Jones v. University of District of Columbia, Civil Action No. 05-1187 (RMU).

• Decision Date: 17 August 2007
• Docket Number: Civil Action No. 05-1187 (RMU).
• Citation: 505 F.Supp.2d 78
• Parties: Valarie JONES, Plaintiff, v. The UNIVERSITY OF the DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, Board of Trustees of the University of the District of Columbia, Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Columbia

505 F.Supp.2d 78

Valarie JONES, Plaintiff, v. The UNIVERSITY OF the DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, Board of Trustees of the University of the District of Columbia, Defendant.

Civil Action No. 05-1187 (RMU).

United States District Court, District of Columbia.

August 17, 2007.

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Alan Lescht, Susan Laiken Kruger, Alan Lescht & Associates, P.C., Washington, DC, for Plaintiff.

Dana K. Delorenzo, Office of the Attorney General For D.C., Washington, DC, for Defendant.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

RICARDO M. URBINA, District Judge.

GRANTING THE DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND SUA SPONTE DISMISSING IN PART THE CLAIMS AGAINST THE DEFENDANT.

I. INTRODUCTION

This case is before the court on the defendant's motion for summary judgment. The plaintiff brings this suit under the Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA"), 42 U.S.C. §§ 12111 et seq., and the Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. § 794,¹ alleging that her employer, the University of the District of Columbia ("UDC"), committed disability discrimination by failing to accommodate her disability. Because the plaintiff failed to exhaust administrative remedies as to ADA claims arising after October 2003, the court dismisses these claims sua sponte. Furthermore, because the plaintiff fails to show that she could perform the essential functions of her job with or without reasonable accommodation, the court grants the defendant's motion for summary judgment on her claims under both the ADA and the Rehabilitation Act.

II. BACKGROUND

The plaintiff alleges the following: In 1988, the plaintiff began working for the defendant as a police officer. Am. Compl. ¶ 7. Between 1999 and 2002, the plaintiff suffered three job-related injuries. Pl.'s Opp'n to Mot. for Summ. J. ("Pl.'s Opp'n") at 3. First, in December of 1999, another employee assaulted the plaintiff while on duty. Def.'s Mot. for Summ. J., Ex. 1 ("Jones Dep.") at 21:11-16. Second, in April 2001, the employee who assaulted the plaintiff entered an elevator with her causing her to suffer a spasm, faint and injure herself. Pl.'s Opp'n at 3. Third, in November 2002, the plaintiff fell while escorting a contractor on the roof of a building. Id. at 3, 98-99.

As a result of these incidents, the plaintiff suffered injuries to her mouth, jaw, face, right shoulder, back, knees and ankle, leaving her with "chronic arthritis in her shoulder, neck and knees, bursitis in her hip, and various chronic back conditions." Jones Dep. at 27:7-16; Pl.'s Opp'n at 2, 11. The plaintiff lives in constant pain, Jones Dep. at 168:5-6, and has spasms when walking, sitting, bending and lifting. Pl.'s Opp'n at 2. She also suffers from anxiety attacks, but has no idea what triggers them. Jones Dep. at 334:20-335:12.

After the plaintiff recuperated from the first two work-related injuries, she returned to light-duty status. Id. at 3. As a result she only did limited patrolling and walking and spent most of her time sitting and supervising communications at the police's base station. Jones Dep. at 46:6-18; Pl.'s Opp'n at 3. Because she remained on pain medication, the plaintiff was not allowed to carry a gun. Jones Dep. at 39:2-10.

But in July 2003, after the third incident (as well as an unrelated gastric bypass surgery), Lieutenant Philip Morton, the plaintiff's supervisor, denied her request for light-duty status. Pl.'s Opp'n at 5-6; Jones Dep. at 125:1-16. The plaintiff then called Robert Robinson, the UDC Vice President of Public Safety and Emergency Management, to request light-duty status. Pl.'s Opp'n at 6. He informed her that no light-duty positions were available. Id. at 133:3-134:14. From July through October 2003, the plaintiff asked several UDC officials to reinstate her to a light-duty position, but these UDC officials informed her that there were still no light-duty positions available and that she could only resume her job once she was at "full capacity." Id. at 134:12, 200; Pl.'s Opp'n at 7.

In December 2003, the plaintiff filed a complaint with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC"), alleging that the defendant's actions violated the ADA. Def.'s Mot. for Summ. J., Ex. 10 ("EEOC Compl."). She charged that the defendant had failed to accommodate her when she asked to resume her light-duty job from July to October 2003. Id. The EEOC determined that the evidence established a violation, and in March 2005, it issued a letter permitting the plaintiff to bring a suit. Pl.'s Opp'n, Ex. 1. The plaintiff filed a complaint with this court in June 2005, alleging discrimination under both the ADA and the Rehabilitation Act.

III. ANALYSIS

A. Subject Matter Jurisdiction

When Congress requires the exhaustion of administrative remedies as an antecedent to judicial review, it is "rooted, not in prudential principles, but in Congress' power to control the jurisdiction of federal courts." Avocados Plus Inc. v. Veneman, 370 F.3d 1243 (D.C.Cir.2004); accord. Spinelli v. Goss, 446 F.3d 159, 162 (D.C.Cir.2006). Thus, before addressing the substantive issues of this case, the court must establish its jurisdiction to adjudicate the plaintiff's claims.

