rule of law which holds that a party is bound by her own testimony. This is true as to testimony regarding matters where the party has full knowledge and access to the facts. Basically Munn's testimony is that she never saw the Jones vehicle in her lane. In the context of a sudden emergency and the fact that sight is only one of the human senses, we find no contradiction with the rule just discussed and the holding of this case.

COMMENT ON THE EVIDENCE

Jones argues that the trial court improperly commented on the evidence. The court of appeals concluded that Jones' argument was correct, but it did not fashion a remedy for this error as the court of appeals reversed the case on other grounds.

During cross-examination of Munn's expert witness Mr. Hicks, Jones' attorney...