Signal Oil & Gas Co. v. Conway, 47018
| Decision Date | 19 June 1972 |
| Docket Number | 2,Nos. 1,No. 47018,3,47018,s. 1 |
| Parties | SIGNAL OIL & GAS COMPANY v. Betty CONWAY |
| Court | Georgia Court of Appeals |
Syllabus by the Court
The writing of a letter by a creditor to an employer whose employee had stopped making payments on an account asking for assistance in getting payment or information as to why payment was not forthcoming does not constitute libel, nor does it give rise to an action for an invasion of privacy or for disturbing the peace of mind, happiness and well-being of the employee. Nor does it become the basis of such an action because the account was incurred by the employee's husband when it appears that the employee had previously been sending checks drawn on her bank account in payment of it.
Mrs. Betty Conway brought suit against Signal Oil & Gas Company in three counts seeking damages because of a letter that Signal Oil had written to her employer, E. I. Dupont deNemours Company.
Mrs. Conway's husband had obtained a credit card from Signal Oil & Gas Company and had used it in making purchases of gasoline. He was regularly employed as a truck driver and dispatcher. He had other credit cards with American Oil Company, Humble Oil, and with Sinclair. Mrs. Conway had charge cards with Mastercharge and with the Citizens & Southern banks. The family finances were handled by Mrs. Conway, who ran the only bank checking account and used it for the payment of bills, including the account of Signal Oil & Gas until December, 1970, when she informed her husband (but not Signal Oil & Gas) that she would not make further payments on that account, and thereafter the account became delinquent in the sum of $210.22.
Mrs. Conway was employed by Dupont as a clerk, typist, teletype operator, and the like. She had worked there for some 14 years and was earning $608 per month. The office in which she had been working was to be transferred to Charlotte, N.C., and all employees were notified of the impending move and afforded opportunity to transfer with the office. Mrs. Conway did not wish to move to Charlotte, and the company transferred her from the job she was then on to the billing department, which would remain in Atlanta, but the salary on the new job was $550 per month, and within two months was raised to $590 per month. This occurred in April, 1971.
On March 11, 1971 Signal Gas & Oil directed a letter to the personnel director at Dupont relative to Mrs. Conway, Account No. 097 23 263, balance $210.22, seeking assistance in getting the account paid. The letter read:
Dupont's personnel director discussed the letter with her, and she informed him that the account with Signal Oil & Gas was not hers, but that of her husband, that the credit card was in the name of her husband, and that she owed Signal Oil & Gas nothing. She also discussed it with the manager and obtained a copy of the letter through him. Two other people at Dupont told her that they knew about the letter.
Plaintiff asserted that she had never made purchases from Signal Oil & Gas on the credit card, and that the letter which it had directed to her employer had greatly upset her, made her nervous and subject to headaches.
In her first count plaintiff seeks recovery for wounded feelings and the disturbance of her peace and happiness, alleging that the letter had defamed her character and reputation and had subjected her to public hatred, contempt and ridicule.
In her second count she seeks recovery for the wrongful interference with her employment, alleging that the letter would be a permanent record in her personnel file, and that it was an unwarranted invasion and intrusion into the realm of her employment.
In the third count she seeks recovery for libel, alleging that the letter amounted to an accusation that she had obtained gasoline on credit and had not paid therefor, that the accusation was false, and was transmitted to other parties.
Defendant moved for summary judgment as to all counts, supporting the motion with the deposition of the plaintiff and the pleadings. From a denial of the motion defendant appeals.
Long, Weinberg, Ansley & Wheeler, Palmer H. Ansley, J. Kenneth Moorman, Atlanta, for appellant.
Cochran, Camp & Snipes, Donald O. Nelson, Smyrna, for appellee.
1. Plaintiff does not designate the letter as libel in the first count, but she does assert that by it defendant has defamed her character and reputation and has subjected her to public ridicule, hatred and contempt. This language comes from Code § 105-701, defining libel, and thus we must examine the letter and the circumstances to determine whether it is libelous.
We conclude that it is not. Certainly there is nothing in the letter that makes it libel per se. It does not charge that the plaintiff has committed a crime, Estes v. Sterchi Bros. Stores, Inc., 50 Ga.App. 619(1), 179 S.E. 222, that she has committed any debasing act which may exclude her from society, Tench v. Ivie, 121 Ga.App. 114, 173 S.E.2d 237, or make any derogatory and defamatory statement against her in reference to her trade or profession. Van Epps v. Jones, 50 Ga. 238, 241.
