Jones v. Sec'y, Case No. 2:08-cv-625-FtM-29SPC

• Decision Date: 23 September 2011
• Docket Number: Case No. 2:08-cv-625-FtM-29SPC
• Parties: AARON RICHARD JONES, Petitioner, v. SECRETARY, DOC and ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE STATE OF FLORIDA, Respondents.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Middle District of Florida

AARON RICHARD JONES, Petitioner,

v.SECRETARY, DOC and ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE STATE OF FLORIDA, Respondents.

Case No. 2:08-cv-625-FtM-29SPC

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA FORT MYERS DIVISION

Dated: September 23, 2011

OPINION AND ORDER

I. Status

Petitioner Aaron Richard Jones (hereinafter "Petitioner" or "Jones") initiated this action by filing a pro se Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus ("Petition," Doc. #1) pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 on August 4, 2008.¹ The Petition challenges Petitioner's April 16, 2003, judgment of conviction for Robbery With a Firearm and Grand Theft Auto entered in the Twentieth Judicial Circuit Court, Lee County, Florida (case number 01-1004CFA). Petition at 1.² Petitioner's sentence and conviction were per curiam affirmed ondirect appeal.³ Jones v. State, Case No. 2D03-2065 (2d DCA 2004); Exh. 9.

The Petition raises the following thirteen grounds for relief:

GROUND ONE

THE TRIAL COURT ERRONEOUSLY DENIED THE DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO SUPPRESS EVIDENCE FOUND DURING AN ILLEGAL DETENTION.

GROUND TWO

THE DEFENDANT'S 6TH AND 14TH AMENDMENT RIGHTS WERE VIOLATED WHERE THE TRIAL COURT ERRONEOUSLY DENIED HIS REQUEST TO INTERVIEW JURORS FOR MISCONDUCT.

GROUND THREE

THE TRIAL COURT ERRONEOUSLY DENIED THE DEFENDANT'S MOTIONS FOR JUDGMENT OF ACQUITTAL.

GROUND FOUR

APPELLATE COUNSEL WAS INEFFECTIVE FOR FAILING TO RAISE ON DIRECT APPEAL THREE CRITICAL ISSUES WHICH SEVERELY PREJUDICED THE DEFENDANT.

GROUND FIVE

THE POSTCONVICTION COURT ERRED IN DENYING THE DEFENDANT'S CLAIM OF NEWLY DISCOVERED EVIDENCE, BY RULING THAT THE EVIDENCE WOULD NOT PRODUCE AN ACQUITTAL ON RETRIAL.

GROUND SIX

TRIAL COUNSEL WAS INEFFECTIVE FOR FAILING TO CALL DETECTIVES MARK CHIHOOD AND MATTHEW SELLERS TO GIVE TESTIMONY THAT WAS FAVORABLE TO THE DEFENSE.

GROUND SEVEN

TRIAL COUNSEL WAS INEFFECTIVE FOR FAILING TO ADEQUATELY CROSS-EXAMINE STATE'S WITNESS DETECTIVE BARRY LEWIS.

GROUND EIGHT

TRIAL COUNSEL WAS INEFFECTIVE FOR FAILING TO MAKE THE INFERENCE BASED ON THE STATE'S FAILURE TO CALL A WITNESS.

GROUND NINE

TRIAL COUNSEL WAS INEFFECTIVE FOR FAILING TO INVESTIGATE AND HAVE AN EXPERT EXAMINE CRITICAL EVIDENCE WHICH COULD HAVE BEEN FAVORABLE TO THE DEFENSE.

GROUND TEN

TRIAL COUNSEL WAS INEFFECTIVE FOR FAILING TO PRESERVE AN ISSUE FOR APPELLATE REVIEW BY OBJECTING TO NOT BEING ABLE TO RE-CROSS-EXAMINE STATE WITNESS GERALD MORE CONCERNING THREATS ISSUED TO HIM BY THE STATE IF HE DID NOT TESTIFY.

GROUND ELEVEN

TRIAL COUNSEL WAS INEFFECTIVE FOR FAILING TO PRESENT EVIDENCE THAT STATE WITNESS TIFFANY FLEMING WAS BIASED AGAINST THE DEFENDANT AND HAD AN ULTERIOR MOTIVE FOR TESTIFYING.

GROUND TWELVE

THE DEFENDANT'S 6TH AND 14TH AMENDMENT RIGHTS WERE VIOLATED WHERE THE COURT DEPARTED FROM ITS ROLE OF IMPARTIALITY DURING TRIAL.

GROUND THIRTEEN

TRIAL COUNSEL WAS INEFFECTIVE FOR FAILING TO OBJECT TO DOCUMENTS ENTERED INTO EVIDENCE AT SENTENCING WHICH VIOLATED THE DEFENDANT'S CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO CONFRONTATION.

See generally Petition.

Respondent filed a Response to the Petition and addressed each of the Grounds for relief raised in the Petition (Doc. #15,Response). Respondent submits that certain of the claims in the Petition should be dismissed as procedurally barred or because they fail to present a federal issue, and other claims should be denied because Petitioner fails to satisfy his burden under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) and (e). Response at 1. Respondent filed exhibits (Exhs. 1-31) in support of the Response, including the three-volume record on direct appeal (Exh. 29, Vols. I, II and III). Petitioner filed a reply to the Response (Doc. #20, Reply). This matter ripe for review.