1. Legal Standard to Dismiss Sua Sponte

Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction and the law presumes that "a cause lies outside this limited jurisdiction." Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 511 U.S. 375, 377, 114 S.Ct. 1673, 128 L.Ed.2d 391 (1994); St. Paul Mercury Indem. Co. v. Red Cab Co., 303 U.S. 283, 288-89, 58 S.Ct. 586, 82 L.Ed. 845 (1938); see also Gen. Motors Corp. v. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 363 F.3d 442, 448 (D.C.Cir.2004) (noting that "[a]s a court of limited jurisdiction, we begin, and end, with an examination of our jurisdiction").

Because "subject-matter jurisdiction is an `Art. III as well as a statutory requirement[,] no action of the parties can confer subject-matter jurisdiction upon a federal court.'" Akinseye v. District of Columbia, 339 F.3d 970, 971 (D.C.Cir. 2003) (quoting Ins. Corp. of Ir., Ltd. v. Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinee, 456 U.S. 694, 702, 102 S.Ct. 2099, 72 L.Ed.2d 492 (1982)). "A claim that the court lacks jurisdiction under Article III of the Constitution may not be waived, since the jurisdiction at issue goes to the foundation of the court's power to resolve a case, and the court is obliged to address it sua sponte." Doe ex rel. Fein v. District of Columbia, 93 F.3d 861, 871 (D.C.Cir.1996). The plaintiff bears the burden of establishing that the court has subject-matter jurisdiction. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 561, 112 S.Ct. 2130, 119 L.Ed.2d 351 (1992). The court may dismiss a complaint for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction only if "it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief." Empagran S.A. v. F. Hoffman-LaRoche, Ltd., 315 F.3d 338, 343 (D.C.Cir.2003) (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46, 78 S.Ct. 99, 2 L.Ed.2d 80 (1957)).

Because subject-matter jurisdiction focuses on the court's power to hear the claim, however, the court must give the plaintiff's factual allegations closer scrutiny when resolving a Rule 12(b)(1) motion than would be required for Rule 12(b)(6) motion for failure to state a claim. Macharia v. United States, 334 F.3d 61, 64, 69 (D.C.Cir.2003); Grand Lodge of Fraternal Order of Police v. Ashcroft, 185 F.Supp.2d 9, 13 (D.D.C.2001). Moreover, the court is not limited to the allegations contained in the complaint. Hohri v. United States, 782 F.2d 227, 241 (D.C.Cir.1986), vacated on other grounds, 482 U.S. 64, 107 S.Ct. 2246, 96 L.Ed.2d 51 (1987). Instead, to determine whether it has jurisdiction over the claim, the court may consider materials outside the pleadings. Herbert v. Nat'l Acad. of Scis., 974 F.2d 192, 197 (D.C.Cir. 1992).

2. The Court Dismisses the Plaintiff's Post-October 2003 ADA Claims Sua Sponte

Violations of the ADA must be brought pursuant to Title VII, which requires the plaintiff to exhaust all of her administrative remedies before bringing suit. Park v. Howard Univ., 71 F.3d 904, 907 (D.C.Cir.1995) (en banc); Raines v. U.S. Dep't of Justice, 424 F.Supp.2d 60, 65 (D.D.C.2006). Requiring the exhaustion of remedies "serves the important purposes of giving the charged party notice of the claim and narrowing the issues for prompt adjudication and decision." Park, 71 F.3d at 907 (internal quotations omitted). "A Title VII lawsuit following the EEOC charge is limited in scope to claims that are like or reasonably related to the allegations of the charge and growing out of such allegations." Id. (internal quotations omitted).

The Supreme Court has provided guidance in evaluating whether specific discriminatory actions can be joined together to lengthen the statute of limitations on claims. Nat'l R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Morgan, 536 U.S. 101, 113, 122 S.Ct. 2061, 153 L.Ed.2d 106 (2002). The Court found that "each incident of discrimination ... constitutes a separate actionable `unlawful employment practice.'" Id. Accordingly, the Court held that "discrete discriminatory acts are not actionable if time barred, even when they are related to acts alleged in timely filed charges." Id. Circuits are split on how broadly to construe the Supreme Court's holding.

The Eighth Circuit interprets the holding narrowly and continues, to use the "reasonably related" test to determine whether a court may review claims not brought before the EEOC without first exhausting administrative remedies. Wedow v. City of Kan. City, Mo., 442 F.3d 661, 673-74 (8th Cir.2006). But the Eighth Circuit notes that, in light of Morgan, it has "narrowed its view of what acts are sufficiently related to be within the scope of the properly filed administrative charges." Id. at 673.

The Tenth Circuit, on the other hand, interprets the Supreme Court's holding broadly. Whereas the Supreme Court's decision barred untimely, but related, incidents occurring prior to the' filing of an EEOC...