Jones v. State
| Citation | 467 N.E.2d 757 |
| Decision Date | 20 August 1984 |
| Docket Number | No. 2-1283A465,2-1283A465 |
| Parties | James JONES, Appellant (Petitioner), v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee (Respondent). |
| Court | Court of Appeals of Indiana |
Susan K. Carpenter, Public Defender of Ind., Melanie C. Conour, Deputy Public Defender, Indianapolis, for appellant.
Linley E. Pearson, Atty. Gen. of Ind., Amy Schaeffer Good, Deputy Atty. Gen., Indianapolis, for appellee.
Petitioner-appellant James Jones (Jones) seeks review of the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief 1 in which he requests that his guilty pleas be vacated as they were not voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently entered because the trial court failed to advise him of the minimum penalties for the offenses or the possibility of issuance of consecutive sentences as required by statute.
We reverse and remand.
The facts most favorable to the decision reveal that, on November 15 and 18, 1980, Jones was charged with two counts of burglary 2 and one count of theft 3 in the Marion County Superior Court and, on July 7, 1981, entered pleas of guilty thereto. Prior to acceptance of the pleas, the trial court admonished Jones as follows:
"Q. Now do you understand by your plea of guilty to Burglary, a Class B Felony in CR80-442C, the maximum penalty for a Class B Felony in this State is up to 20 years imprisonment A. Yes.
and up to a $10,000 fine. In CR80-462C the maximum penalty for Burglary, a Class C Felony is up to eight years in prison and up to a $10,000 fine. The maximum penalty for Theft, a Class D Felony is up to four years in prison and up to a $10,000 fine. I am not saying this is what you will receive, but I have a duty to explain to you the maximum penalties in these cases. Do you understand that?
Q. Has your lawyer explained to you the maximum penalties in the various cases?
A. Yes sir.
Q. Now on the other hand, if you had a trial in both of the cases you might be proven not guilty and completely exonerated and acquitted. That could be the other possibility if you had a trial. Do you understand that?
A. Yes sir."
Following acceptance of the pleas, the trial court sentenced Jones, in accordance with the agreement, to two six-year terms of imprisonment for the burglary counts and one two-year term for the theft count, such terms of imprisonment to run concurrently with one another and consecutively to a sentence rendered in an unrelated case. Jones challenged the validity of his convictions based upon the pleas by post-conviction relief, and he now appeals the denial of his petition.
Resolution of this case revolves around one issue: 4
Does the trial court's failure to advise Jones of the possible minimum penalties for the crimes charged and of the possibility of the issuance of consecutive sentences necessitate that the pleas be vacated because they were not voluntarily, intelligently, and knowingly rendered, despite recent amendment of Indiana's guilty plea statute to provide that a guilty plea need only be set aside when a defendant's constitutional rights are violated?
PARTIES' CONTENTIONS--Jones maintains the recent amendment of Indiana's guilty plea statute to provide for vacating guilty pleas only when constitutional rights of a defendant are violated should be given no effect because it is in conflict with existing Indiana case law.
The State counters that the amendment allows Indiana courts to adopt a "harmless error" approach to vacating guilty pleas. Accordingly, unless Jones has suffered prejudice by violation of his constitutional rights, the guilty pleas need not be vacated for failure to advise Jones of the minimum possible sentences or the possibility of consecutive sentences.
CONCLUSION--The recent amendment of Indiana's guilty plea statute which would require setting aside a plea of guilty only if the failure to properly advise the defendant violates his constitutional rights does not alter existing Indiana law.
(1) determining that he understands the nature of the charge against him;
(2) informing him that by his plea he waives his rights to:
(A) a public and speedy trial by jury;
(B) confront and cross-examine the witnesses against him;
(C) have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor; and
(D) require the state to prove his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt at a trial at which the defendant may not be compelled to testify against himself;
(3) informing him of the maximum possible sentence and minimum sentence for the crime charged and any possible increased sentence by reason of the fact of a prior conviction or convictions, and any possibility of the imposition of consecutive sentences; and
(4) determining if a written recommendation, under chapter 3 of this article, has been executed by the prosecutor and the defendant, and if such recommendation exists, then informing the defendant that if the court accepts the plea, it is bound by the terms of the written recommendation.
(b) A defendant in a misdemeanor case may waive the rights under subsection (a) by signing a written waiver without first being addressed by the judge and formally advised of those rights."
IC 35-35-1-2(a), (b) (1982) (formerly IC 35-4.1-1-3) [hereinafter cited as the guilty plea statute].
Then, in 1984, the legislature made some minor changes in sections 2(a) and 2(b) and, more importantly, added section 2(c) which provides:
"(c) Any variance from the requirements of this section that does not violate a constitutional right of the defendant is not a basis for setting aside a plea of guilty."
1984 Ind.Acts, Pub.L. No. 179-1984 () [hereinafter cited as the amendment].
In order to evaluate the effect of the amendment, we must first make a pilgrimage to the fountainhead of guilty plea law, Boykin v. Alabama, located at 395 U.S. 238, 89 S.Ct. 1709, 23 L.Ed.2d 274, and decided by the United States Supreme Court in 1969. From Boykin emerged the concept that, because a plea of guilty results in a waiver of constitutional rights, acceptance of the plea cannot be upheld unless the record affirmatively presents an intelligent and voluntary waiver. Three federal constitutional rights were specifically enumerated as being encompassed in the rule: the privilege against compulsory self-incrimination, the right to trial by jury, and the right to confront one's accusers.
Indiana quickly implemented this policy, first by case law, then by statute. In Brimhall v. State, (1972) 258 Ind. 153, 279 N.E.2d 557, and Bonner v. State, (1973) 156 Ind.App. 513, 297 N.E.2d 867, our courts granted post-conviction relief when defendants were not affirmatively advised of their Boykin rights, which are state constitutional rights as well as federally protected rights. Soon thereafter, the general assembly enacted legislation which required the trial court to inform the defendant not only of Boykin rights that are waived by pleading guilty, but also of, inter alia, the maximum and minimum sentences for the offense charged and any possibility of consecutive sentencing. IC 35-35-1-2(a), (b) (1982) (originally enacted by 1973 Ind.Acts, Pub.L.No. 325-1973 Sec. 4).
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