Jordan v. Postell
| Citation | 434 S.C. 510,864 S.E.2d 558 |
| Decision Date | 18 August 2021 |
| Docket Number | Appellate Case No. 2018-001024,Published Opinion No. 5848 |
| Parties | John JORDAN, Appellant, v. Melissa POSTELL, Respondent. |
| Court | Court of Appeals of South Carolina |
Justin M. McGee, of McGee Law Firm, LLC, of Charleston, for Appellant.
Donald Jay Budman, of Solomon Budman & Stricker, LLP, of Charleston, for Respondent.
In this divorce action, John Jordan (Husband) argues the family court erred by (1) finding a house purchased by Melissa Postell (Wife) eight years before the marriage was not transmuted into marital property; (2) incorrectly calculating Husband's special equity interest in said property; (3) finding a different house sold to Husband by Wife's father three weeks before the marriage was marital property; (4) not distributing the parties’ retirement accounts equally; (5) failing to award Husband alimony; (6) failing to find that the parties were jointly responsible for their respective 2016 state and federal income tax liabilities—and jointly entitled to any refunds; and (7) failing to award Husband attorney's fees. We affirm in part and reverse in part.
The principal issue in this matter concerns the house located at 864 Harbor Place Drive in Charleston (Harbor Place). Eight years before her marriage to Husband, Wife purchased Harbor Place from her father on April 28, 1995, for $92,800.1 Wife initially refinanced the mortgage in 1998 before refinancing it again on December 31, 2002. The mortgage balance owed as of that date was $108,000. Then, on June 18, 2003, Wife opened a Home Equity Line of Credit (Home Equity Loan), secured by Harbor Place, in an amount not to exceed $40,250. The parties married shortly thereafter, on November 2, 2003.
Also relevant to the divorce action is Husband's purchase of the house located at 694 Ponderosa Drive in Charleston (Ponderosa). On October 8, 2003—three weeks before his marriage to Wife—Husband purchased Ponderosa from Wife's father for $125,550. Wife's father included the phrase "LOVE AND AFFECTION FOR MY SON-IN-LAW" in the deed transferring the property as consideration for the sale to Husband. From its initial purchase to the present, the parties used Ponderosa exclusively as a rental property.
After almost thirteen years of marriage, Husband filed for divorce on April 1, 2016. Additionally, Husband filed a motion for temporary relief requesting financial assistance from Wife for his rental costs, attorney's fees, and an advance of the equitable distribution of the parties’ marital assets. On May 2, 2016, a hearing was held before the family court on the motion for temporary relief. The family court issued its temporary order on the motion shortly thereafter. The order required the parties to attend mediation, denied both parties spousal support, denied Husband's request for an advance on his portion of the marital assets, and held the issue of attorney's fees in abeyance. The parties attended mediation on June 28, 2016, but the mediation was unsuccessful. The final hearing on the matter was held on July 11 through 13, 2017.
On October 9, 2017, the family court issued its Final Order and Decree of Divorce, finding the following: (1) Wife was the sole owner of Harbor Place and it did not transmute into marital property; (2) Husband had an $18,000 special equity interest in Harbor Place based on the $30,000 value of the home improvements he made; (3) Ponderosa was transmuted into marital property, therefore, Husband was required to pay Wife $19,200 for her interest in the property, but could retain exclusive ownership and possession of the property; (4) each party was entitled to 45% of the other party's retirement; (5) Husband was not entitled to alimony; (6) each party was responsible for their own tax obligations; and (7) Husband was not entitled to attorney's fees.
On October 23, 2017, Husband filed a motion to reconsider, alter, or amend the family court's order, challenging the aforementioned findings by the court, save for the court's ruling on alimony. On May 2, 2018, the family court filed an amended final order and decree, acknowledging the fact that the Home Equity Loan was indeed marital property. All other findings of the family court remained intact. This appeal from Husband followed.
