K.K. v. Clark Cnty. Bd. of Educ.

• Citation: 439 F.Supp.3d 905
• Decision Date: 13 February 2020
• Docket Number: Civil Action No. 5:19-005-DCR
• Parties: K.K., BY AND THROUGH her next friend J.K., Plaintiff, v. CLARK COUNTY BOARD OF EDUCATION, et al., Defendants.
• Court: United States District Courts. 6th Circuit. United States District Court of Eastern District of Kentucky

439 F.Supp.3d 905

K.K., BY AND THROUGH her next friend J.K., Plaintiff,

v.CLARK COUNTY BOARD OF EDUCATION, et al., Defendants.

Civil Action No. 5:19-005-DCR

United States District Court, E.D. Kentucky, Central Division. (at Lexington).

Signed February 13, 2020

Edward E. Dove, Dove Law, Lexington, KY, for Plaintiff.

Elizabeth Anna Deener, John G. McNeill, Landrum & Shouse LLP, Lexington, KY, for Defendants.

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

Danny C. Reeves, Chief Judge

K.K. has alleged various civil rights and tort claims, by and through her next friend J.K., ("the plaintiff" or "K.K.") against Defendants Becca Boyd, Kris Creteau, and the Clark County Board of Education ("the Board"). Boyd, Creteau, and the Board have filed a motion for partial summary judgment regarding Plaintiff K.K.'s federal claims. [Record No. 36] Boyd and Creteau also have filed a separate motion for partial summary judgment on the state law claims brought against them in their individual capacities. [Record No. 31] Collectively, the defendants seek summary judgment on all remaining counts. After reviewing the record and the parties' arguments, the Court agrees that the defendants are entitled to judgment on all claims.

I.

K.K. was a Seventh Grade student at Robert D. Campbell Junior High School in Clark County, Kentucky. Clark County Public Schools has a Safety Tipline, Online Prevention ("S.T.O.P.") program that is run through the Kentucky Center for School Safety and the Kentucky Department of Education. The tip line is designed for individuals in the community, students, or parents to anonymously provide information about unsafe situations, including abuse, to school personnel.

An October 2, 2018, S.T.O.P. tip stated that K.K. and her sister were being physically abused by their father. [Record No. 31-2, p. 2] The tip explained that the kids were told to lie by their father because the state would take them away if they talked about their abuse. [Id. ] Clark County Director of Pupil Personnel Greg Hollon was monitoring the tip line when the S.T.O.P. tip came in on October 2. After communicating with state social services, Hollon forwarded the tip in an e-mail to school personnel for further verification because social services could not follow-up on the tip without the students acknowledging the abuse or showing visible signs of trauma. [Id. at 1.]

Seventh Grade Counselor Becca Boyd and Seventh Grade Assistant Principal Kris Creteau investigated the tip pursuant to Hollon's e-mail. Boyd called K.K. into her office to discuss the matter. [Record No. 31-3, p. 1] The door was shut, and the office window's blinds were completely closed. [Id. ] Boyd asked K.K. about school and her goals. [Record No. 31-4] Boyd relayed to the child the report that she was being physically abused at home and conducted a visible check of K.K.'s arms and face while the plaintiff was speaking. [Id. ]

Creteau then entered the office. She again explained the anonymous tip and asked if anyone was hurting K.K. [Record No. 31-3] K.K. responded that no adult in her life was hurting her and affirmed that she would be comfortable telling them if someone was abusing her. [Id. ]

Creteau told K.K. that they needed to check for bruises or cuts on her body. [Id. ] K.K. pulled her jeans up to show no bruises on her lower legs. [Id. ] Boyd asked her to pull her shirt up to her bra line so they could look at her stomach and back. [Id. ] Creteau then asked if she was comfortable to show them her thighs, and K.K. said yes. [Id. ] Boyd told her to pull her pants down but keep her underwear in place. [Id. ] K.K. complied with these requests. [Id. ] Creteau noted there were no bruises or cuts on her thighs, stomach, or back. [Id. ] K.K. then discussed her custody situation with Creteau and Boyd and informed them of a protection order in place against her mother. [Id. ]

Creteau called Hollon and conveyed their findings. [Id. ] Hollon said that she should let K.K.'s father know that there would be no further action on the part of the school. [Id. ] K.K.'s father came to pick her up from school, and Creteau explained to him and K.K. that the school would take no further action. [Id. ]

