Jones v. Rogers Townsend & Thomas, P.C.
| Decision Date | 27 July 2022 |
| Docket Number | 2022-UP-314,Appellate Case 2019-001140 |
| Court | South Carolina Court of Appeals |
| Parties | Ronald L. Jones and Gayle Langley Jones, Thomas Huguenin Gaillard, as Trustee of The Thomas Huguenin Gaillard Revocable Trust, Dated April 3, 2007, and Thomas W. Cone, Jr. as Trustee of The Thomas W. Cone, Jr. Revocable Trust, Dated April 3, 2007, Respondents, v. Rogers Townsend &Thomas, P.C.; Lisa Hostetler; Alexander C. Peabody; and Peabody &Associates, Inc., Defendants, Of Which Rogers Townsend &Thomas, P.C. and Lisa Hostetler are Appellants. |
THIS OPINION HAS NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE. IT SHOULD NOT BE CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN ANY PROCEEDING EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 268(d)(2), SCACR.
Heard May 3, 2022
Appeal From Berkeley County Deadra L. Jefferson, Circuit Court Judge
Warren C. Powell, Jr., and Chelsea Jaqueline Clark, both
of Bruner Powell Wall &Mullins, LLC, of Columbia, for Appellants.
J. Jay Hulst, of Williams &Hulst, LLC, of Moncks Corner, and Robert Wade Maring, of Maring &Moyer, LLC, of Georgetown both for Respondents.
This legal malpractice case arises out of a real estate closing. The Joneses were the purchasers. Rogers Townsend &Thomas P.C. (the law firm) closed the sale.
The Joneses sued the law firm after they discovered an alleged easement on their property in favor of the Joneses' neighbors, the Trustees. The law firm convinced the circuit court to add the Trustees to the suit as necessary parties but the circuit court later dismissed them. That dismissal is the subject of this appeal.
The court dismissed the Trustees because the Trustees and the Joneses entered a new easement agreement after the Trustees were added to the suit. This new agreement extinguished the old easement, though (of course) the old easement remained a ripe dispute between the Joneses and the law firm in the malpractice case.
We affirm because we agree with the circuit court's reasoning: the Trustees have no interest in the old easement and thus, no interest in this suit.
The Joneses purchased the property in 2010. They hired the law firm to do the closing. The law firm allegedly failed to discover and disclose an easement granting the Trustees an easement over the property.
The Joneses sued the law firm for malpractice. The law firm asserted the easement either never existed, was no longer enforceable, or was waived, and that if any of those things were true, the Joneses could not prove damages.
The law firm moved to join the Trustees to the suit and argued the Trustees were necessary parties. Judge Buckner granted the motion.
Not long after that, the Trustees and the Joneses entered into an agreement terminating the original easement and establishing a new one over a narrower portion of land. Then, the Trustees moved to be released from the suit, claiming they no longer had any interest in the case. The law firm moved to amend its answer to include a request for a declaratory judgment.
After back-to-back hearings, Judge Jefferson granted both motions. The law firm appeals the decision dropping the Trustees from the case.
Did the circuit court err in dismissing the Trustees from this case?
The parties disagree on the standard of review. The Trustees and the Joneses argue we should review for abuse of discretion. The law firm argues we should view the facts in its favor and reverse if it is entitled to relief under any theory. See Grimsley v. S.C. L. Enf't Div., 396 S.C. 276, 281 721 S.E.2d 423, 426 (2012) ().
Our precedent provides "[a] motion to dismiss a party is addressed to the court's discretion." Demian v. S.C. Health &Hum. Servs. Fin. Comm'n, 297 S.C. 1, 5, 374 S.E.2d 510, 512 (Ct. App. 1988) () (reviewing a decision not to dismiss a party for abuse of discretion). Also, federal courts uniformly cite the abuse of discretion standard in situations involving joinder. See, e.g., DirecTV, Inc. v. Leto, 467 F.3d 842, 844 (3d Cir. 2006) (); Letherer v. Alger Grp., L.L.C., 328 F.3d 262, 266-68 (6th Cir. 2003) (), overruled on other grounds by Blackburn v. Oaktree Cap. Mgmt., LLC, 511 F.3d 633 (6th Cir. 2008).
