Jones v. Schneiderman

• Decision Date: 16 August 2012
• Docket Number: No. 11 Civ. 8215(KMW).,11 Civ. 8215(KMW).
• Citation: 888 F.Supp.2d 421
• Parties: Jon JONES, et al., Plaintiffs, v. Eric T. SCHNEIDERMAN, et al., Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Southern District of New York

888 F.Supp.2d 421

Jon JONES, et al., Plaintiffs,

v.Eric T. SCHNEIDERMAN, et al., Defendants.

No. 11 Civ. 8215(KMW).

United States District Court,

S.D. New York.

Aug. 16, 2012.

Barry Evan Friedman, New York University School of Law, New York, NY, for Plaintiffs.

John Michael Schwartz, State of New York Office of the Attorney General, New York, NY, for Defendants.

Jamie A. Levitt, Jonathan Carl Rothberg, Leah Andrea Ramos, Morrison & Foerster LLP, New York, NY, for Plaintiffs/Defendants.

OPINION & ORDER

KIMBA M. WOOD, District Judge:

Plaintiffs challenge the constitutionality of a 1997 New York state law prohibiting the live performance of professional mixed martial arts (“MMA”) in New York. Zuffa, LLC, the leading MMA promoter doing business as the Ultimate Fighting Championship (“UFC”), together with a group of professional and amateur MMA athletes, MMA trainers, and MMA fans (collectively, “Plaintiffs”) bring this action against the New York State Attorney General and the New York County District Attorney (“Defendants”) to invalidate the law.

Plaintiffs' Complaint states seven counts: (1) as applied to Plaintiffs, the law violates their First Amendment rights of expression (Count I); (2) on its face, the law is overbroad, in violation of the First Amendment (Count II); (3) the law is unconstitutionally vague, in violation of the Due Process Clause (Count III); (4) the law violates the Equal Protection Clause (Count IV); (5) the law lacks a rational basis, in violation of the Due Process Clause (Count V); (6) the law violates the Commerce Clause (Count VI); and (7) as applied to Plaintiffs, a separate 2001 liquor law violates their First Amendment rights of expression (Count VII).

The Court directed Defendants to limit their initial Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss to Count IV (Equal Protection) and Count V (Due Process irrationality). For the reasons stated below, the 1997 law satisfies the rational basis scrutiny that is required by the Equal Protection and Due Process clauses. Accordingly, the Court GRANTS Defendants' motion to dismiss Counts IV and V.

I. BACKGROUND¹A. Professional MMA

Professional MMA bouts feature fighters trained in various martial and combat arts, including karate, jiu jitsu, boxing, kickboxing, grappling, judo, Muay Thai, and wrestling. (Compl.¶ 1). Fighters may strike their opponents while standing or while grappling on the ground, using fists, elbows, knees, and feet to subdue them. ( Id. at ¶¶ 39, 200.) In UFC-sponsored contests, fights are typically staged inside “the Octagon,” an eight-sided padded-floor platform surrounded by a chain-link fence. ( Id. at ¶ 40.) Because the Octagon resembles a cage, MMA is sometimes colloquially referred to as “cage fighting.” ( Id.)

Although the modern origins of MMA trace back to Brazilian full-contact martial arts developed 80 years ago, interest among American sports fans in MMA emerged in the early 1990s. ( Id. at ¶ 19). The promoters of early MMA contests attracted interest by advertising the sport's violence and its risk to fighters. ( Id. at ¶ 23). In what Plaintiffs acknowledge was an “ill-advised marketing strategy,” fights were sold as “no holds barred” contests under the slogan “There Are No Rules!” ( Id.) As one MMA advertisement promised, “Each match will run until there is a designated winner—by means of knock-out, surrender, doctor's intervention, or death.” ( Id.) In this context, many states banned MMA fighting. ( Id. at ¶ 5).

B. Legislative History

In 1996, the New York Legislature held hearings on the question “Should New York Ban Extreme Fighting?” ( Id. at ¶ 35 n. 15.) At the hearings, representatives from the leading promoters testified about MMA's rules, and medical experts testified about the risks that the sport posed to fighters' safety. ( Id. at ¶¶ 71–78.) Legislators who supported banning MMA voiced two primary concerns: (1) MMA fights posed a health and safety risk to fighters, and (2) MMA fights undermined public morals and had a negative influence on New York youth. ( Id. at ¶¶ 31–36.)

In 1997, the legislature enacted New York Unconsolidated Law § 8905–a, which prohibits the conduct of any “combative sport” within the state of New York.² ( Id. at ¶ 29.) The statute defines a “combative sport” as “any professional match or exhibition” in which participants may deliver “kicks, punches or blows of any kind to the body of an opponent.” ( Id. at ¶ 261.) The statute exempts boxing, wrestling, and statutorily defined “martial arts” (including judo, karate, and tae kwon do). ( Id. at ¶¶ 261, 286.) The practical effect of the legislation is to prohibit all professional MMA matches and exhibitions in New York.

