Jones v. State, No. 14-03-00650-CR (TX 3/10/2005)
| Decision Date | 10 March 2005 |
| Docket Number | No. 14-03-00650-CR.,14-03-00650-CR. |
| Parties | VIRGINIA ESTELL JONES, Appellant v. THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee. |
| Court | Supreme Court of Texas |
On Appeal from the 12th District Court, Walker County, Texas, Trial Court Cause No. 19,968.
Affirmed.
Panel consists of Justices ANDERSON, HUDSON, and FROST.
Appellant Virginia Estell Jones challenges her conviction for introducing implements of escape into a correctional facility. She asserts ten issues on appeal, alleging: (1)-(2) the evidence is legally and factually insufficient to support her conviction; (3) the trial court erred when it denied her motion to suppress custodial statements; (4) the jury charge failed to require a unanimous verdict; (5) the trial court erred in admitting evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts in violation of Texas Rules of Evidence 403 and 404(b); (6) the jury charge and statements made by the State misled the jury as to the meaning of "reasonable doubt;" (7) the jury engaged in misconduct by deliberating before the close of the evidence and the reading of the jury charge; (8) her trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance; (9) the trial court defined the offense improperly and improperly enhanced punishment; and (10) the trial court committed constitutional error by failing to properly instruct the jury on the law of parole. We affirm.
Appellant and Mark Stallings, an inmate in the Holliday Unit of the Institutional Division of the Texas Department of Criminal Justice in Huntsville, Texas, shared a romantic relationship. Appellant regularly visited Stallings in prison, and they corresponded regularly by mail. In this correspondence, appellant and Stallings, using code words, discussed appellant acquiring a gun. On or about August 2, 1998, appellant allegedly supplied Stallings with a gun. Five days later, Stallings used the gun to threaten and to hold a prison guard hostage in an attempt to escape. Prior to trial, Stallings signed a written confession in which he stated that appellant brought the gun to him in prison during a contact visit on August 2, 1998, and another inmate, Jerry Dale Stanley, helped him smuggle it past the guards in the visitation room.
At trial, the State asserted that appellant gave the gun to Stallings during the August 2, 1998 contact visit, although no one saw appellant deliver the gun to Stallings. At that time, prison visitors were not patted down, searched for contraband, or required to pass through metal detectors. Stanley and another inmate, Joseph Kellerman, testified that Stallings's escape plan included appellant smuggling a gun into the prison and giving it to him during visitation. Stanley testified that when he and Stallings left the visitation room on August 2, Stallings handed him a heavy item, wrapped in cloth, and asked him to hold it. The item was successfully smuggled past the guards supervising the visitation.
Stanley gave a second version of events. In contrast to the account given in his first written confession, in a second written confession and at trial, Stallings testified that he received the gun from a corrupt corrections officer.
Appellant testified that she acquired the gun for her own protection. She also testified that she did not give Stallings the gun during visitation, but that she gave the gun to a man sent by Stallings to pick it up from her at her home. Felix Garza, appellant's ex-boyfriend, testified that he bought the gun for appellant. Although the gun used by Stallings had the serial number filed off, a firearms expert was able to restore the serial number. The custodian of records for the pawn shop where Garza purchased the gun testified that Garza purchased a gun with the same serial number as the gun used by Stallings. Prison records indicate that Stallings had no visitors other than appellant between the date the gun was purchased and the date of Stallings's attempted escape.
Appellant was charged by indictment with introducing implements of escape into a correctional facility. Appellant pleaded "not guilty." A jury found appellant guilty and assessed punishment at ten years in the Texas Department of Criminal Justice, Institutional Division and a $10,000 fine.
A person commits a felony if the person, with the intent to facilitate escape, introduces into a correctional facility, or provides an inmate with, a deadly weapon or anything that may be useful for escape. TEX. PEN. CODE ANN. § 38.09(a) (Vernon 2003). A person is criminally responsible for an offense committed by another if that person, acting with intent to promote or assist the commission of the offense, solicited, encouraged, directed, aided, or attempted to aid the other person to commit the offense. TEX. PEN. CODE ANN. § 7.02(a)(2) (Vernon 2003). The jury charge authorized the jury to convict appellant as a principal or as a party and instructed the jury on the law of parties and the need to corroborate accomplice testimony. In appellant's first and second issues, she asserts that the evidence is legally and factually insufficient to support her conviction because there is no evidence to show that appellant (1) delivered the gun to Stallings; (2) introduced the gun into the prison unit; or (3) had the specific intent to facilitate Stallings's escape from prison.
