Jones v. North American Aerodynamics, Inc., Civ. No. 81-0007-B.

Decision Date04 October 1984
Docket NumberCiv. No. 81-0007-B.
Citation594 F. Supp. 657
PartiesBernice JONES, Plaintiff, v. NORTH AMERICAN AERODYNAMICS, INC., et al., Defendants.
CourtU.S. District Court — District of Maine

Barry K. Mills, Ellsworth, Me., for plaintiff.

Howard H. Dana, Jr., Portland, Me., for North American Aerodynamics.

Peter W. Culley, Portland, Me., for West Point-Pepperell, Inc.

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER ACCEPTING RECOMMENDATION OF MAGISTRATE

CYR, Chief Judge.

The plaintiff brings this action for injuries allegedly sustained when her jumpsuit ignited as portions of her parachuting equipment came in contact with electrical power lines during the course of a parachute jump in Louisiana. The complaint alleges that the jumpsuit fabric was defective and unreasonably dangerous, and that defendants failed to give adequate warning of the dangerous characteristics of the fabric. North American Aerodynamics, Inc. (NAA), the alleged manufacturer of the jumpsuit, moved for dismissal for lack of personal jurisdiction. On March 28, 1984, the United States Magistrate issued a report recommending that the motion to dismiss be granted. The plaintiff objected.

The material facts are undisputed. Born and raised in Maine, plaintiff moved to Louisiana in 1973 where she resided until 1978, when she returned to Maine. She purchased her parachuting equipment in 1974 or 1975 through a mail order catalog retailer located in Illinois or Texas. The accident occurred on April 5, 1975 in Louisiana. NAA is incorporated and has its principal place of business in New Jersey. It has no employees in Maine and no Maine stores sell its products. The only advertising entering Maine is that contained in three nationally circulated parachuting magazines. NAA published its own catalog in 1972, 1974 and 1976 (at least one of these catalog issues was intended for nationwide distribution) and has retailed its products through its own catalogs and through other mail order retailers. During the ten-year period from 1971 to 1980, NAA shipped $2,400 worth of goods into Maine, out of a total volume of between 1.5 and 1.7 million dollars in sales made through its own catalog. NAA shipments to Maine through its own catalog sales never exceeded $750 per year; on 33 occasions, extending over a ten-year period, it mailed goods into Maine in furtherance of its own catalog sales. These data do not cover any Maine sales of NAA products which may have occurred through other mail order retailers; the record contains no evidence as to whether there were any such sales in Maine, though total nationwide sales through such retailers between 1971 and 1980 exceeded 1.1 million dollars.

The plaintiff's injuries were incurred in Louisiana. She received medical and psychiatric treatment in Louisiana; she has required further medical and psychiatric treatment since moving to Maine.

Plaintiff commenced this action on January 13, 1981 and for purposes of this motion it is agreed that her decision to return from Louisiana to Maine was not motivated by "forum shopping." "Certification To The Supreme Judicial Court" (pleading No. 35), at ¶ 17.

The exercise of personal jurisdiction over NAA must be authorized by Maine law and conform with federal due process. Wass v. American Safety Equipment Corp., 573 F.Supp. 39, 42 n. 7 (D.Me. 1983). The limits of personal jurisdiction under Maine law are coextensive with the federal due process requirements. See Architectural Woodcraft Co. v. Read, 464 A.2d 210, 212 (Me.1983); Labbe v. Nissen Corp., 404 A.2d 564, 569 (Me.1979).

Due process requirements are satisfied when in personam jurisdiction is asserted over a nonresident corporate defendant that has `certain minimum contacts with the forum such that the maintenance of the suit does not offend "traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice."' International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 66 S.Ct. 154, 158, 90 L.Ed. 95 (1945), quoting Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 463 61 S.Ct. 339, 343, 85 L.Ed. 278 (1940). When a controversy is related to or `arises out of' a defendant's contacts with the forum, the Court has said that a `relationship among the defendant, the forum, and the litigation' is the essential foundation of in personam jurisdiction. Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 204 97 S.Ct. 2569, 2579, 53 L.Ed.2d 683 (1977).
Even when the cause of action does not arise out of or relate to the foreign corporation's activities in the forum State, due process is not offended by a State's subjecting the corporation to its in personam jurisdiction when there are sufficient contacts between the State and the foreign corporation. Perkins v. Benguet Consolidated Mining Co., 342 U.S. 437 72 S.Ct. 413, 96 L.Ed. 485 (1952).

Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia v. Hall, ___ U.S. ___, ___, 104 S.Ct. 1868, 1872, 80 L.Ed.2d 404 (1984) footnotes omitted.

Helicopteros and earlier Supreme Court decisions prescribe a three-step analysis. First, the defendant must have some contact with the forum state; if it does not, due process prohibits the exercise of in personam jurisdiction. World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 295, 100 S.Ct. 559, 566, 62 L.Ed.2d 490 (1980). If the defendant has forum contacts, the court must proceed to the second step in its analysis: whether the suit arises out of or is related to defendant's forum contacts? The answer to this question determines the test to be applied in the third step of the analysis. If the suit arises out of or relates to the defendant's forum contacts, the critical question becomes whether the relationship among the defendant, the forum and the litigation forms a fair and reasonable foundation for the exercise of jurisdiction over the defendant. But if the cause of action does not arise out of and is not related to the defendant's forum contacts, the court considers only the relationship between the forum state and the foreign defendant. In such a case, Helicopteros seems to hold that the exercise of personal jurisdiction is appropriate only if the defendant has "continuous and systematic general business contacts" with the forum state. Id. ___ U.S. at ___, 104 S.Ct. at 1873.

The Magistrate concluded that plaintiff's cause of action does not arise out of and that it bears no relation to defendant's forum contacts. Report And Recommended Decision, etc., at 3-4. The Magistrate therefore turned his attention to whether the defendant "has carried on continuous and systematic, although unrelated, activities in the state," id., concluding that defendant had not done so and, therefore, recommending that the motion to dismiss be granted.

Although the basis for plaintiff's objection to the Magistrate's report are not entirely clear, she seems to contend that the Magistrate erred in three respects. First, plaintiff contends that the Magistrate ignored some of defendant's forum contacts. Second, she seems to contend that the cause of action is "related to" defendant's forum contacts.1 Third, plaintiff argues that the Magistrate gave insufficient consideration to plaintiff's status as a Maine resident.

The determination as to whether plaintiff's cause of action is related to the defendant's forum contacts determines the relevance and significance of the other factors which plaintiff contends deserve closer consideration. Therefore, the Court starts with the second of plaintiff's three objections.

The essence of plaintiff's second objection appears to be that her action is related to defendant's contacts with Maine because the cause of action arises out of the sale of the same type of equipment which defendant offered for sale and sold throughout the nation, including Maine. This argument is not entirely without persuasive merit.

The protection against inconvenient litigation afforded by the due process clause is typically described in terms of `reasonableness' or `fairness.'" World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 292, 100 S.Ct. 559, 564, 62 L.Ed.2d 490 (1980). It follows from this concern for fairness and reasonableness that the due process standard for determining the appropriateness of exercising in personam jurisdiction should be "flexible," id. at 294, 100 S.Ct. at 565, and that it may require judicial consideration of a number of different factors, see id. Furthermore, the due process limitations on the exercise of in personam jurisdiction are designed to "give a degree of predictability to the legal system that allows defendants to structure their primary conduct with some minimum assurance as to where that conduct will and will not render them liable to suit." World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 297, 100 S.Ct. 559, 567, 62 L.Ed.2d 490 (1980). Both of these concerns would appear to be well served by plaintiff's interpretation of the relatedness requirement. Certainly, NAA cannot be said to have structured its primary activity so as to avoid being haled into court in this forum. Indeed, NAA's commercial conduct directed at Maine, i.e., advertising for sale and selling its skydiving equipment in Maine, has rendered reasonably foreseeable precisely the kind of suit which it now finds itself defending.

On the other hand, a yet broader interpretation of the relatedness doctrine would promote greater flexibility. The standard applied at the third step in the due process analysis depends on whether the cause of action is related to the defendant's forum contacts. And, as noted above, upon reaching the third step in the analysis more and different factors will be considered if, at the second step in the analysis, the cause of action has been found to be related to the defendant's forum contacts. Hence, greater analytical flexibility obtains once a cause of action is determined to have arisen from or to have been related to the defendant's forum contacts.2

Finally, the case law provides some support for a liberal interpretation of the relatedness requirement. Although the Supreme Court recently "declined to...

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    ...general business contacts" with the forum state, Id. ___ U.S. at ____, 104 S.Ct. at 1873. Jones v. North American Aerodynamics, Inc., 594 F.Supp. 657, 659 (D.Me.1984) (per Cyr, C.J.). It is clear beyond any doubt that the claim for relief asserted by the Plaintiffs in this case does not ari......
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