Jordan v. State, A92A1575
| Decision Date | 04 November 1992 |
| Docket Number | No. A92A1575,A92A1575 |
| Citation | 206 Ga.App. 173,424 S.E.2d 852 |
| Parties | JORDAN v. The STATE. |
| Court | Georgia Court of Appeals |
Harold D. McLendon, Dublin, for appellant.
Ralph M. Walke, Dist. Atty., for appellee.
Curtis Jordan was convicted in a bifurcated trial of aggravated assault and possession of a firearm by a convicted felon. He appeals from the denial of his motion for new trial.
1. Appellant contends the evidence was insufficient to support the verdict as a matter of law. The testimony presented at trial by several eyewitnesses established that on the night of June 1, 1990, appellant and Kenny Lewis went in appellant's Chevrolet Blazer to the "Bottom," a commercial area in downtown Soperton where several bars were located and where patrons often congregated outside the establishments. Appellant and John Leon Strong began arguing, and Strong beat appellant. Lewis testified that when he tried to break up the fight, Strong's friend Henry Lee Cummings stopped him. Soperton Police Officer Kemp, who was patrolling the area on foot, separated the two men and arrested Strong, whom he booked and released.
Appellant and Lewis left the Bottom, went to appellant's home, and then returned to the Bottom about 30 minutes later. Lewis testified that as appellant drove past Strong's parked truck, Strong called out to appellant "oh, you've come back for some more." Lewis stated that appellant stopped, got out of the Blazer, and fired one shot, hitting Strong in the head. When appellant jumped back into the Blazer and drove away, Lewis saw a revolver in his hand. Lewis testified that when a police patrol car began chasing them a few blocks later, appellant threw the gun out his window and then stopped the Blazer a half block away.
Lewis, bystander Tom Polk, and Cummings, who was seated in the passenger seat of Strong's truck when Strong was shot, recalled hearing only one gunshot. Officer Kemp also testified that he ran to the scene when he heard a single shot. Polk and Kemp both testified that they looked into Strong's truck and saw no weapon, and Cummings also stated he did not see Strong with a weapon when the shooting occurred. Strong's brother testified that as a result of the shooting Strong is totally disabled, cannot walk or talk, and does not recall the shooting.
Evidence adduced during the trial of the weapons charge established that a deputy sheriff who searched the area where appellant was stopped after the shooting found a .38 caliber Smith & Wesson revolver in a ditch. Lewis testified that the revolver police retrieved looked similar to the one he saw in appellant's hand after he shot Strong. A certified copy of appellant's prior felony conviction in Florida was admitted into evidence.
We find this evidence satisfies the standard set forth in Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979) and was sufficient to authorize the jury to conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that appellant did not act in self-defense and was guilty of the charged crimes. See Powell v. State, 201 Ga.App. 188(1), 410 S.E.2d 378 (1991); Murray v. State, 180 Ga.App. 493, 494, 495(4), 349 S.E.2d 490 (1986). Although no witness testified with absolute certainty that appellant had been in possession of the revolver introduced into evidence, the conviction for firearm possession was authorized because the testimony from eyewitnesses who saw appellant with a gun constituted direct evidence of possession of a firearm.
2. Appellant contends the trial court failed to adhere to the procedure set forth in McKaskle v. Wiggins, 465 U.S. 168, 177-179, 104 S.Ct. 944, 950-951, 79 L.Ed.2d 122 (1984) concerning limitations on the role of standby counsel once a defendant decides to represent himself. Our review of the transcript persuades us that McKaskle is not applicable because appellant waived his right to represent himself. See id. at 182-183, 104 S.Ct. at 953-954. Rather than unequivocally asserting his right of self-representation, appellant repeatedly stated that he did wish to have counsel, and he solicited and acquiesced in standby counsel's assistance on several occasions. Indeed, appellant's only objection to the court's appointment of the public defender to represent him was that he believed the court had not given the public defender ample time to prepare the case. Nonetheless, even if we construe appellant's statements midway through the trial as an expression of his intention to represent himself, the trial court did follow the requirements of McKaskle by explaining to the jury that appellant was representing himself and that the public defender was remaining in the courtroom to assist the court; by continuing to ask appellant whether he wished to question witnesses or present arguments; and by permitting appellant to...
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Gibbs v. State
...ready for trial and stated to the court that he had made attempts to locate witnesses for Gibbs' defense. See Jordan v. State, 206 Ga.App. 173, 174-175, 424 S.E.2d 852 (1992). Basically, Gibbs' claim on this point translates into a repetition that trial counsel was ineffective, specifically......