In evaluating a legal-sufficiency challenge, we view the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict. Wesbrook v. State, 29 S.W.3d 103, 111 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000). The issue on appeal is not whether we, as a court, believe the State's evidence or believe that appellant's evidence outweighs the State's evidence. Wicker v. State, 667 S.W.2d 137, 143 (Tex. Crim. App. 1984). The verdict may not be overturned unless it is irrational or unsupported by proof beyond a reasonable doubt. Matson v. State, 819 S.W.2d 839, 846 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991). The jury, as the trier of fact, "is the sole judge of the credibility of the witnesses and of the strength of the evidence." Fuentes v. State, 991 S.W.2d 267, 271 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999). The jury may choose to believe or disbelieve any portion of the witnesses' testimony. Sharp v. State, 707 S.W.2d 611, 614 (Tex. Crim. App. 1986). When faced with conflicting evidence, we presume the trier of fact resolved conflicts in favor of the prevailing party. Turro v. State, 867 S.W.2d 43, 47 (Tex. Crim. App. 1993). Therefore, if any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt, we must affirm. McDuff v. State, 939 S.W.2d 607, 614 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997).
Appellant asserts that the non-accomplice evidence is legally insufficient to support her conviction. Appellant argues that the State established only that appellant had an opportunity to commit the crime and failed to present evidence sufficient to establish all the elements of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt. A conviction cannot be based upon the testimony of an accomplice unless that testimony is corroborated by other evidence tending to connect the defendant with the offense committed. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 38.14 (Vernon 1979). The corroboration is insufficient if it merely shows the commission of the offense. Id. To corroborate accomplice-witness testimony, the law requires some non-accomplice evidence that tends to connect the accused to the commission of the offense. See Hernandez v. State, 939 S.W.2d 173, 178-79 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997). In determining the sufficiency of the corroboration, we eliminate the testimony of the accomplice and ask whether other inculpatory evidence tends to connect the accused to the commission of the offense, even if it does not directly link the accused to the crime. See McDuff, 939 S.W.2d at 612. We consider each case on its own facts and circumstances and look to all facts as furnishing the corroboration. See Munoz v. State, 853 S.W.2d 558, 559 (Tex. Crim. App. 1993). The corroborative evidence may be circumstantial or direct, and it need not establish the accused's guilt of the charged offense or directly link the accused to the offense; it is sufficient if it tends to connect the defendant to the offense. Id. We must review the corroborating evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict. Knox v. State, 934 S.W.2d 678, 686-87 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996).
In this case, Stallings and Stanley were accomplice witnesses. Therefore, we must apply the standard discussed above to determine whether there is evidence other than their testimony that tends to connect appellant to the offense. Kellerman, a fellow inmate of Stallings and Stanley, testified that Stallings's escape plan included appellant smuggling a gun into the prison and giving it to Stallings during visitation. We conclude that this evidence sufficiently tends to connect appellant with the offense alleged. Therefore, the testimony of Stallings and Stanley is sufficiently corroborated and the jury was free to consider their testimony.
A fact finder determines intent from all the facts and infers intent from the conduct and circumstances surrounding those facts. See Williams v. State, 688 S.W.2d 486, 488 (Tex. Crim. App. 1985); Murchison v. State, 93 S.W.3d 239, 254 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2002, pet. ref'd). Stallings's first written confession, which he recanted at trial, stated appellant gave the gun to him during a contact visit and he used that gun in an escape attempt several days later. The jury heard testimony from two of Stalling's fellow inmates that his escape plan included appellant smuggling a gun into prison and giving it to him during visitation. The jury was also presented with details about the hostage situation and Stallings's attempted escape. F...
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