Jordan v. Frederick Leyland & Co.

• Decision Date: 22 July 1925
• Docket Number: No. 17682.,17682.
• Citation: 7 F.2d 386
• Court: U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Louisiana
• Parties: JORDAN v. FREDERICK LEYLAND & CO. Limited.

7 F.2d 386 (1925)

JORDAN v. FREDERICK LEYLAND & CO. Limited.

No. 17682.

District Court, E. D. Louisiana, New Orleans Division.

July 22, 1925.

F. S. Normann, of New Orleans, La., for plaintiff.

Henry P. Dart, Jr., of New Orleans, La., for defendant.

BEATTIE, District Judge.

This is an action at law by the plaintiff against the defendant for $7,200, less a credit of $306.

I assume jurisdiction is based upon the fact that the plaintiff is a citizen of Louisiana and the defendant is a foreign corporation.

The action is based specifically upon the Louisiana Workmen's Compensation Act (Act No. 20 of 1914).

The injury suffered is alleged to have been accidental, and is alleged to have been suffered by plaintiff during the course of his employment by defendant as a stevedore to assist in loading cotton on the steamship Mercia, lying in the navigable waters of the Mississippi river, and the injury is alleged to have occurred while the plaintiff was engaged in his work in the hold of the steamship.

Plaintiff further avers that but for certain acts of waiver and estoppel alleged by him, the work in which he was engaged "would be construed as maritime in its nature, that his employment would be construed as a maritime contract, and that the injuries received would likewise be construed maritime, and the rights and liabilities of petitioner would come clearly within the maritime jurisdiction; but petitioner avers that defendant has substituted, in lieu of the general maritime law, the provisions of the Louisiana Workmen's Compensation Law, and has therefore waived its rights, and is now estopped to assert its rights, obligations, and liabilities under the general maritime law." There are other allegations of estoppel and waiver in the petition.

The defendant filed an exception to the jurisdiction of the court, and also an exception of no cause of action.

These exceptions were argued before I assumed the duties of judge, and I understand were either overruled or referred to the merits, to be passed upon on the trial of the merits of the case, and as a result the defendant filed an answer. After I assumed my duties, the exceptions were reopened and argued, and they are now the subject of this opinion.

Under the decisions of Southern Pac. Co. v. Jensen, 244 U. S. 205, 37 S. Ct. 524, 61 L. Ed. 1086, L. R. A. 1918C, 451, Ann. Cas. 1917E, 900, Knickerbocker Ice Co. v. Stewart, 253 U. S. 149, 40 S. Ct. 438, 64 L. Ed. 834, 11 A. L. R. 1145, Washington v. Dawson & Co., 264 U. S. 219, 44 S. Ct. 302, 68 L. Ed. 646, it is clear that there is no cause of action against defendant, unless, by some waiver or estoppel, the defendant is prohibited from taking advantage of the general law as it is held to be by these decisions.

In So. Pac. Co. v. Jensen, page 217, 37 S. Ct. 529, the court said: "The work of a stevedore in which the deceased was engaging is maritime in its nature; his employment was a maritime contract; the injuries which he received were likewise maritime; and the rights and liabilities of the parties in connection therewith were matters clearly within the admiralty jurisdiction."

On page 216 (37 S. Ct. 529) the court said: "And plainly, we think, no such legislation New York Workmen's Compensation Act is valid if it contravenes the essential purpose expressed by an act of Congress or works material prejudice to the characteristic features of the general maritime law or interferes with the proper harmony and uniformity of that law in its international and interstate relations. This limitation, at the least, is essential to the effective operation of the fundamental purposes for which such law was incorporated into our national laws by the Constitution itself."

This decision was rendered under a writ of error to the state court of New York.

Thereafter Congress amended the federal statute relating to the jurisdiction of the District Court, so as to save to claimants in admiralty causes the rights and remedies under the Workmen's Compensation Law of any state. This act of Congress was declared unconstitutional in Knickerbocker Ice Co. v. Stewart, supra, on the principles enunciated in Southern Pac. Co. v. Jensen, supra.

Thereafter Congress adopted another amendment to the Judicial Code (Comp. St. Ann. Supp. 1923, §§ 991, 1233), further attempting to make applicable to admiralty the Workmen's Compensation Laws of the different states, and this last act of Congress was declared unconstitutional in the case of Washington v. Dawson, supra.

The plaintiff in this case has attempted to show that he is not within the rules laid down by the decisions above cited, because, as he alleges, the Louisiana Workmen's Compensation Law has been adopted by the defendant.