"The family court is a court of equity." Lewis v. Lewis , 392 S.C. 381, 386, 709 S.E.2d 650, 652 (2011). Therefore, the proper standard of review in family court matters is de novo. Stoney v. Stoney , 422 S.C. 593, 594, 813 S.E.2d 486 (2018). Accordingly, "[o]n appeal from the family court, the appellate court has jurisdiction to find facts in accordance with its own view of the preponderance of the evidence." S.C. Dep't of Soc. Servs. v. Polite , 391 S.C. 275, 279, 705 S.E.2d 78, 80 (Ct. App. 2011). However, "this broad scope of review does not alter the fact that a family court is better able to make credibility determinations because it has the opportunity to observe the witnesses." Wilburn v. Wilburn , 403 S.C. 372, 380, 743 S.E.2d 734, 738 (2013). "Additionally, the de novo standard does not relieve the appellant of the burden of identifying error in the family court's findings." Id. "Accordingly, we will affirm the decision of the family court in an equity case unless its decision is controlled by some error of law or the appellant satisfies the burden of showing the preponderance of the evidence actually supports contrary factual findings by th[e appellate] court." Holmes v. Holmes , 399 S.C. 499, 504, 732 S.E.2d 213, 216 (Ct. App. 2012).
Husband argues Harbor Place is transmuted marital property because (1) Harbor Place was used exclusively for marital purposes during the marriage; (2) the parties are jointly liable for the Home Equity Loan debt secured by the property; (3) the parties, working together, caused a $108,000 reduction in mortgage indebtedness during the marriage through the use of marital funds; (4) the funds used for Harbor Place and borrowed against Harbor Place were commingled and are incapable of being traced; (5) Husband personally did significant work to maintain and improve the property; and (6) the Home Equity Loan was used almost exclusively for Husband's benefit. We disagree.
Property acquired by either party before the marriage is generally nonmarital property. S.C. Code Ann. § 20-3-630(A)(2) (2014). "Nevertheless, ‘[p]roperty that is nonmarital when acquired may be transmuted into marital property if it becomes so commingled with marital property that it is no longer traceable, is titled jointly, or is used by the parties in support of the marriage or in some other way that establishes the parties’ intent to make it marital property.’ " Pittman v. Pittman , 407 S.C. 141, 148, 754 S.E.2d 501, 505 (2014) (quoting Wilburn , 403 S.C. at 384, 743 S.E.2d at 740 ). "As a general rule, transmutation is a matter of intent to be gleaned from the facts of each case." Id. at 149, 754 S.E.2d at 505 (quoting Johnson v. Johnson , 296 S.C. 289, 295, 372 S.E.2d 107, 110 (Ct. App. 1988) ). "The spouse claiming transmutation must produce objective evidence showing that, during the marriage, the parties themselves regarded the property as the common property of the marriage." Id. (quoting Jenkins v. Jenkins , 345 S.C. 88, 98, 545 S.E.2d 531, 537 (Ct. App. 2001) ).
We find Husband did not present sufficient evidence of Wife's intent to transmute Harbor Place into marital property. Wife purchased the house eight years prior to the marriage, she never put Husband's name on the title or mortgage, and the funds used to pay the mortgage were not so commingled as to make them untraceable. See Pittman , 407 S.C. at 148, 754 S.E.2d at 505 ; Ray v. Ray , 296 S.C. 350, 353, 372 S.E.2d 910, 912 (Ct. App. 1988) (). At the final hearing on the matter, Wife testified that she always referred to Harbor Place as "my house" and always considered it as such. Husband provided no evidence or testimony to the contrary. See Pittman , 407 S.C. at 149, 754 S.E.2d at 505 .
Husband argues the fact that Wife used marital funds to discharge the mortgage indebtedness, which, by his estimation, she would not have been able to do without his financial contributions to the household, provides further support for transmutation. However, this fact alone does not evince Wife's intent to relinquish sole ownership of her home. See Pittman , 407 S.C. at 148, 754 S.E.2d at 505 (); Fitzwater v. Fitzwater , 396 S.C. 361, 368–69, 721 S.E.2d 7, 11 (Ct. App. 2011) (); see also Roy T. Stuckey, Marital Litigation in South Carolina 337 (5th ed. 2020) (...
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