Jones v. New York City Transit Authority

• Decision Date: 17 December 1984
• Parties: Annie JONES, Plaintiff, v. NEW YORK CITY TRANSIT AUTHORITY, Defendant.
• Court: New York City Court

Page 623

483 N.Y.S.2d 623

126 Misc.2d 585

Annie JONES, Plaintiff, v. NEW YORK CITY TRANSIT AUTHORITY, Defendant.

Civil Court of the City of New York New York County, Part 33.

Dec. 17, 1984.

Mortimer Schulman, New York City, for plaintiff; Newman, O'Malley & Epstein, Lawrence Epstein, New York City, of counsel.

Richard K. Bernard, Brooklyn, for defendant; Theodore Friedman, New York City, of counsel.

DAVID B. SAXE, Judge.

There is an intensifying national concern regarding the issue of whether blind and deaf persons should serve as jurors. ¹ In this case, a personal injury matter involving substantial amounts of physical evidence, a blind person was sought to be excluded from jury service through the use of a challenge for cause based solely on his blindness. The issue that I must decide is whether his exclusion was improper under Sec. 510(3) of the Judiciary Law. The facts in this particular case compel the Court to grant the challenge for cause.

Initially, this case does not concern the issue of whether a litigant's right to a fair trial by an impartial jury is being infringed upon ² but rather what is involved here is a statutory interpretation of Sec. 510(3) of the Judiciary Law of New York as amended in 1983.

Previously, the relevant New York Statute regarding juror qualifications was Sec. 596(3) of the Judiciary Law. This section provided:

"In order to be qualified to serve as a juror ... a person must:

3. Be in the possession of his natural faculties and not infirm or decrepit."

Under this statute, blind individuals were systematically disqualified from jury service. In Lewinson v. Crews, 28 A.D.2d 111, 282 N.Y.S.2d 83 (2d Dept.1967), affd. 21 N.Y.2d 898, 289 N.Y.S.2d 619, 236 N.E.2d 853 (1968), app. dismissed, 393 U.S. 13, 89 S.Ct. 46, 21 L.Ed.2d 12 (1968) the court held that a blind person was not qualified to be a juror under Judiciary Law, Sec. 596(3) because he did not possess the "natural faculties" required by the statute. The court stated that the term "natural faculties" dealt with an individual's physical attributes since it is used conjunctively in the statute with the term "infirm and decrepit"--essentially physical characteristics.

Section 596 was later amended and became Sec. 510(3) of the Judiciary Law, which, prior to its 1983 amendment provided:

"In order to qualify as a juror a person must:

3. Be in possession of his natural faculties and not incapable, by reason of mental or physical infirmity, of rendering satisfactory jury service."

The constitutionality of § 510(3), as applied to a blind person who was disqualified from being a juror, was upheld by the courts in Jackanin v. Carey, 476 F.Supp. 420 (E.D.N.Y.1979), affd. 633 F.2d 204 (2nd Cir.1980). The court dismissed the blind plaintiff's complaint which alleged § 510(3) deprived him of equal protection under the fourteenth amendment.

Thus, the case law prior to the 1983 amendment has consistently held that blind persons are properly excluded from jury service under the New York statute.

In September of 1983 § 510(3) was amended and now provides:

"In order to qualify as a juror a person must:

3. Not have a mental or physical condition, or combination thereof, which causes the person to be incapable of performing in a reasonable manner the duties of a juror."

This case, involving the issue of whether a blind person was improperly excluded from the jury through the use of a cause challenge, is the first to arise in New York since the 1983 amendment took effect.

In People v. Guzman, 125 Misc.2d 457, 478 N.Y.S.2d 455 (Sup.Ct.N.Y.Cty., 1984), the court held that a juror who was otherwise qualified could not be excluded for cause merely on the basis of his deafness. In formulating its decision, the court relied heavily on the legislative history of § 510(3)'s amendment and the importance of the legislators' intent in passing a statute.

The legislature, in its memorandum, stated that the purpose of the proposed changes were:

" 'To remove the arbitrary prohibition against persons with "physical infirmity" from being impanelled for jury duty and, by so doing, to increase the number of people who would be available for jury duty, while at the same time, making New York's law accord with the regulations promulgated and proposed under Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, as amended.' "

Id., 125 Misc.2d 457, 560, 478 N.Y.S.2d 455, 458.

Prior to the enactment of the statute, the provision which referred to "natural faculties" was understood as excluding "as jurors certain disabled individuals on the basis of their perceived inability to perform functions which have no effect on actual jury service." Id., 125 Misc.2d at 461, 478 N.Y.S.2d at 459.

The court went on to state:

"A canon of statutory construction says that:

'As a general rule, the legislative intent with which statutes are enacted is to be collected from the context, from the occasion and necessity of the law, from the mischief felt, and from the objects and remedy in view ... and in passing upon matters of legislative intent and competence, the courts do not merely read the bare end product of the legislative labors, but rather they read the statute in light of the * * * facts which were found by the Legislature and which prompted the enactment.' " Id., 125 Misc.2d 457, 461, 478 N.Y.S.2d 455, 459.

The Court in People v. Guzman, supra, concluded that the mischief which the legislature sought to remedy in amending § 510(3) was the predetermination that individuals with physical disabilities are incapable of serving as jurors. The Court stated that:

"In order to advance the remedy, the qualifications of the individual prospective juror, as they relate to a case, should be examined." Id., 125 Misc.2d at 461-462, 478 N.Y.S.2d at 459.

Similarly, when considering the competence of a blind person, the court must determine whether the person's impairment would preclude him from serving as a reasonable juror in that particular case. Physical handicaps, such as blindness, must be treated like any other disability when determining whether a prospective juror should be held incompetent to serve on a jury and thus removed for cause. It is therefore important to look at the duties and responsibilities of the jury and determine whether a blind individual is incapable of performing these duties.

In Lewinson v. Crews, supra, the Court stated that the various practical duties and responsibilities which fall upon a juror include:

1. Evaluating physical evidence such as still photographs, moving pictures, mechanical objects, and diagrams drawn on a blackboard, and;

2. Determining a witness' veracity by his facial expressions and body movements. 28 A.D.2d at 113, 282 N.Y.S.2d 83.

Physical evidence is often an important aspect of a trial though not every trial includes the use of physical evidence. For example, in commercial cases, where little or no physical evidence is involved, blindness would not render an individual incapable of performing his duty as a juror. However, when a significant portion of the evidence in a particular case is physical, the blind individual should clearly be excluded from serving as a juror. Note, Due Process: The Deaf and the Blind as Jurors, 17 New Eng.L.Rev. 119, 145 (1981).

In this case, a significant amount of the evidence consisted of physical evidence, the interpretation of which by the jurors would be extremely important in reaching their verdict. The blind individual would thus be at a disadvantage during jury deliberations in following the Court's instructions to consider all evidence presented at trial. Therefore the blind individual's inability to visually perceive the physical evidence involved is the primary reason for excluding him from this particular jury.

In addition to a blind person's inability to evaluate physical evidence, another reason stated in past...