Jordan v. People

• Decision Date: 07 March 1894
• Citation: 36 P. 218,19 Colo. 417
• Parties: JORDAN v. PEOPLE. [1]
• Court: Colorado Supreme Court

36 P. 218

19 Colo. 417

JORDAN v. PEOPLE. ^[1]

Supreme Court of Colorado

March 7, 1894

Error to district court, Arapahoe county.

Thomas Jordan, plaintiff in error, was proceeded against in the court below by information. He was convicted of murder in the first degree, and sentenced accordingly, and brings error. Affirmed.

H. B. O'Reilly and G. W. Miller, for plaintiff in error.

Eugene Engley, Atty. Gen., and H. T. Sale, Asst. Atty. Gen., for the People.

HAYT C.J.

Of the errors assigned, the ruling of the district court upon plaintiff in error's plea to the jurisdiction of that court may properly be considered first. This raises two questions: First, the constitutionality of the act of 1887 with reference to district courts; second, the legality of the action of the court sitting at a place other than at the county courthouse. The act challenged, among other things authorizes the several judges of the district court to sit separately for the trial of causes, and provides that each 'shall have and exercise all the powers and functions, as well in vacation of court as in term time, which he might have and exercise if he were the sole judge of said court.' Acts 1887, p. 260. It will be conceded that the act in question is in violation of the constitution as originally adopted, but to provide for the rapid increase of business resulting from an increase of population and the development of the state, sections 12 and 14 of article 6 of the state constitution were amended by a vote of the people in the year 1886. The nature and extent of these amendments will appear from a reading of the sections as amended, the amendments consisting of the words inclosed in brackets '12. The state shall be divided into judicial districts in each of which there shall be elected by the electors thereof, one [or more] judge[s] of the district court therein [as may be provided by law] whose term of office shall be six years; the judges of the district courts may hold courts for each other, and shall do so when required by law; [and the general assembly may by law provide for the selection or election of a suitable person to preside in the trial of causes in special cases.]' '14. The general assembly may [whenever two-thirds of the members of each house concur therein] [increase or diminish the number of judges for any district or] increase or diminish the number of judicial districts and the judges thereof.' It is contended that neither of these provisions authorizes or contemplates that such additional judges shall exercise the powers of a court. If this contention is well founded then the amendments are not only insufficient to authorize the legislature to grant any relief to the overburdened dockets of the courts, but authorize an unnecessary incumbrance upon the judicial system of the state. Since their adoption the number of judges has been increased in Arapahoe county from one to five. Now there are five departments of the district court in Arapahoe county, each presided over by a single judge. The argument of counsel, if carried to its logical conclusion, would result in the abolition of all district courts in districts having more than one judge. This must be the case, because each judge is of equal importance and dignity, and has like power with every other judge; and, if one has no authority to preside over a court, then the authority of the others must be likewise limited. It is said that the 'intention of the legislature [in proposing the amendment] was perhaps to provide for additional courts as well as judges, but that it did not do so.' It matters but little what the intention of the legislature may have been in the premises. The amendment having been ratified by the people, the intention of the people is more important. It is unreasonable to suppose that the people intended to authorize mere sinecures. It is far more natural to assume that they intended that the additional judges should be provided with courts over which they might preside, and thereby assist in the disposal of the public business. It is true, the amendments in question do not, in terms, authorize the additional judges to hold separate courts and it is equally true that the amendments do not prohibit their doing so. The distinguishing feature between the federal and state constitutions is that the former is a grant of powers to congress, while the latter operates as a restriction upon the plenary powers otherwise belonging to the state legislature. To defeat a state statute, therefore, on the ground that it is unconstitutional, something more is required than to show that there is no provision of the constitution to authorize it. It must be further shown that it is prohibited. Here there is an entire absence of such a showing, and the statute must be upheld.

2. As to the second question raised by the plea, it is only necessary to say that, while the court must be held at the county seat, it is not required to be held in any particular building.

3. By a motion to quash, plaintiff in error raises an objection to prosecution by information, In this case the probable guilt of the accused was first ascertained and certified as the result of a previous preliminary examination. The case is therefore identical with the case of In re Dolph, 17 Colo. 35, 28 P. 470. In that case it was determined that prosecutions by indictments and information as concurrent remedies might be provided for by the legislature. In that case the same objections to the statute were raised as in this case. They were carefully considered, and the validity of the statute maintained. It is unnecessary, at this time, to repeat the reasons then given. Upon reconsideration of the conclusions then reached, we see no reason to modify or change the same.

4. It is urged that the information in this case does not charge murder in the first degree. Our statute declares it 'shall not be necessary to set forth the manner in which or the means by which the death of the deceased was caused, but it shall be sufficient in every indictment for murder to charge that the defendant did feloniously, willfully and of his malice aforethought kill and murder the deceased. * * *' Gen. St. § 926. Each count of the information contains all the averments required by the statute, and the additional charge that the killing was premeditated. The statute, taking its origin in England, has been adopted in a number of our states; and, so far as we are advised, wherever the question has been raised, the statute has been held constitutional, and indictments in the form provided held sufficient to charge murder of the first degree. 2 Bish. Cr. Proc. (2d Ed.) §§ 523-539, and cases cited. The act is not in conflict with the section of the bill of rights providing that 'in criminal prosecutions the accused shall have the right * * * to demand the nature and cause of the accusation.' Const. art. 2, § 16. An information must show the nature and cause of the accusation, i. e. it must set out the crime charged. It need not set out the mode or manner of its perpetration, or the instrument or agency employed to accomplish the result. Redus v. People, 10 Colo. 208, 14 P. 323; State v. Meyers, 99 Mo. 107, 12 S.W. 516; Goersen v. Com., 99 Pa. St. 388; Hill v. People, 1 Colo. 436. The indictment in the Redus Case was held sufficient to charge murder of the first degree without the word 'premeditated;' a fortiori, must the indictment in this case, charging the murder to have been premeditated, be held sufficient.

5. In rebuttal the state was allowed to introduce evidence of medical experts as to the sanity of the prisoner, and this is assigned for error. It was not necessary for the state to prove the sanity of the plaintiff in error in the first instance,...