Jones v. State

• Decision Date: 07 February 2000
• Docket Number: No. 35,35
• Citation: 745 A.2d 396,357 Md. 408
• Parties: Donald Anthony JONES v. STATE of Maryland.
• Court: Maryland Court of Appeals

745 A.2d 396

357 Md. 408

Donald Anthony JONES v. STATE of Maryland.

No. 35, Sept. Term, 1999.

Court of Appeals of Maryland.

February 7, 2000.

Gina M. Serra, Asst. Public Defender (Stephen E. Harris, Public Defender, on brief), Baltimore, for Petitioner.

Mary Ann Ince, Asst. Atty. Gen. (J. Joseph Curran, Jr., Atty. Gen. of Maryland, on brief), Baltimore, for Respondent.

Argued before BELL, C.J., and ELDRIDGE, RODOWSKY, RAKER, WILNER, CATHELL and HARRELL JJ HARRELL, Judge.

Donald Anthony Jones, Petitioner, was convicted by a jury in the Circuit Court for Prince George's County of one count of second degree assault, Maryland Code (1957, 1996 Repl.Vol.), Article 27, § 12A, and four counts of reckless endangerment, Maryland Code (1957, 1996 Repl.Vol., 1998 Supp.), Article 27, § 12A-2(a)(1).¹ On direct appeal, the Court of Special Appeals affirmed the judgments. Jones v. State, 125 Md.App. 168, 724 A.2d 738 (1999). We issued a writ of certiorari to determine whether the trial court erred by refusing to instruct the jury that self-defense applied to the reckless endangerment charges.² Jones v. State, 354 Md. 330, 731 A.2d 439 (1999). We hold that common law self-defense is a viable defense to a charge of the statutory crime of reckless endangerment under § 12A-2(a)(1) and, consequently, we reverse the judgments of the Circuit Court and the Court of Special Appeals as to the reckless endangerment convictions.

I.

As our holding in this case turns on a purely legal analysis, we adopt, with slight modifications, the facts as stated by the Court of Special Appeals:

"On [6 July 1997], Carmen Reavis met several of her friends for an afternoon of fun at Adventure World [now Six Flags], a water amusement park located in Prince George's County. Among them were Tracy Barber, Gerald Goode, Walter Stokes, Reginald Davis, and William Brown. The group collected inside the park at around 1:30 p.m. and spent the next several hours together. [Petitioner] and Rashad Friday, his friend, arrived at Adventure World at around 5:30 p.m. the same day. About ten minutes later, Friday spotted Reavis, whom he did not know, and, thinking she was attractive, approached her.

"[Petitioner] testified in his own defense. He explained that Friday `reached over to touch [Reavis'] arm to get her attention so she could hear him....' When Reavis did not respond, Friday `touched' her arm again. This time, `[s]he responded immediately with cursing and fussing.' Friday then `put his hands up and like okay, no problem.' [Petitioner] turned away momentarily to speak with some friends who were standing nearby; when he looked back he saw that `approximately seven to nine guys [had] surrounded [Friday] in a confrontation.' Among them were Goode, Stokes, Brown, and Davis. [Petitioner] approached the men and said to Friday, `[l]et's walk.' He and Friday then walked together toward the front gate, "where we had seen some safety, the only place I[had] seen security.' The group followed. At that point, [Petitioner] became scared.

"[Petitioner] further testified that as he and Friday crossed over a narrow bridge, he looked to his right and saw three of the pursuers attack Friday. He watched Friday `go down' as his attackers `stomp[ed] on him' and kicked him in the head and chest. Immediately thereafter, someone grabbed [Petitioner] from behind, threw him into a railing and repeatedly hit his head against it. [Petitioner] remembered being accosted by three assailants: one who stood behind him and restrained his arms and two others who alternated striking him in the head and chest. [Petitioner] explained that, `[w]hen I got one of my arms released I reached in my right pocket, pulled out a knife, opened it up' and `cut each of them until they let me go.'

"The State's witnesses offered a very different version of events. Reavis testified that as she and her friends were walking toward the `Mind Eraser' roller coaster, Friday grabbed her arm. She did not want to speak with him, so she continued walking. Friday approached her again a few minutes later and this time reached over and touched her breast. When Goode learned what had happened, he confronted Friday and warned him to keep his hands to himself. According to Reavis, `it wasn't like a crowd of people, you know, around or nothing. It was just like basically us three, and it was a couple people around, but they was like a little distance back.' Friday made disparaging remarks to Reavis and she found him to be belligerent, not apologetic. Reavis heard [Petitioner] ask Goode if he wanted to `take it outside,' but Goode refused. About five minutes later, [Petitioner] and Friday suddenly attacked Goode on the bridge. Brown, Williams, and Davis got involved in the brawl to help Goode. Reavis saw [Petitioner] `swinging his arms wildly.'

