Jones v. Perry Cnty. Fiscal Court

• Decision Date: 11 May 2016
• Docket Number: Civil Action No. 6: 15–050–DCR
• Citation: 185 F.Supp.3d 947
• Parties: Jody Jones, Plaintiff, v. Perry County Fiscal Court, et al., Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Kentucky

185 F.Supp.3d 947

Jody Jones, Plaintiff,

v.Perry County Fiscal Court, et al., Defendants.

Civil Action No. 6: 15–050–DCR

United States District Court, E.D. Kentucky, Southern Division. (at London).

Signed May 11, 2016

Cheryl U. Lewis, Hyden, KY, for Plaintiff.

Jonathan C. Shaw, Michael J. Schmitt, Porter, Schmitt, Banks & Baldwin, Paintsville, KY, for Defendants.

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

Danny C. Reeves, United States District Judge

This matter is pending for consideration of several motions, including the defendants' motion for summary judgment. [Record No. 40] Sovereign immunity protects Defendant Perry County Fiscal Court ("PCFC") from Plaintiff Jody Jones' state law claims, and Jones has not presented sufficient proof to maintain his federal constitutional claims against PCFC. Therefore, PCFC is entitled to summary judgment on all claims. The defendants' motion will also be granted regarding the plaintiff's official capacity claims against Defendant Judge Scott Alexander, Perry County's Judge Executive. In his individual capacity, Judge Alexander is also entitled to summary judgment regarding all of Jones' state law claims and with respect to Jones' federal claim based on an alleged violation of the plaintiff's rights protected by the Fourteenth Amendment. However, summary judgment is not appropriate regarding Jones' First Amendment claim against Judge Alexander in his individual capacity.

The plaintiff has also submitted motions requesting an evidentiary hearing and permission to file a sur-reply. [Record Nos. 49; 50] Because neither an evidentiary hearing nor a sur-reply are necessary, those motions will be denied.

I.

Many of the relevant facts are undisputed. On October 24, 2012, Plaintiff Jody Jones began working as a maintenance employee for the Perry County Fiscal Court. [Record Nos. 40–1, p. 1; 45, p. 2] Jones was hired by his uncle, Denny Ray Noble. At the time of Jones' hiring, Noble held the office of Perry County's Judge Executive. [Record Nos. 40–1, p. 1; 45, p. 3] At its meeting on November 20, 2012, PCFC retroactively approved the decision to hire Jones with the intention that he would replace Darrell Fugate, the maintenance supervisor who was planning to retire. [Record No. 40–2, p. 5] Sometime after Jones was hired and Fugate retired, Eric Harkins was also hired as a maintenance employee. [Record Nos. 40–1, p. 6; 45, p. 3]

In 2014, while Noble was running for re-election, several PCFC employees, including Jones and Harkins, actively campaigned on Noble's behalf. [Record Nos. 40–1, pp. 2, 7; 45, p. 3; 33, pp. 41–42] On at least one occasion, Alexander, who was running against Noble, saw Harkins, Jones, and other PCFC employees with Noble while they were campaigning. [Record Nos. 33, pp. 41–42; 34, pp. 8–9]

In May of 2014, Alexander defeated Noble in the primary election. [Record Nos. 40–1, p. 1; 45, p. 3] Alexander then went on to win the general election. On January 5, 2015, he assumed the office of Perry County Judge Executive. [Record Nos. 40–1, pp. 1–2; 45, p. 1] On the afternoon of January 6, 2015, on his second day as county judge executive, Alexander called Jones into his office and told him that he was being terminated. [Record Nos. 40–1, p. 2; 45, pp. 7–8] Jones and Alexander agree that Jones then asked if he was being fired "because of Denny Ray." [Record Nos. 33, p. 34; 34, p. 34] Jones testified during his deposition that Alexander silently mouthed the words, "You are right." [Record No. 33, p. 34] Alexander denies this and testified that he only responded, "All I'm saying is you are terminated." [Record No. 34, pp. 34–35] After he left work, Jones claims that he called Alexander and told him that he needed a termination letter. [Record No. 33, p. 35] According to Jones, Alexander responded that "he had to get with John Carl [Perry County's attorney] in the morning to see why he fired me." Id.

The parties agree that, the next day, Jones received a one-sentence letter that simply stated, "Your employment with the Perry County Fiscal Court will be officially terminated on Wednesday, January 7, 2014[sic]." [Record Nos. 1–1, pp. 4–5; 40–1, p. 2] The parties also agree that Jones was not fired because of poor job performance or discipline issues. [Record Nos. 34, pp. 12–13; 44, p. 5] While Alexander knew that Jones was related to Noble, he contends that he did not fire Jones based on his connection to the former judge executive. [Record No. 34, pp. 10, 19] Instead, Alexander maintains that he fired Jones because Jones and Harkins were performing the same job, and budget constraints required that he terminate one of them. Id. at 18–19. According to Alexander, he observed Harkins and Jones changing lightbulbs together and going to pick up the mail as a team. Id. at 20–21, 32. Alexander admits that he had no reason for terminating Jones over Harkins. Id. at 43.