II. Applicable § 2254 Law

Jones filed his timely⁴ Petition after April 24, 1996, the effective date of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA), Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214 (1996). Consequently, post-AEDPA law governs this action. Abdul-Kabir v. Quarterman, 127 S. Ct. 1654, 1664 (2007); Penry v. Johnson, 532 U.S. 782, 792 (2001); Davis v. Jones, 506 F.3d 1325, 1331, n.9 (11th Cir. 2007). Under AEDPA, a federal court's standard of review "is greatly circumscribed and is highly deferential to the state courts." Stewart v. Sec'y Dep't of Corr., 476 F.3d 1193, 1208 (11th Cir. 2007)(internal quotations and citations omitted). AEDPA altered the federal court's role in reviewing state prisoner applications in order to "prevent federal habeas 'retrials' and toensure that state-court convictions are given effect to the extent possible under law." Bell v. Cone, 535 U.S. 685, 693 (2002); see also Harrington v. Richter, _ U.S. _, 131 S. Ct. 770, 787 (2011)(internal quotations and citations omitted)(emphasizing "[f]ederal habeas review of state conviction frustrates both the State's sovereign power to punish offenders and their good-faith attempts to honor constitutional rights."). Consequently, the Court applies the following principles of law in evaluating the claims set forth in the instant Petition.

A. Only Federal Claims are Cognizable

A federal court may entertain an application for a writ of habeas corpus from a person in state custody pursuant to a state court judgment only on the grounds that the petitioner is in custody in violation of the United States Constitution or the laws or treaties of the United States. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a). A claimed violation of state law is insufficient to warrant review or relief by a federal court under § 2254. Pulley v. Harris, 465 U.S. 37, 41 (1984)(stating "[a] federal court may not issue the writ on the basis of a perceived error of state law."); Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 67-68 (1991)(stating "[t]oday, we reemphasize that it is not the province of a federal habeas court to reexamine state-court determinations on state-law questions."); Waddington v. Sarausad, 129 S. Ct. 823, 832 n.5 (2009)(same); Cabberiza v. Moore, 217 F.3d 1329, 1333 (11th Cir. 2000)(stating § 2254 not enacted to enforcestate-created rights). Carrizales v. Wainwright, 699 F.2d 1053, 1055 (11th Cir. 1983)(finding claim involving pure question of state law does not raise issue of constitutional dimension for federal habeas corpus purposes; state's interpretation of its own laws or rules provides no basis for federal habeas corpus relief, since no question of a constitutional nature is involved).

B. Exhaustion and Procedural Default

A federal court may only review an issue under § 2254 if petitioner first afforded the state courts an adequate opportunity to address that issue. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1)(A).

Before seeking a federal writ of habeas corpus, a state prisoner must exhaust available state remedies, 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1), thereby giving the State the opportunity to pass upon and correct alleged violations of its prisoners' federal rights. To provide the State with the necessary opportunity, the prisoner must fairly present his claim in each appropriate state court (including a state supreme court with powers of discretionary review), thereby alerting that court to the federal nature of the claim.

Baldwin v. Reese, 541 U.S. 27, 29 (2004)(internal citations and quotations omitted.) This imposes a "total exhaustion" requirement in which all the federal issues must have first been presented to the state courts. Rhines v. Weber, 544 U.S. 269, 274 (2005). "In other words, the state prisoner must give the state courts an opportunity to act on his claims before he presents those claims to a federal court in a habeas petition." O'Sullivan v. Boerckel, 526 U.S. 838, 842 (1999). See also Henderson v. Campbell, 353 F.3d 880, 891 (11th Cir. 2003) ("A state prisoner seeking federal habeasrelief cannot raise a federal constitutional claim in federal court unless he first properly raised the issue in the state courts.") (quoting Judd v. Haley, 250 F.3d 1308, 1313 (11th Cir. 2001)); Duncan v. Henry, 513 U.S. 364, 365 (1995)(stating "exhaustion of state remedies requires that petitioners 'fairly present federal claims to the state courts in order to give the State the opportunity to pass upon and correct alleged violations of its prisoners' federal rights'"). Additionally, in articulating a factual basis in support of a claim for relief, a petitioner must have also alleged the factual predicate to the state court. Kelley v. Sec'y for Dep't of Corrs., 377 F.3d 1317, 1343-44 (11th Cir. 2004)(noting that petitioners may not present particular factual instances of ineffective assistance of counsel in their federal petition if they did not first raise them in the state courts).

"A claim is procedurally defaulted if it has not been exhausted in state court and would now be barred under state procedural rules." Mize v. Hall, 532 F.3d 1184, 1190 (11th Cir. 2008). Under the procedural default doctrine, "[i]f the petitioner has failed to exhaust state remedies that are no longer available, that failure is a procedural default which will bar federal habeas relief, . . . . ." Smith v. Jones, 256 F.3d 1135, 1138 (11th Cir. 2001). A procedural default for failing to exhaust state court remedies will only be excused in two narrow circumstances. First, a petitioner may obtain federal habeas review of a procedurally defaulted claim if he shows both "cause" for the default and actual"prejudice" resulting from the asserted error. House v. Bell, 547 U.S. 518, 536-37 (2006); Mize v. Hall, 532 F.3d at 1190. Second, under exceptional circumstances, a petitioner may obtain federal habeas review of a procedurally defaulted claim, even without a showing of cause and prejudice, if such review is necessary to correct a fundamental miscarriage of justice. House v. Bell, 547 U.S. 518, 536 (2006); Edwards v. Carpenter, 529 U.S. 446, 451 (2000).

C. Deference to State Court Decision

Habeas relief may not be granted with respect to a claim adjudicated on the merits in state court unless the adjudication of the claim:

(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the

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