Jones v. State
| Docket Number | 28164,Appellate Case 2020-000188 |
| Decision Date | 21 June 2023 |
| Parties | Anthony Allan Jones, II, Petitioner, v. State of South Carolina, Respondent. |
| Court | South Carolina Supreme Court |
Submitted May 16, 2022
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI
Appeal from Charleston County Robert E. Hood, Circuit Court Judge
Elizabeth Anne Franklin-Best, of Elizabeth Franklin-Best P.C., of Columbia, for Petitioner.
Attorney General Alan McCrory Wilson and Senior Assistant Deputy Attorney General William M. Blitch, Jr., both of Columbia, for Respondent.
Allison Krause Elder and Katherine Weaver Patterson, both of Greenville, for Amici Curiae Root & Rebound, SC Commission on Indigent Defense, Dr. Kate Kleinfelter, Justice 360, and Cornell Law School Juvenile Justice Clinic; Hannah Lyon Freedman, of Columbia, for Amicus Curiae Justice 360; Dr. Aleksandra Boguslawa Chauhan, of Columbia, for Amicus Curiae S.C. Commission on Indigent Defense; and John H. Blume, III, of Ithaca, NY, for Amicus Curiae Juvenile Justice Clinic and Cornell Law School.
Petitioner Anthony Jones pleaded guilty on December 12, 2016 to first-degree burglary and armed robbery, crimes he committed at the ages of sixteen and seventeen, respectively. Pursuant to subsection 63-19-20(1),[1] the definitional statute of chapter nineteen in the Juvenile Justice Code, the circuit court had jurisdiction over Jones's charges, rather than the family court.[2] The circuit court judge sentenced Jones to ten years in prison for armed robbery and fifteen years for first-degree burglary, with the sentences to run concurrently. Jones did not file a direct appeal. Instead, he filed an application for post-conviction relief ("PCR") on several grounds, including a challenge to the constitutionality of subsection 63-19-20(1). After a hearing, the PCR court dismissed the application, finding the constitutional challenge was not a cognizable PCR claim and, even if it were, the statute was constitutional. We granted Jones's petition for a writ of certiorari to consider whether the PCR court erred.
We conclude Jones properly brought this challenge in his PCR application and subsection 63-19-20(1) is constitutional. However, in keeping with our prior decisions regarding sentencing juveniles, circuit court judges must consider the mitigating factors of youth as identified in Aiken v. Byars[3] when sentencing. Consideration of these factors can be done at sentencing; therefore, a separate Aiken hearing is not required. Accordingly, we affirm in part and reverse in part.
On June 7, 2015, Jones entered a home in Dorchester County through an unlocked door. The victim had left her patio door unlocked for neighbors to return furniture. When the victim returned home, she noticed her firearm was missing from her nightstand and her cat was outside. Investigators found fingerprints inside the victim's residence that matched Jones's fingerprints.
Jones used the stolen firearm in an armed robbery in Charleston County on June 28, 2015. Jones contacted the robbery victim regarding a Craigslist advertisement for a laptop. He and a co-defendant met the victim for the purported sale. The co-defendant opened the victim's car door, grabbed the laptop, and pointed a revolver at the victim. Jones and the co-defendant fled with the laptop.
After police identified the vehicle from the victim's description, a high-speed chase ensued. The vehicle crashed into a tree, and Jones and the co-defendant fled. Police eventually arrested Jones and the co-defendant, and they found the laptop in the vehicle and the revolver in a nearby yard. Police also discovered the vehicle belonged to Jones's father. Later, the co-defendant gave a statement implicating Jones as the person who planned the robbery and provided the weapon.
The State indicted Jones for first-degree burglary in Dorchester County on October 1, 2015, and for armed robbery in Charleston County on October 20, 2015. Jones appeared before the circuit court because armed robbery (subsection 16-11-330(A)) is defined as a Class A felony.[4] S.C. Code Ann. § 16-1-90(A) (2015 & Supp. 2021); id. § 63-19-20(1) (2010) ().[5]
Jones agreed to plead guilty to both charges during the plea hearing held in Charleston County on December 12, 2016. After negotiations, the Dorchester County Solicitor recommended to the court that Jones receive the statutory minimum sentence of fifteen years in prison for the first-degree burglary charge. The Charleston County Solicitor did not make a sentencing recommendation.
