Jordan Marsh Co. v. Labor Relations Com'n
| Decision Date | 29 December 1942 |
| Citation | 45 N.E.2d 925,312 Mass. 597 |
| Parties | JORDAN MARSH COMPANY v. LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION. |
| Court | United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court |
November 9, 1942.
Present: FIELD, C.
J., DONAHUE, QUA COX, & RONAN, JJ.
Labor and Labor Union. Certiorari. Pleading, Civil, Demurrer.
The filing of a demurrer to a petition for a writ of certiorari, without the filing of a return, is permissible practice to attack the sufficiency of the petition.
In the absence of extraordinary circumstances, certiorari does not lie previous to a proceeding under Section 6 of G.L.c. 150A inserted by
St. 1938, c.
345, Section 2, to correct error of law alleged to have been committed by the labor relations commission in determining a collective bargaining unit and certifying collective bargaining representatives under Section 5; the remedy provided by Sections 6 (f) and 5 (d) following a proceeding under Section 6 is adequate and exclusive.
PETITION for a writ of certiorari, filed in the Superior Court on June 10, 1942.
The petitioner appealed from an order by Collins, J., sustaining a demurrer to the petition.
C. A. Robert, (W.
F. Byrne with him,) for the petitioner.
L. E. Crowley, for the respondents.
This is a petition for a writ of certiorari to review a proceeding under Section 5 (c) of the State labor relations law, G.L.c 150A, as inserted by St. 1938, c. 345, Section 2, wherein the Labor Relations Commission certified that a certain labor organization had been selected by a majority of the petitioner's employees in an appropriate bargaining unit as their representative for the purposes of collective bargaining. Various errors are alleged to have been committed by the respondents in conducting the proceedings. The respondents demurred without filing a return, and the demurrer was sustained in the Superior Court on the ground, among others, that the petitioner had an adequate remedy under Section 6 (f) of the State labor relations law.
The filing of a demurrer to a petition for a writ of certiorari, either with or without a return, is recognized as permissible practice where it is desired to attack the sufficiency of the petition itself. Worcester & Nashua Railroad v. Railroad Commissioners, 118 Mass. 561 , 564. Selectmen of Wakefield v. Judge of First District Court of Eastern Middlesex, 262 Mass. 477. Webster v. Alcoholic Beverages Control Commission, 295 Mass. 572 . Irwin v. Municipal Court of the Brighton District of the City of Boston, 298 Mass. 158 . See Morrissey v. State Ballot Law Commission, ante, 121, 124.
The question in the case is whether certiorari lies to correct alleged errors of law where the commission has gone no further than to determine "the unit appropriate for the purposes of collective bargaining" (Section 5 [b]) and to "certify" the name of the union "designated or selected" (Section 5 [c]) "for the purposes of collective bargaining by the majority of the employees" (Section 5 [a]) in that unit, and where there has been as yet no charge of any "unfair labor practice" on the part of the petitioner, and no "cease and desist" order (Section 6 [c]), and where, other than as above stated, no "final order . . . granting or denying in whole or in part the relief sought" (Section 6 [f]) has been made.
Petition for certiorari is the common method available under our practice for the correction of errors of law committed in the course of proceedings of boards and commissions acting in a quasi judicial capacity. Although procedure in certiorari, with its emphasis upon the return of the respondents, may be thought cumbersome and in some respects not wholly satisfactory, yet the function performed by it is highly necessary in the modern governmental structure. Swan v. Justices of the Superior Court, 222 Mass. 542, 544. Commissioner of Public Works of Boston v. Justice of the Municipal Court of the Dorchester District, 228 Mass. 12 , 15. Whitney v. Judge of the District Court of Northern Berkshire, 271 Mass. 448 , 458-459. On the other hand it is still true that certiorari is one of the so called "extraordinary remedies," and that resort may not be had to it if the law provides adequate remedies by other methods. Mayor of Medford v. Judge of First District Court of Eastern Middlesex, 249 Mass. 465 , 468. Maher v. Commonwealth, 291 Mass. 343 , 345, 346. The issue therefore reduces itself to the inquiry whether the remedies afforded the petitioner by the labor relations law itself are so inadequate as to render certiorari necessary for the prevention of substantial injustice and to lead to the conclusion that the statutory remedy was not designed to be exclusive.
The structure and content of the statute make it plain that the functions of the commission are divided into two broad classes. The first class, described in Section 5, originally entitled "Representatives and Elections" (see St. 1937, c 436, Section 9), has to do with the ascertainment of an appropriate bargaining unit and the certification of the collective bargaining representatives who shall have been designated or selected by the majority of the employees in that unit. The powers of the commission under Section 5 do not extend beyond these two matters. Its function under Section 5 is essentially a fact finding function. It does not itself select the bargaining representatives. It merely certifies those who have been designated or selected by the majority of the employees in the unit. This is in pursuance of the declared policy of the statute to encourage and protect the practice of collective bargaining through representatives of the workers' own choosing (Section 1). This procedure does not end in any order requiring anybody to do anything and, except as hereinafter stated, there is no provision for a court review. Nevertheless the commission must provide for an "appropriate hearing" and "may take a secret ballot of employees, or utilize any other suitable method to ascertain such representatives." The second class of functions of the commission is described in Section 6, which was originally entitled "Prevention of Unfair Labor Practices." See St. 1937, c. 436, Section 10. Under this section it is the duty of the commission to hear complaints and to state findings of fact, but the commission may go further than merely finding the facts and may make "cease and desist" orders and other orders to effectuate the policies of the chapter. It is only in proceedings under Section 6 that anyone is ordered to do anything. And Section 6 (f) contains ample provisions whereby "any person aggrieved by a final order" may file in the Superior Court a transcript of the entire record and may have the order reviewed and, in a proper case, modified or set aside in whole or in part, although the commission's findings of fact, if supported by evidence, are to be conclusive. Moreover, it is provided by Section 5 (d) that whenever an order under Section 6 is based in whole or in part upon facts certified in accordance with Section 5 the transcript of the entire record filed in court under Section 6 (f) shall include the record of the investigation under Section 5 and "the decree of the court enforcing, modifying, or setting aside in whole or in part the...
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