In my opinion nothing short of a direct specific agreement, binding upon the plaintiff and the defendant, could take the plaintiff's case out of the positive rules laid down by the Supreme Court in the cases above cited. I have even some doubt as to whether a specific agreement on this subject, in view of the Supreme Court decisions, could be enforceable in a case like this. However, I do not now decide this, as such a case has not been presented, and it may be that a specific agreement between an employer and an employee, to adopt a state law as the measure of their liabilities and obligations and rights, may be enforceable, even though it "contravenes the essential purposes expressed by an act of Congress, or works material prejudice to the characteristic features of the general maritime law, or interferes with the proper harmony and uniformity of that law in its international and interstate relations."

In Washington v. Dawson, 264 U. S. at page 228, 44 S. Ct. 305, the court said: "This cause presents a situation where there was no attempt to prescribe general rules. On the contrary, the manifest purpose was to permit any state to alter the maritime law and thereby introduce conflicting requirements. To prevent this result the Constitution adopted the law of the sea as the measure of maritime rights and obligations. The confusion and difficulty, if vessels were compelled to comply with the local statutes at every port, are not difficult to see. Of course, some within the states may prefer local rules; but the Union was formed with the very definite design of freeing maritime commerce from intolerable restrictions incident to such control. The subject is national. Local interests must yield to the common welfare. The Constitution is supreme."

The Supreme Court has applied, in certain cases involving employment on navigable waters, or in connection therewith, the Workmen's Compensation Laws, but the nature of the employment in these cases was different from that of the plaintiff in the case at bar, which comes within the category stated in Southern Pacific Co. v. Jensen, wherein the court said that the work was maritime in its nature; the employment was a maritime contract; the injuries were maritime; and the rights and liabilities of the parties in connection therewith were matters clearly within the admiralty jurisdiction. The cases now referred to are Grant Smith-Porter Co. v. Rohde, 257 U. S. 469, 42 S. Ct. 157, 66 L. Ed. 321, 25 A. L. R. 1008, and State Industrial Commission v. Nordenholt Co., 259 U. S. 263, 42 S. Ct. 473, 66 L. Ed. 933, 25 A. L. R. 1013.

In Grant Smith-Porter Co. v. Rohde, the proceeding was in admiralty, to recover damages for personal injuries to an employee who was injured while at work on a partially completed vessel lying at a dock in the Willamette river belonging to the Grant Smith-Porter Ship Company. On page 476 (42 S. Ct. 158) the court said: "The injury was suffered within a state whose positive enactment prescribed an exclusive remedy therefor. And as both parties had accepted and proceeded under the statute by making payments to the industrial accident fund it cannot properly be said that they consciously contracted with each other in contemplation of the general system of maritime law. * * * Under such circumstances regulation of the rights, obligations and consequent liabilities of the parties, as between themselves, by a local rule would not necessarily work material prejudice to any characteristic feature of the general maritime law, or interfere with the proper harmony or uniformity of that law in its international or interstate relations."

On Page 477 (42 S. Ct. 158) the court said: "This conclusion accords with Southern Pacific Co. v. Jensen, 244 U. S. 205 37 S. Ct. 524, 61 L. Ed. 1086, L. R. A. 1918C, 451, Ann. Cas. 1917E, 900; Chelentis v. Luckenbach S. S. Co., 247 U. S. 372 38 S. Ct. 501, 62 L. Ed. 1171; Union Fish Co. v. Erickson, 248 U. S. 308 39 S. Ct. 112, 63 L. Ed. 261; and Knickerbocker Ice Co. v. Stewart, 253 U. S. 149 40 S. Ct. 438, 64 L. Ed. 834, 11 A. L. R. 1145. In each of them the employment or contract was maritime in nature and the rights and liabilities of the parties were prescribed by general rules of maritime law essential to its proper harmony and uniformity. Here the parties contracted with reference to the state statute; their rights and liabilities had no direct relation to navigation, and the application of the local law cannot materially affect any rules of the sea whose uniformity is essential."

This case was excepted from the rule in Southern Pacific Co. v. Jensen and other cases cited, because the employment was not maritime; that is, was not aboard of a completed vessel engaged in commerce, but was aboard a vessel in course of construction. For this reason the court held that the parties had not consciously contracted with each other in contemplation of the general system of maritime law, and that therefore the local law was applicable, as it would work no material prejudice to the general maritime law, and could not "materially affect any rules of the sea whose uniformity is essential." By this it is clearly shown that the local law cannot be permitted to apply, because it...