At the time of his plea and sentencing, Jones was eighteen years old and had previously been adjudicated delinquent as a juvenile for second-degree burglary, a weapons charge, and shoplifting. The plea court sentenced him to fifteen years in prison for first-degree burglary[6] and ten years for armed robbery,[7] to run concurrently.
Following his sentencing, Jones did not pursue a direct appeal. However, on April 14, 2017, Jones simultaneously filed identical applications for PCR in Dorchester County and Charleston County. In these applications, Jones sought to vacate his pleas. By order dated June 22, 2017, a circuit court judge granted Jones's motion to merge the applications into one action for PCR.
Jones raised two arguments in his PCR application. First, Jones alleged his plea counsel was constitutionally ineffective according to Strickland v. Washington, 46 U.S. 668 (1984) because counsel did not properly investigate the mitigating circumstances of Jones's youth and failed to engage in meaningful plea negotiations. Second, Jones contended subsection 63-19-20(1),[8] which transferred him from family court to circuit court as an adult, was unconstitutional. Specifically, Jones asserted the statutory provision is unconstitutional because it does not allow discretion in sentencing for a defendant who was a juvenile at the time of the crime, which deprived him of due process. Further, Jones claimed his sentence is also cruel and unusual in violation of the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution and article I, sections 3 and 15, of the South Carolina Constitution.
The PCR court conducted the hearing on November 18, 2019 and subsequently dismissed Jones's application in an order dated January 29, 2020. The court relied on two principal reasons in dismissing the application.
First, the court ruled that Jones did not meet his burden under Strickland in alleging constitutional ineffectiveness for failing to investigate mitigating circumstances of youth because Jones was sentenced to the mandatory minimum for both crimes. In support of this, the PCR court found that plea counsel noted Jones's youth and the plea court considered Jones's age. Jones did not appeal the Strickland ruling to this Court.
Second, the PCR court ruled counsel was not deficient in failing to challenge the constitutionality of subsection 63-19-20(1) because "[a]t the time of [Jones's] plea, and to date, South Carolina's automatic waiver provision and [Jones's] mandatory minimum sentence are considered constitutional." The court found, even if the court interpreted Jones's claim as a Strickland challenge, "[i]t is a long-standing rule that an attorney is not required to be clairvoyant and anticipate or discover changes in the law which were not in existence at the time of trial." Further, the court noted that "[a]ny allegation that the waiver provision was unconstitutional or that [Jones's] sentence was unconstitutional could and should have been raised either in a direct appeal or through the Federal Habeas procedures."
Jones appealed the dismissal of his PCR application for the sole purpose of challenging the constitutionality of subsection 63-19-20(1). See Rule 243(a), SCACR; Rule 243(1), SCACR. This Court granted the petition because it involves a challenge to the constitutionality of a statute. See Rule 203(d)(1)(A)(ii), SCACR.
In an appeal from a PCR court, "[q]uestions of law are reviewed de novo, and we will reverse the PCR court's decision when it is controlled by an error of law." Sellner v. State, 416 S.C. 606, 610, 787 S.E.2d 525, 527 (2016).
"This Court has a limited scope of review in cases involving a constitutional challenge to a statute because all statutes are presumed constitutional and, if possible, will be construed to render them valid." Curtis v. State, 345 S.C. 557, 569, 549 S.E.2d 591, 597 (2001). "Further, a legislative act will not be declared unconstitutional unless its repugnance to the Constitution is clear and beyond a reasonable doubt." Id. at 570, 549 S.E.2d at 597.
Jones argues subsection 63-19-20(1) is unconstitutional. In support, Jones contends the provision restricts a judge's ability to consider the mitigating factors of youth as articulated in Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460 (2012) because a family court is in a better position to adjudicate juveniles. In Jones's view, the provision prevents judges from exploring the full impact of a defendant's youth on the record before a juvenile is "automatically waived" to the circuit court. Jones maintains that "adult court" delivers more severe sentences to defendants.
Conversely, the State argues that the provision is constitutional and, therefore, the PCR court did not commit an error of law dismissing Jones's PCR application. The State contends that Jones has no constitutional right to have his case adjudicated in family court. Additionally, the State asserts that any right a person may have to be in the family court's jurisdiction is statutorily created.
Because Jones appeals the PCR cour...
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