If forced to choose, we would follow the cases cited above and treat this as a joinder issue entrusted to the circuit court's discretion, but we find we do not need to choose. We do not see any disputed facts or inferences to draw in anyone's favor. Indeed, our conclusions would be the same if we viewed the record and gave the law firm the benefit of any factual disagreements.
The Trustees and the Joneses argue that the circuit court's order is not immediately appealable and that we can avoid addressing the merits. Orders denying joinder are generally not immediately appealable. See Marshall v. Winter, 250 S.C. 308, 312, 157 S.E.2d 595, 596-97 (1967) (); Crussiah v. Inova Health Sys., 688 Fed.Appx. 218, 218 (4th Cir. 2017) ( an order denying a motion for joinder was neither a final nor an appealable interlocutory order). Here, however, the circuit court did not deny joinder. Instead, the circuit court dismissed the Trustees from the case after it had previously joined them. This was a dispositive decision as to the Trustees-it dismissed them from the case-and the grant of a dispositive motion is immediately appealable. See Link v. Sch. Dist. of Pickens Cnty., 302 S.C. 1, 3-6, 393 S.E.2d 176, 177-79 (1990) (); Murphy v. Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp., 346 S.C. 37, 44-45, 550 S.E.2d 589, 593 (Ct. App. 2001) (), overruled on other grounds by Farmer v. Monsanto Corp., 353 S.C. 553, 579 S.E.2d 325 (2003).
To this point, we have said the circuit court "dismissed" the Trustees. The Trustees captioned their motion as seeking "nonjoinder," but, as the briefing recognizes, misjoinder (rather than nonjoinder) is the vehicle for dropping parties who have previously been added. The law firm argues the Trustees are necessary parties under Rule 19, SCRCP, because it is not possible to afford complete relief or avoid duplicative litigation without them. It further argues the circuit court's dismissal of the Trustees pursuant to Rule 21, SCRCP (titled "Misjoinder and Nonjoinder of Parties"), was not proper. The Trustees and the Joneses argue the Trustees are not necessary parties under Rule 19 and that dismissal under Rule 21 was proper.
Removing a necessary party is generally improper. See 4 James Wm. Moore et al., Moore's Federal Practice § 21.05 (3d ed.) . A party is necessary if:
(1) in his absence complete relief cannot be accorded among those already parties, or (2) he claims an interest relating to the subject of the action and is so situated that the disposition of the action in his absence may (i) as a practical matter impair or impede his ability to protect that interest or (ii) leave any of the persons already parties subject to a substantial risk of incurring double, multiple, or otherwise inconsistent obligations by reason of his claimed interest.
The Trustees do not meet Rule 19's criteria. Their rights against the Joneses are settled by the new easement, not the old one. This situation is not meaningfully different from Hardwick v. Liberty Mutual Insurance Company, which was a dispute between the driver of a rental car involved in an accident and the rental company's insurer. 243 S.C. 162, 133 S.E.2d 71 (1963). Our supreme court explained the driver's personal automobile insurer was not a necessary party because nothing indicated the court needed to ascertain the rights under that policy before the court could determine the rights between the driver and the rental insurer. Id. at 169-70, 133 S.E.2d at 74 . So too here-the Trustees' rights against the Joneses are settled by the new easement, not the old one. We are convinced the circuit court does not need to ascertain the Trustees' rights before it can determine the dispute about the old easement between the Joneses and the law firm. See Altom Transport, Inc. v. Westchester Fire Ins. Co., 823 F.3d 416, 420-21 (7th Cir. 2016) ().
We have not been able to identify any interest the Trustees could have in this suit. The Trustees have no claim against the law firm for legal malpractice. The Trustees also have no interest in the original easement. We do not see any practical problems created by dropping the Trustees, nor do we see a risk of inconsistent judgments. The Joneses may win or lose their malpractice case, and we see no way either outcome affects the new easement between the Joneses and the Trustees. Therefore, the Trustees are not necessary parties.
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