"Stokes testified that [Petitioner] had a knife and that during the brawl, [Petitioner] stabbed him in the leg. Brown testified that during the commotion, [Petitioner] was `swinging' and then spun around and stabbed him. When the dust cleared, Stokes, Brown, Goode, and Davis had been wounded." Jones, 125 Md.App. at 170-71, 724 A.2d at 739.

The State charged Petitioner with one count each of attempted second degree murder, attempted voluntary manslaughter, first degree assault, second degree assault, and reckless endangerment for the injuries to Walter Stokes. The State also charged Petitioner with three counts of second degree assault and three counts of reckless endangerment for the injuries inflicted upon William Brown, Gerald Goode, and Reginald Davis.

Petitioner's jury trial commenced in the Circuit Court for Prince George's County on 21 January 1998. Before the trial concluded on 23 January 1998, Petitioner's trial counsel presented, in writing, to the trial judge his requested jury instructions. Among these instructions, Petitioner included the following regarding the reckless endangerment charges:

If an individual is acting in defense of a crime of violence, he cannot be guilty of reckless endangerment. It is the State's burden to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant was not acting in defense of a crime of violence. If you are not so convinced, you must find the defendant not guilty of all counts charging reckless endangerment.

To this, Petitioner's trial counsel appended a supporting footnote which referenced Maryland Code (1957, 1996 Repl.Vol.), Article 27, § 12A-2(b)(4). Unfortunately, Petitioner's statutory support referred to a superceded subsection of the reckless endangerment statute. Section 12A-2(b)(4), in the version cited by Petitioner and that was effective prior to 8 April 1997, provided that the prohibitions of the reckless endangerment statute generally did not apply to "an individual acting in defense of a crime of violence."³ The record does not reflect that Petitioner, the State, or the court acknowledged or were aware of the superceded status of the statutory provision cited by Petitioner in support of the requested instruction. The trial judge did not give Petitioner's relevant jury instruction.⁴

The trial judge did instruct the jury that self-defense applied to all the charges against Petitioner, except the reckless endangerment counts. Following the judge's delivery of the jury instructions, Petitioner's trial counsel excepted to certain omissions from the instructions. Among the exceptions, his counsel asked the trial judge to instruct that self-defense applied to the reckless endangerment charges. Defense counsel stated, "if an individual is acting in defense of a crime of violence he cannot be guilty of reckless endangerment... I think the jury should know that, that it's akin to self-defense." Defense counsel again referred to Maryland Code (1957, 1996 Repl.Vol.), Article 27, § 12A-2(b)(4) in support of his oral request.⁵ The trial judge overruled Petitioner's exception.⁶

As noted supra, the record does not reflect that either party or the judge was aware expressly that defense counsel was relying on a superceded version of § 12A-2(b),⁷ as the basis of the request for the relevant jury instruction. The General Assembly amended § 12A-2, and specially subsection (b), with the new version taking effect on 8 April 1997, approximately three months before Petitioner's altercation at Adventure World. In the amended version, § 12A-2(b) no longer provides a defense for individuals acting in defense of a crime of violence to a charge under § 12A-2(a)(1), which served as the basis of the reckless endangerment charges against Petitioner.

The jury found Petitioner not guilty of attempted second degree murder, attempted voluntary manslaughter, and first degree assault. It convicted Petitioner of second degree assault against Stokes and all four counts of reckless endangerment. At sentencing, the reckless endangerment conviction as to Stokes was merged into the related assault conviction. The trial court sentenced Petitioner to ten years in prison with all but four years suspended for the second degree assault conviction as to Stokes and three concurrent four-year sentences in prison for the remaining reckless endangerment convictions.

The Court of Special Appeals affirmed the convictions. Jones v. State, 125 Md. App. 168, 724 A.2d 738 (1999). The intermediate appellate court determined that Petitioner's requested jury instruction was based on a superseded statutory provision and that under the correct version of the statute, the self-defense provision which Petitioner relied upon ("defense of a crime of violence") applied only to a § 12A-2(a)(2) charge ("recklessly discharges a firearm from a motor vehicle"). Because the court resolved that Petitioner's jury instruction was based on an inaccurate statement of the law (as to the statute), it held that the trial judge properly refused to give the requested self-defense jury instruction as to the reckless endangerment counts premised on § 12A-2(a)(1)(general reckless endangerment...