The defendants claim that PCFC approved Alexander's decision to terminate Jones' position at its meeting on January 22, 2015. [Record No. 40–1, pp. 10–11] The minutes from that meeting merely show that PCFC approved the decision to hire a list of PCFC employees. [Record No. 40–4] Jones' name is not on the list. Id.

On March 10, 2015, Jones filed this action in Perry Circuit Court against PCFC and Alexander, in his official and his individual capacities. [Record No. 1–1] Jones asserts three state law claims and two based on 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Id. In Count I, Jones claims that he is entitled to damages for political discrimination arising from the defendants' violation of Ky. Rev. Stat. § 67.710(7). Id. at 6–7. In Count II, Jones requests declaratory and injunctive relief for the defendants' violation of sections 2 and 3 of the Kentucky Constitution. Id. at 7. Specifically, Jones seeks "to be reinstated to his former position with full back pay and benefits, and to have his termination declared and void." Id. Jones also requests punitive damages and attorneys' fees under Count III for "State Law Wrongful Discharge." Id. at 7–8. Jones has also asserted federal constitutional claims based on 42 U.S.C. § 1983. In Count IV, Jones claims that the defendants violated his procedural due process rights under the Fourteenth Amendment by failing to give him proper notice and a hearing. Id. at 8–9. In Count V, Jones seeks damages for the defendants' alleged violation of his First Amendment rights to freedom of speech and freedom of association. Id. at 9.

On March 20, 2015, the defendants removed the case to this Court under 28 U.S.C. § 1331. [Record No. 1] The defendants have now moved for summary judgment on all of the plaintiff's claims. [Record No. 40] They contend that they are entitled to immunity on all claims, but also argue that summary judgment is appropriate for each claim on the merits. Id.

II.

Under Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, "[t]he court shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). "A genuine issue of material fact exists when there is ‘sufficient evidence favoring the nonmoving party for a jury to return a verdict for that party.’ " Chao v. Hall Holding Co., 285 F.3d 415, 424 (6th Cir.2002) (quoting Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986) ). See Harrison v. Ash, 539 F.3d 510, 516 (6th Cir.2008). In deciding whether to grant a motion for summary judgment, the Court must view all the facts and draw all inferences from the evidence in a light most favorable to the non-moving party. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986).

III.

PCFC argues that sovereign immunity protects it from liability for all of the plaintiff's state law claims. [Record No. 40–1, p. 20] PCFC also contends that Jones has not shown sufficient proof to maintain his § 1983 claims against it. Id. at 18–19.

Alexander contends that he is entitled to qualified immunity for all of the plaintiff's claims against him in his individual capacity. Id. at 13–15. Regarding Jones' state law claims against Alexander in his official capacity, Alexander contends that he is protected by the same sovereign immunity applicable to PCFC. Id. at 20. Finally, Alexander argues that the § 1983 claims asserted against him in his official capacity are duplicative of Jones' § 1983 claims against PCFC. Id. at 17–18. As outlined below, Alexander and PCFC are entitled to immunity on some, but not all, of Jones' claims.

A. Federal Claims based on 42 U.S.C. § 1983

State governments are not subject to liability under § 1983. Howlett ex rel. Howlett v. Rose, 496 U.S. 356, 376, 110 S.Ct. 2430, 110 L.Ed.2d 332 (1990). However, the Supreme Court has construed the word "person" in § 1983 to include municipal corporations and other similar governmental entities. Id. Accordingly, PCFC and its employees are potentially liable under the statute. Nevertheless, liability under § 1983 is limited. Qualified immunity is still available under certain circumstances for government employees sued in their individual capacities. See Henry v. Metro. Sewer Dist., 922 F.2d 332, 339 (6th Cir.1990). And governmental entities are not subject to vicarious liability under § 1983 for the actions of their employees. Monell v. Dept. of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 694, 98 S.Ct. 2018, 56 L.Ed.2d 611 (1978).

1. Qualified Immunity for Judge Alexander

"The doctrine of qualified immunity protects government officials ‘from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.’ " Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 231, 129 S.Ct. 808, 172 L.Ed.2d 565 (2009) (quoting Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818, 102 S.Ct. 2727, 73 L.Ed.2d 396 (1982) ). Once the defense is raised, the burden is on the plaintiff to prove that the official is not entitled to immunity....