Jordan v. J. C. Penney Co.
| Decision Date | 07 September 1966 |
| Docket Number | No. 3,No. 42015,42015,3 |
| Citation | 114 Ga.App. 822,152 S.E.2d 786 |
| Parties | Barbara M. JORDAN v. J. C. PENNEY COMPANY |
| Court | Georgia Court of Appeals |
Syllabus by the Court
The trial court did not err in dismissing the petition as amended.
Mrs. Barbara M. Jordan filed a three count petition against the defendant J. C. Penney Company alleging injuries as a result of tortious misconduct, slander, and invasion of privacy by the authorized servants and agents of the defendant. The trial court sustained general demurrers to each count of the petition with leave to amend. Within the time allowed plaintiff amended her petition, and the defendant renewed its demurrers to the petition as amended and filed a motion to dismiss each count of the petition as amended upon the ground that plaintiff 'failed to amend said petition in conformity with the court's order' sustaining the demurrers to the original petition. The trial court then sustained all demurrers to the petition as amended and ordered same dismissed. Plaintiff enumerates error on this ruling as well as the court's denial of her motion to strike the defendant's answer.
Jack V. Dorsey, Atlanta, for appellant.
Greene, Neely, Buckley & DeRieux, John D. Jones, Atlanta, for appellee.
1. The original order sustaining the general demurrers with leave to amend unappealed from did not become the law of the case since after plaintiff's amendments the defendant renewed its demurrers to the 'petition as amended' and moved to strike each count of the 'petition as amended.' Under the ruling in Folsom v. Howell, 94 Ga. 112(1), 21 S.E. 136 and the recent case of Perkins v. First National Bank of Atlanta, 221 Ga. 82(7), 143 S.E.2d 474, this opened the sufficiency of the petition to a fresh adjudication. Since the demurrers to the petition as amended were sustained, we look to the petition as amended to determine if a cause of action was set forth therein.
2. Count 1 of the petition is based on tortious misconduct occasioned by the following alleged facts: One of defendant's employees on December 17, 1964, demanded that plaintiff, while on defendant's premises and in the presence of a large number of other customers, turn over her charge card and stated to plaintiff that no more credit would be extended to her. When plaintiff asked the reason for such action, the employee informed her that it was because she had gone bankrupt; that later the same day defendant's assistant manager called plaintiff at her home inquiring if she had an account with their Macon store, that a customer with the same name as plaintiff who lived near Macon had gone bankrupt; that the following day the defendant's manager called plaintiff stating that a mistake had been made; that several days later plaintiff received a letter of apology from the defendant, and advising that she was being issued a new account number; that about six weeks later plaintiff received a certified letter from an attorney allegedly representing the defendant advising her that the revoked credit cards had not been turned in and that the use of the cards with knowledge of their revocation might well constitute a serious offense; that after receipt of this letter, plaintiff called said attorney long distance in an effort to convince him that she was not a bankrupt; that the attorney 'talked very ugly and unkind to plaintiff and told her that if she had done nothing wrong, what in the hell was she worried about?, and then he hung up the phone.'
As to the conduct of defendant's employee while plaintiff was in the store, no tortious misconduct is shown, since the defendant could refuse credit to anyone at anytime and without giving a reason therefor. Such remarks as were allegedly made fail to come within the category of opprobrious, insulting or abusive language. The explanation given by the employee was in response to a request by plaintiff. As stated in ...
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Price v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co.
...proprietor conduct insufficient to state an intentional tort for emotional distress, as in Miller and Brown, supra. Jordan v. J.C. Penney Co., 114 Ga. App. 822, 824 (1966). There was no authority for recognizing an independent cause of action for the intentional infliction of emotional dist......
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Signal Oil & Gas Co. v. Conway, 47018
...Baugh, 111 Ga.App. 813, 815, 143 S.E.2d 489; Herring v. Pepsi Cola Bottling Co., 113 Ga.App. 680, 149 S.E.2d 370; Jordan v. J. C. Penney Co., 114 Ga.App. 822, 152 S.E.2d 786; City Stores Company v. Henderson, 116 Ga.App. 114, 156 S.E.2d Plaintiff urges that the lateral demotion which she re......
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City Stores Co. v. Henderson, 42819
...assistant manager amounts to slander. Consequently neither of them has committed any tort against the plaintiffs. Jordan v. J. C. Penney Co., 114 Ga.App. 822, 152 S.E.2d 786; Zayre of Atlanta, Inc. v. Sharpton, 110 Ga.App. 587(2), 139 S.E.2d 339; Barry v. Baugh, 111 Ga.App. 813, 143 S.E.2d ......
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