Jones v. State, 39640
| Decision Date | 11 April 1955 |
| Docket Number | No. 39640,39640 |
| Citation | 223 Miss. 812,79 So.2d 273 |
| Parties | Hobson P. JONES v. STATE of Mississippi. |
| Court | Mississippi Supreme Court |
Jackson & Ross, Jackson, for appellant.
J. P. Coleman, Atty. Gen., by Joe T. Patterson, Asst. Atty. Gen., for appellee.
The appellant was indicted in the Circuit Court of the First Judicial District of Hinds County on a charge of grand larceny. The indictment charged that he did wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously take, steal and carry away $300 good and lawful money of the United States of America, of the value of $300, the property of L. C. Lipscomb. The appellant's trial resulted in his conviction and he was sentenced to a term of five years in the State penitentiary. From the judgment and sentence, he prosecutes this appeal.
The proof is undisputed. The appellant and Robert Conn, sometime in June, 1952, met Carl Matthews in Utica, Mississippi, and informed him that they had a scheme whereby they could make some money and that they were looking for prospects. They accompanied Matthews to Port Gibson, where Matthews introduced them to two Negroes, L. C. Lipscomb and his stepfather, Jake Tarleton. There the appellant unfolded his scheme and exhibited a small pasteboard box, and demonstrated how the box might be so manipulated as to double or triple money. Lipscomb and Tarleton were induced to meet Matthews, Conn and the appellant in Utica the next morning, and they went to Utica pursuant to such appointment. When they got there they were informed by Conn and Matthews that the appellant was in Jackson, and they were persuaded to come to Jackson for the purpose of meeting the appellant at the Robert E. Lee Hotel. Tarleton had $200 in money, and Lipscomb had $300. Conn, Matthews, Lipscomb and Tarleton came to Jackson in an automobile and stopped in front of, or by the side of, the Robert E. Lee Hotel. Conn went in the hotel to locate the appellant. In a little while, the appellant appeared and inquired of Tarleton and Lipscomb if they understood the deal, and they were then induced to pay the money to Jones, Tarleton paying him $200, and Lipscomb paying him $300. It was represented to them by the appellant Jones, according to the testimony of Lipscomb, which is undisputed, that the appellant wanted to get the serial numbers from the $300 which Lipscomb was induced to pay him, and that the same identical money, that is to say, the $300, would be returned to Lipscomb, plus three for one. Pursuant to this scheme, the $300 was paid by Lipscomb to the appellant, and Tarleton also paid the appellant $200. Matthews gave the appellant $200, which it later developed had been furnished to him by Conn in order to create the appearance that Matthews had faith in the scheme. The appellant, after getting the money, disappeared in the hotel, and when he did not return, the parties went to look for him, and they couldn't find him and did not again see him until they had reported the matter to the police, and they identified the appellant in a line-up at police headquarters in Jackson a day or two later.
The appellant contends that the proof is insufficient to convict him of the crime of grand larceny and that the trial court, therefore, erred in denying his request for a peremptory instruction. The basis of this contention is that the proof is consistent with an hypothesis that would establish either grand larceny or embezzlement or obtaining money under false pretenses, and, therefore, as a matter of law, tends to establish neither of such charges, and hence is insufficient to establish the guilt of the appellant beyond every reasonable doubt. Even if it should be granted that the appellant's argument is correct in theory, it is not maintainable in this case because not supported by the proof. Essential elements are lacking in the proof to establish the appellant's guilt of either the crime of embezzlement or the crime of obtaining money under false pretenses. Embezzlement is the wrongful appropriation or conversion of property where the original taking was lawful or with the consent of the owner. 29 C.J.S., Embezzlement, Sec. 4, p. 672; Jackson v. State, 211 Miss. 828, 52 So.2d 914.
In the case at bar, the proof shows that the original taking was effected by fraud and was, therefore, unlawful. Watson v. State, 36 Miss. 593. In cases of false pretense, it is essential that the proof show that the owner in parting with the property invests the recipient with the title thereto as well as the possession thereof. Courtney v. State, 174 Miss. 147, 164 So. 227; Fuller v. State, Miss., 72 So.2d 454. The undisputed proof in the case at bar shows that there was no intention on the part of Lipscomb to transfer to the appellant the title to the money which was delivered to the appellant. The money was delivered to the appellant in order that the appellant might take the serial numbers thereof, and with the express understanding that the identical money was to be returned to Lipscomb. Hence the proof in the case before us shows neither a lawful taking nor an intention on the part of Lipscomb to vest in the appellant the title to the money which was delivered to him, and, therefore, the proof fails to establish either the crime of embezzlement or obtaining money under false pretenses.
On the other hand, the undisputed proof shows that the appellant obtained possession of the money by fraudulent means and with...
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In re Miss. Rules Evidence
...judge abuses this authority, however, when he abandons his judicial detachment and assumes an advocacy position. See Jones v. State, 223 Miss. 812, 79 So. 2d 273 (1955), appeal dismissed, cert. denied, 350 U.S. 869 [76 S. Ct. 116, 100 L. Ed. 770] (1955), rehearing denied, 350 U.S. 919 [76 S......
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Davis v. State
...614(b). The judge only abuses this authority when he abandons his judicial detachment and assumes an advocacy position. Jones v. State, 223 Miss. 812, 79 So.2d 273 (1955). In the case of Griffin v. State, the Court said: "The circuit judge has an undoubted right to interrogate witnesses in ......
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Norman v. State, 51995
...to indicate his opinion as to the value of the witness's testimony. Hannah v. State, 336 So.2d 1317, 1322 (Miss.1976); Jones v. State, 223 Miss. 812, 79 So.2d 273 (1955); Breland v. State, 180 Miss. 830, 178 So. 817 (1938); Griffin v. State, 171 Miss. 70, 156 So. 652 (1934); Cobb v. State, ......
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Hannah v. State
...judge has the right to interrogate witnesses, within sound judicial discretion, to develop the truths of an issue. Jones v. state, 223 Miss. 812, 79 So.2d 273 (1955); Breland v. State, 180 Miss. 830, 178 So. 817 (1937); and Griffin v. State, 171 Miss. 70, 156 So. 652 (1934). We have studiou......