C. Evolution of MMA

Since the passage of the ban, the rules governing professional MMA have changed to make the sport safer and more palatable to a mainstream audience. In 1997, weight classes for fighters were introduced. ( Id. at ¶ 42.) In 1999, five-minute rounds were implemented. ( Id.) Rules were adopted to eliminate groin strikes, head butts, and joint manipulation, and to prohibit fighters from kicking downed opponents or striking them in the back of the neck and head. ( Id. at ¶¶ 41–42.)

In 2000, the New Jersey State Athletic Control Board sanctioned the first MMA fight under its Unified Rules of Mixed Martial Arts. ( Id. at ¶ 42.) The following year, New Jersey became the first state to formally sanction MMA. ( Id. at ¶ 43.) Nevada soon followed, largely adopting New Jersey's unified rules. ( Id.) Today, 45 of the 48 states with athletic commissions have elected to regulate, rather than prohibit, MMA. ( Id. at ¶ 48.) Although there is some variation in rules by state, most athletic commissions have adopted the unified rules codified by New Jersey. ( Id. at ¶ 43.)

Since that time, MMA has experienced what Plaintiffs describe as a “meteoric rise in popularity.” ( Id. at ¶ 2.) MMA is now reportedly the fastest growing spectator sport in the United States. ( Id. at ¶¶ 1, 64.) Fights are now regularly broadcast on network and pay-per-view television, and Plaintiffs estimate that the UFC reaches five hundred million homes worldwide. ( Id. at ¶ 1.) Although the UFC is MMA's largest promoter, many other promoters operate professional and amateur contests in the United States as well. ( Id. at ¶ 52.) Despite developments in MMA's rules and safety practices, efforts to overturn the ban in the New York Legislature have failed. ( Id. at ¶ 66.) It is within this context that Plaintiffs bring the instant action.

II. DISCUSSIONA. Applicable Legal Standard

1. The Court Accepts Plaintiffs' Pleading as True for Purpose of the Motion to Dismiss

To survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, a plaintiff must plead sufficient facts “to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007). A claim is facially plausible “when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009). The Court must accept as true all well-pleaded factual allegations in the complaint, and “draw[ ] all inferences in the plaintiff's favor.” Allaire Corp. v. Okumus, 433 F.3d 248, 249–50 (2d Cir.2006) (citation omitted).

2. The Court Applies Rational Basis Scrutiny to the Equal Protection and Due Process Challenges

The Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution states that no state may “deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.” U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1. This language has been interpreted to mean that, in legislation, “all persons similarly situated should be treated alike.” City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 439, 105 S.Ct. 3249, 87 L.Ed.2d 313 (1985). Where a challenged law neither singles out a suspect class nor interferes with a fundamental right, courts require only that it satisfy rational basis scrutiny. Hayden v. Paterson, 594 F.3d 150, 170 (2d Cir.2010) (Equal Protection); Molinari v. Bloomberg, 564 F.3d 587, 606 (2d Cir.2009) (Due Process). Plaintiffs do not claim to be members of a “suspect” or a “quasi-suspect class.” As a sport, professional MMA does not implicate a fundamental right.³ Accordingly, the Court applies rational basis scrutiny to the ban under Plaintiffs' Equal Protection and Due Process challenges.⁴ Because Plaintiffs' factual allegations supporting Counts IV and V are substantively the same, the Court considers the Equal Protection and Due Process challenges together.

Rational basis scrutiny requires legislation to be “rationally related to a legitimate state interest.” Beatie v. City of New York, 123 F.3d 707, 711 (2d Cir.1997) (quoting City of Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 440, 105 S.Ct. 3249). The Supreme Court has emphasized that the standard of review is “a paradigm of judicial restraint.” FCC v. Beach Commc'ns, Inc., 508 U.S. 307, 314, 113 S.Ct. 2096, 124 L.Ed.2d 211 (1993). In “areas of social and economic policy,” a statutory classification must be upheld “if there is any reasonably conceivable state of facts that could provide a rational basis for the classification.” Id. at 313, 113 S.Ct. 2096. A court will not invalidate a law unless the “varying treatment of different groups or persons is so unrelated to the achievement of any combination of legitimate purposes that [it] can only conclude that the legislature's actions were irrational.” Hayden, 594 F.3d at 170 (quoting Vance v. Bradley, 440 U.S. 93, 97, 99 S.Ct. 939, 59 L.Ed.2d 171 (1979)).

3. The Court Need Not Decide Whether Changed Circumstances Are Relevant in Reviewing the Law for a Rational Basis

Defendants assert that, in considering whether the law has a rational basis, the relevant question is whether the law was rational at the time of enactment. Plaintiffs counter that the Court must also consider any changed circumstances since...