Jones v. State
Decision Date | 31 August 1984 |
Docket Number | No. 982S377,982S377 |
Citation | 467 N.E.2d 681 |
Parties | Tom JONES, Appellant, v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee. |
Court | Indiana Supreme Court |
Joe Keith Lewis, Fishburne & Lewis, Marion, for appellant.
Linley E. Pearson, Atty. Gen., Richard Albert Alford, Deputy Atty. Gen., Indianapolis, for appellee.
This is a direct appeal from a conviction upon a plea of guilty to class B felony rape. Ind.Code Sec. 35-42-4-1 (Burns Supp.1984). Appellant-Defendant Tom Jones was sentenced to ten years imprisonment plus an additional ten years for aggravating circumstances. He now requests a review of the trial court's imposition of an aggravated sentence upon him.
These are the facts that are pertinent to the appeal. On November 6, 1980, two eleven-year-old girls were walking to Franklin Elementary School in Marion, Indiana, when they were abducted by two men as they passed Crofton Industries. Ambrose Washington took the girl he abducted in one direction. Appellant took the girl he abducted in another direction to a vacant building where he raped her. Washington was taken into custody by the police on the day of the commission of the crime. Jones was taken into custody in September of 1981.
On March 9, 1982, at the start of the second day of trial, Appellant changed his pleas of not guilty to one count of Rape, a class B felony. The trial court accepted Appellant's guilty plea and ordered the Probation Officer of Grant County to conduct a pre-sentence investigation and to submit a report. Later on March 16, 1982, the trial court moved its sentencing hearing date for Appellant from April 2, 1982, to April 16, 1982, upon learning that the Probation Department was sending Jones to the Reception-Diagnostic Center of the Indiana Department of Corrections for the purpose of a pre-sentence evaluation.
The findings of the Grant County Probation Department included the statement that use of the felony sentencing sheet resulted in the indication that Appellant should be sentenced to a minimum term of six years or be placed on probation. The probation officer who prepared the report, however, recommended to the trial court that Appellant be sentenced for the maximum time allowed under a class B felony. The probation officer stated that the age of the victim was the aggravating circumstance. The Reception-Diagnostic Center in its pre-sentencing evaluation of Appellant concluded that he would be a good candidate for probation or for a minimum sentence if the court deemed it appropriate. At the sentencing hearing, the trial court heard testimony from David Jenks, the probation officer who conducted Appellant's pre-sentence investigation and prepared the pre-sentence report, and from Howard Jones, Sr., Appellant's father. The court also heard arguments from counsel.
In order to carry out our function of reviewing the trial court's exercise of discretion in sentencing, we must be told of its reasons for imposing the sentence. Green v. State, (1981) Ind., 424 N.E.2d 1014, on remand (1983) Ind., 451 N.E.2d 638. This statement of reasons must contain the following three elements: (1) It must identify all significant mitigating and aggravating circumstances--a failure to find either when clearly supported by the record may reasonably give rise to a belief that they were overlooked, hence not properly considered. (See Page v. State, (1981) Ind., 424 N.E.2d 1021; on remand (1982) Ind., 442 N.E.2d 977, reh. denied (1983); (2) It must include the specific reason why each circumstance is mitigating or aggravating; and (3) The mitigating circumstances must be weighed against the aggravating factors in order to determine if the aggravating circumstances offset the mitigating circumstances. Some articulation of this balancing process must be made in the record by the trial judge. Spinks v. State, (1982) Ind., 437 N.E.2d 963; Abercrombie v. State, (1981) Ind., 417 N.E.2d 316, on remand (1982) Ind., 441 N.E.2d 442.
In the instant case, the trial judge stated his reasons for imposing an aggravated sentence upon Appellant as follows:
Appellant now specifically contends, inter alia, that the trial court erred by failing to consider the Reception-Diagnostic...
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