The question, then, is whether the letter may be libelous per quod, that is to say, whether the extrinsic facts developed by the pleadings and the deposition are such that it can be held as a matter of law that plaintiff's reputation and character were or were not damaged thereby. 'To maintain an action for libel, the matter published must either be libelous per se, or it must be so stated that it may reasonably be construed by innuendo at least, to be libelous.' McCravy v. Schneer's, 47 Ga.App. 703, 171 S.E. 391.
A creditor has the right to ask his debtor to pay what he owes, without being subject to an action for libel. McCravy v. Schneer's, 47 Ga.App. 703, 704, 171 S.E. 391, supra. He may direct a letter to the debtor's employer, seeking assistance in getting the debtor to pay without being subjected to an action for libel. Haggard v. Shaw, 100 Ga.App. 813, 112 S.E.2d 286. Cf. Gouldman-Taber Pontiac, Inc. v. Zerbst, 213 Ga. 682, 100 S.E.2d 881.
Does the fact that the credit card was in the name of plaintiff's husband, and that he may have made all purchases represented by the account, require a different result here? We think not. By plaintiff's own admission in her deposition, she had been making payment of the account to Signal Oil & Gas from the checking account through which she handled the family finances, and when she decided to cease doing so she told her husband that she would not make further payments to it-but she did not notify Signal Oil & Gas. The reasonable inference to be drawn from these facts was that plaintiff, who was handling the family finances, had either purchased gasoline on her husband's credit card, or that she had assumed the payment of the account. Having received prior payments from her, the company might reasonably expect to receive further payments from her. It had received no notice from her or otherwise that the practice had been discontinued, other than the failure to receive payment. In this circumstance it was wholly reasonable that the company make inquiry to the employer of the party from whom it had been receiving payment and thus either get the arrearages paid up or get information as to why the account was not being paid.
The letter contains no imputation of insolvency. It did not seek to alter her credit status; indeed, she was not then seeking any extension of credit and the information in the letter was neither used nor intended to be used to impair her credit standing.
This situation is easily distinguishable from that in Southeast Bankcard Association v. Woodruff, 124 Ga.App. 478, 184 S.E.2d 191, where the information concerning the debtor was sent out to many hundreds of merchants who were using the Master Charge credit card system in extending credit to holders of the cards, and consisted of a listing of his name under a column headed 'Most Wanted.' We held this sufficiently to implicate that the debtor had wrongfully used the card or his credit in such a manner that it could not be held as a matter of law to be free of libel. Likewise, the situation is distinguishable from that in White v. Parks, 93 Ga. 633, 20 S.E. 78, which is more like unto that in Southeast Bankcard Assn. v. Woodruff.
We can see no difference between situations where the debtor contended the charge that a debt was owing was false because it had been paid, or because the merchandise had been faulty, and the present situation where it is contended that the charge was false because the merchandise had been purchased by her husband and not by her. In either event there is simply a contention by the debtor that the debt was not owed by him. Particularly is this true under the facts here.
The most that plaintiff claims under this count is that she has been annoyed, has been nervous and upset and subject to headaches. That is not enough to make a libel of the letter. Mere annoyance or loss of peace of mind, or even physical illness caused by the alleged defamation is not enough to make it so. Odgers on...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
Drug Emporium, Inc. v. Peaks, A97A0710
...another context, to state specifically special damages means that they must be pleaded with particularity. Signal Oil & Gas Co. v. Conway, 126 Ga.App. 711, 717(3), 191 S.E.2d 624, rev'd on other grounds, 229 Ga. 849, 194 S.E.2d 909. The same rule applies when praying for punitive damages. T......
- Kohlmeyer & Co. v. Bowen
-
Torok v. Yost, 70544
...the complaint, as amended, claiming any special damages with particularity, and this is required. OCGA § 9-11-9(g); Signal Oil & Gas Co. v. Conway, 126 Ga.App. 711, 716-717, (see also 722), 191 S.E.2d 624 (1972), rev'd on other grounds, 229 Ga. 849, 194 S.E.2d 909 (1972). Not only must they......
-
Housing Authority of Atlanta v. Starcher
...of the property as a special item of damage and therefore could not recover upon that theory, citing Signal Oil etc. Co. v. Conway, 126 Ga.App. 711, 717(2), 191 S.E.2d 624 (1972). Since that case and those cited therein deal with pleading libel they are inapposite. Moreover, the damages ask......