Jones v. State
| Decision Date | 02 October 2009 |
| Docket Number | No. A09A1244.,A09A1244. |
| Citation | 300 Ga. App. 287,684 S.E.2d 411 |
| Parties | JONES v. The STATE. |
| Court | Georgia Court of Appeals |
Richard M. Darden, for appellant.
Tom Durden, Dist. Atty., Henry P. Smith, Asst. Dist. Atty., for appellee.
After a jury trial, Eric Lamar Jones was convicted of (a) child molestation, by attempting to place his penis in C.L.'s vagina; and (b) aggravated child molestation, by placing his penis in her anus. Jones seeks relief from his judgment, asserting claims of insufficient evidence, impermissible testimony, erroneous jury instruction, and juror misconduct. Because Jones has demonstrated no reversible error, we affirm.
1. Jones contends that the state failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he committed the offenses. When an appellant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence, "the relevant question is whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt."1
So viewed, the evidence showed that the sexual molestation occurred one day in November 2006. Jones was seventeen years old and living with his parents and younger siblings; C.L. was seven years old. Jones's mother and C.L.'s mother were very close friends, and their families often visited one another's residences in Hinesville. The offenses underlying this case were committed during one such visit at the Joneses' residence.
C.L. testified that, while they were in a bedroom, Jones placed his penis in her vagina; and while they were in another bedroom, Jones placed his penis in her anus. During that same visit, C.L. described, Jones put his fingers on her front private area, while she was sitting on his lap on the living room sofa. Jones told C.L. not to tell anyone.
C.L.'s mother and father testified that, later that evening, C.L. described to them what Jones had done. They summoned Jones's parents back to their home, where C.L. repeated the allegations to them. Jones's mother testified that when she and her husband confronted their son that same night, Jones denied any inappropriate contact with C.L. Jones's mother further testified that, the next day, she told C.L.'s mother that her son had denied all of the allegations.
But according to C.L.'s parents, Jones's mother reported to them that next day that, when confronted, their son confessed to them: "I did it." C.L.'s father elaborated at trial that Jones's mother's report was that Jones had confessed only to the sofa incident.
The state also called Gloria Christ, a mutual acquaintance of C.L.'s mother and Jones's mother. Gloria Christ was a minister, and the two mothers had previously volunteered their time to work at the Heart of Christ Ministry, an entity operated by Gloria Christ that distributed donated money, food, clothing, and other such items to individuals seeking help. Gloria Christ testified that Jones's mother had confided in her that Jones had confessed to her (Jones's mother) about C.L.'s allegations, although Jones's mother never specified any details. Jones's mother maintained at trial, however, that her son never confessed to her about any of C.L.'s allegations and that she had not stated otherwise either to C.L.'s parents or to Gloria Christ.
The state called several witnesses to whom C.L. had described being molested by Jones. The detective assigned to investigate the case testified about his interview with C.L. a few days after the date in question, and a video recording of the interview was played to the jury. It showed C.L. recounting the same sexual acts described in her trial testimony. The state also called C.L.'s school counselor, who testified that C.L. told her that she had been molested by Jones; and C.L.'s school teacher, who testified that C.L. had told her that she had received a "bad touch."
On appeal, Jones points to what he claims are evidentiary weaknesses and inconsistencies in the state's case. "However, resolving evidentiary conflicts and inconsistencies, and assessing witness credibility, are the province of the factfinder, not this [c]ourt."2 "On appeal, [Jones] no longer enjoys the presumption of innocence."3 The evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the prosecution, was sufficient for a rational trier of fact to find Jones guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of the crimes of which he was convicted.4
2. Jones contends that the trial court erred by refusing to grant his motion for mistrial, which was based upon testimony he claims constituted an impermissible comment on his silence. During cross-examination of the detective, in an apparent effort to show that the state had failed to adequately investigate the case, defense counsel asked, "Did you attempt to interview [Jones's younger sibling]?" The detective answered, "How could I interview [her] when her mother wouldn't let me talk to Eric Jones[?]"
Jones asserts that the detective's answer was unresponsive and impermissibly showed that he (Jones) had invoked his right to remain silent at the time of his arrest.5 We agree that the detective's rhetorical question was unresponsive — the detective was asked what he did, not what the defendant's mother did or did not do.6 Fairly construed, however, while the remark may be viewed as evidence that Jones's mother had thwarted the detective's attempt to interview her teenaged son, it fell short of implying further that Jones had elected to remain silent.7 Because Jones thus has failed to show that a mistrial was essential to preserve his right to a fair trial, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by refusing to grant the motion for mistrial.8
3. Jones contends that the trial court erroneously charged the jury regarding the testimony of a child victim.
The trial of this case occurred in [May 2008]. Thus, this issue is controlled by the 2007 amendment to OCGA § 17-8-58, effective July 1, 2007. Under subsection (a) of that Code section, a criminal defendant is required to "inform the court of the specific objection and the grounds for such objection before the jury retires to deliberate." Subsection (b) precludes appellate review where there is a "[f]ailure to object in accordance with subsection (a)." As [Jones] did not specifically object to the charge on [a child victim's] testimony at the conclusion of the jury charge, he has waived his right to urge error on appeal.9
Although Jones's attorney purported to reserve any objection, "at the time of trial, a `reservation of objection' could no longer be used to preserve objections to the charge."10
4. Jones contends that the trial court erred by denying his motion for new trial, which alleged juror misconduct. More specifically, Jones complains that a juror failed to disclose during voir dire that he knew Gloria Christ.
At the motion for new trial hearing, the juror testified that he did not realize during voir dire that he knew someone named "Gloria Christ." When she walked onto the witness stand, however, he realized that he did know her, but by a different name, "Gloria Winters." He explained that he had not called this realization to anyone's attention during the trial because, as a first time juror, he simply had not known what, if anything, to do. The juror stated that he had not been trying to hide anything. He recounted at the new trial hearing his prior dealings with the woman he knew as "Gloria Winters." The juror was a minister. And in that capacity, on a monthly basis over a two- to four-year period, he had taken various donations to Winters for her ministry. The juror further stated that, at the time of voir dire, he was aware of the Heart of Christ Ministry.
As Jones points out, for a defendant to secure a new trial because a juror did not give a correct response to a question posed on voir dire, "a defendant must show that (1) the juror failed to answer honestly a material question on voir dire and (2) a correct response would have provided a valid basis for a challenge for cause."11
The rationale for this rule is that a trial represents an important investment of private and social resources, and it ill serves the important end of finality to wipe the slate clean simply to recreate the peremptory challenge process because counsel lacked an item of information which objectively he should have obtained from a juror on voir dire examination.12
(a) We consider the first portion of the inquiry: whether Jones showed that the juror failed to answer the question honestly. During voir dire, the prosecuting attorney posed to the panel whether anyone knew One individual, not the individual at issue here, revealed, Defense counsel also probed the matter by stating to the panel: No one responded.
Although the trial court's order summarily rejected Jones's motion for new trial, the transcript of the new trial hearing reveals that the court found that Jones had failed to show that the juror had answered the questions dishonestly. In particular, the court noted, "[The juror's] testimony is that he didn't hear Winter[s] and he didn't know anything about it until he saw her walk in the courtroom, not during the voir dire." The court also stated its finding that the juror ...
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