K.K. testified that she cried during the investigation. [Record No. 31-6, p. 17] She further reported that numerous students and former classmates questioned or harassed her online and through texts about the October 2 incident after they heard about the pending litigation. [Id. at pp. 12-13] This led to her deleting several social media accounts. [Id. ] Although K.K. reports feeling increasingly self-conscious about her body, she has not seen a counselor or therapist concerning any emotional distress she experienced as a result of the incident. [Id. at pp. 14-15] Further, K.K.'s grades did not suffer after the investigation. [Record No. 31-9]

K.K., by and through her next friend, J.K., filed this lawsuit on January 10, 2019, asserting violations of her Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, as well as various state law claims. [Record No. 1] The defendants filed a prior motion for partial summary judgment to dismiss the Count III's (federal) failure to train claim and the state law claims asserted against them in their official capacity. [Record No. 24] The Court subsequently dismissed K.K.'s claims for negligence (First Count IV), invasion of privacy (First Count IV), grossly negligent infliction of emotional distress (Second Count IV), and intentional infliction of emotional distress (Count V) against Boyd and Creteau in their official capacities. [Record No. 29] Additionally, her claim for failure to train (Count III) was dismissed in its entirety. [Id. ]

Boyd, Creteau and the Board have now moved for partial summary judgment on the remaining federal law claims: a § 1983 claim against Boyd and Creteau (in their individual and official capacities), as well as the Board alleging a violation of the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution (Count I); a § 1983 claim against Boyd and Creteau (in their individual and official capacities) alleging deliberate indifference in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution (Count II); and another § 1983 claim against Boyd and Creteau (in their individual and official capacities) for deliberate indifference to the plaintiff's constitutional rights (Count VI). [Record No. 36] Boyd and Creteau have also moved for partial summary judgment on the remaining state law claims asserted against them in their individual capacities: violations of the Constitution of Kentucky (First Count IV); negligence (First Count IV); invasion of privacy (First Count IV); grossly negligent infliction of emotional distress (Second Count IV); and intentional infliction of emotional distress (Count V).¹ [Record No. 31] These two motions collectively request summary judgment on all remaining counts. [See Record Nos. 29, 31, and 36.]

II.

Summary judgment is appropriate if there are no genuine disputes regarding any material facts and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a) ; see Celotex Corp. v. Catrett , 477 U.S. 317, 322–23, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986) ; Chao v. Hall Holding Co. , 285 F.3d 415, 424 (6th Cir. 2002). A dispute over a material fact is not "genuine" unless a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc. , 477 U.S. 242, 247-48, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). The determination must be "whether the evidence presents a sufficient disagreement to require submission to a jury or whether it is so one-sided that one party must prevail as a matter of law." Anderson , 477 U.S. at 251-52, 106 S.Ct. 2505 ; see Harrison v. Ash , 539 F.3d 510, 516 (6th Cir. 2008).

Once the moving party has met its burden of production, "its opponent must do more than simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts." Keeneland Ass'n, Inc. v. Earnes , 830 F. Supp. 974, 984 (E.D. Ky. 1993) (citing Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp. , 475 U.S. 574, 586, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986) ). The nonmoving party cannot rely on the assertions in its pleadings; rather, it must come forward with probative evidence to support its claims. Celotex , 477 U.S. at 324, 106 S.Ct. 2548. In deciding whether to grant summary judgment, the Court views all the facts and inferences drawn from the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. , 475 U.S. at 586, 106 S.Ct. 1348.

III.

The defendants contend in one motion for partial summary judgment that they are entitled to judgment regarding the remaining federal claims, all of which involve § 1983. [Record No. 36] The Court agrees, and judgment will be entered in favor of Boyd, Creteau, and the Board on Counts I, II, and VI.

A. The Claims Asserted Against the Board and the School Officials in their Official Capacities Fail as a Matter of Law.

The defendants assert they are entitled to judgment as a matter of law on all § 1983 claims asserted against the Board, including Counts I, II, and VI.² Only Count I of the remaining counts explicitly alleges a cause of action against the Board. [Record No. 1, pp. 3-4]. However, Counts II and VI are deliberate indifference claims asserted against school personnel in their official (as well as personal) capacities. [Id. at pp. 4-5, 7-8]

When a plaintiff alleges a cause of action against government actors in their official capacities, she seeks damages from the government entity itself. Jones v. Perry Cty. Fiscal Ct. , 185 F. Supp. 3d 947, 959-60 (E.D. Ky. 2016) (citing Kentucky v. Graham , 473 U.S. 159, 166, 105 S.Ct. 3099, 87 L.Ed.2d 114 (1985) ; Pusey v. City of Youngstown , 11 F.3d 652, 657 (6th Cir. 1993) ). Therefore, "[a]s long as the government entity receives notice and an opportunity to respond, an official-capacity suit is, in all respects other than name, to be treated as a suit against the entity." Grah...