Josh J. v. Commonwealth

• Decision Date: 31 January 2018
• Docket Number: SJC–12286
• Citation: 89 N.E.3d 1123,478 Mass. 716
• Parties: JOSH J., a juvenile v. COMMONWEALTH.
• Court: United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court

478 Mass. 716

89 N.E.3d 1123

JOSH J., a juvenile

v.COMMONWEALTH.

SJC–12286

Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, Suffolk..

Argued October 5, 2017

Decided January 31, 2018

Eliza Lockhart–Jenks, Committee for Public Counsel Services, for the juvenile.

Marina Moriarty, Assistant District Attorney, for the Commonwealth.

Present: Gants, C.J., Gaziano, Lowy, Budd, Cypher, & Kafker, JJ.

LOWY, J.

This case, here on a reservation and report by a single justice of the county court in response to the juvenile's petition under G. L. c. 211, § 3, requires us to consider the proper application of G. L. c. 276, § 58, and G. L. c. 276, § 58B, specifically with regard to the number of days an individual may be held without bail after a bail revocation hearing. We conclude that where an individual has been released on bail pursuant to G. L. c. 276, § 58, and there is probable cause to believe the individual committed a crime while released on bail, the Commonwealth may seek to revoke bail under either § 58 or § 58B. The judge must then determine whether the Commonwealth satisfied the requirements of the particular statute, either § 58 or § 58B, under which it sought to revoke bail.

1. Background and prior proceedings. On May 6, 2016, a delinquency complaint issued charging the juvenile with breaking and entering in the daytime with intent to commit a felony and larceny over $250. A judge in the Juvenile Court set the juvenile's bail at $1,000. The judge also advised the juvenile, pursuant to G. L. c. 276, § 58, that the juvenile's bail could be revoked if he committed a new crime while on release. The juvenile posted bail and was released.

In August, 2016, two delinquency complaints issued against the juvenile for several new crimes he allegedly committed while on release on the pending charges, including two counts of assault and battery on a pregnant victim and one count of malicious destruction of property valued over $250. In November, 2016, based on the new charges, the Commonwealth sought to revoke the juvenile's bail pursuant to G. L. c. 276, § 58. A Juvenile Court judge allowed the Commonwealth's motion, revoked the juvenile's bail, and set a date for a bail review hearing on January 30, 2017, which amounted to a ninety-day bail revocation.¹

By January 10, 2017, the charges stemming from the juvenile's conduct while he was released on bail had been resolved.² The juvenile continued to be held on the original charges, however, so he moved to vacate the bail revocation order, but the judge who had revoked bail denied that motion. In response, the juvenile filed an emergency petition with this court pursuant to G. L. c. 211, § 3. After a hearing, the single justice issued an interim order, noting that the issue raised by the juvenile in the petition, which he now presses before the full court, was not raised in the trial court, and concluding that the Juvenile Court judge did not abuse his discretion in refusing to vacate the bail revocation order in these circumstances. One day later, there was a disposition in the underlying delinquency complaint. The single justice subsequently reserved and reported the matter raised in the juvenile's petition to the full court, in order to give the court an opportunity to address the proper application of G. L. c. 276, §§ 58 and 58B,

2. Discussion. Although this case is moot, we address the issues raised because, as the single justice noted, they are "fully briefed and raise matters of importance that are likely to arise again, but are unlikely to be capable of appellate review in the normal course before they become moot." Delaney v. Commonwealth, 415 Mass. 490, 492, 614 N.E.2d 672 (1993), quoting Upton, petitioner, 387 Mass. 359, 365, 439 N.E.2d 1216 (1982).

Bail revocation under §§ 58 and 58B. The juvenile claims that the judge erred in applying the ninety-day revocation period under G. L. c. 276, § 58B, as opposed to the sixty-day revocation period under G. L. c. 276, § 58, after finding probable cause to believe that the juvenile had committed a crime while released on bail under § 58. The crux of the juvenile's argument is that because bail can be revoked under either § 58 or § 58B, where an individual commits a crime while on release, the statutes create an ambiguous bail revocation framework, and therefore, the rule of lenity requires the application of the sixty-day revocation period under § 58. To resolve this issue, we begin with the pertinent portions of § 58 and § 58B. General Laws c. 276, § 58, sixth par., provides in pertinent part:

"If a person is on release pending the adjudication of a prior charge, and the court ... finds probable cause to believe that the person has committed a crime during said period of release, the court shall then determine, in the exercise of its discretion, whether the release of said person will seriously endanger any person or the community.... If the court determines that the release of said person will seriously endanger any person or the community and that the detention of the person is necessary to reasonably assure the safety of any person or the community, the court may revoke bail on the prior charge and may order said person held without bail pending the adjudication of said prior charge, for a period not to exceed sixty days."

The relevant portion of G. L. c. 276, § 58B, provides:

"A person who has been released after a hearing pursuant to [ § 58 ]... shall be subject to a revocation of release and an order of detention ... [if] the judicial officer finds (1) that there is probable cause to believe that the person has committed a [F]ederal or [S]tate crime while on release, ... and (2) the judicial officer finds that there are no conditions of release that will reasonably assure the person will not pose a danger to the safety of any other person or the community; or the person is unlikely to abide by any condition or combination of conditions of release."

"...

"A person detained under this subsection ... shall not be detained for a period exceeding ninety days excluding any period of delay as defined in [ Mass. R. Crim. P. 36 (b) (2), 378 Mass. 909 (1978) ]."

To determine the proper application of §§ 58 and 58B, we apply the well-established principles of statutory construction. Our fundamental aim is to "discern and effectuate the intent of the Legislature." Commonwealth v. Morgan, 476 Mass. 768, 777, 73 N.E.3d 762 (2017). To that end, "[t]he language of the statute is the primary source of insight into the intent of the Legislature." Commonwealth v. Millican, 449 Mass. 298, 300, 867 N.E.2d 725 (2007). Therefore, where the statute is clear and unambiguous, our inquiry into the Legislature's intent need go no further than the statute's plain and ordinary meaning. See Falmouth v. Civil Serv. Comm'n, 447 Mass. 814, 818, 857 N.E.2d 1052 (2006) ; Shamban v. Masidlover, 429 Mass. 50, 54, 705 N.E.2d 1136 (1999) ("we are constrained to follow statutory language when it is plain and unambiguous, unless to do so would lead to an absurd result, or be contrary to the Legislature's manifest intention"). We also are mindful that where "two or more statutes relate to the same subject matter, ‘they should be construed together so as to constitute a harmonious whole,’ creat[ing] a consistent body of law, and giv[ing] full effect to the expressed intent of the Legislature." Paquette v. Commonwealth, 440 Mass. 121, 130, 795 N.E.2d 521 (2003), cert. denied, 540 U.S. 1150, 124 S.Ct. 1153, 157 L.Ed.2d 1044 (2004), quoting Board of Educ. v. Assessor of Worcester, 368 Mass. 511, 513–514, 333 N.E.2d 450 (1975).

The plain language of G. L. c. 276, §§ 58 and 58B, is clear and unambiguous, particularly where § 58B explicitly includes persons released on bail under § 58 ; an individual who is released on bail pursuant to § 58 may have his or her bail revoked under either § 58 or § 58B where, among other requirements, there is probable cause to believe the individual committed a crime while on release. The Legislature's decision to provide two bail revocation mechanisms in these circumstances does not create ambiguity. Paquette, 440 Mass. at 130, 795 N.E.2d 521 ("The Legislature is presumed to be aware of existing statutes when it amends a statute or enacts a new one"). The Commonwealth's discretion to seek to revoke bail under either § 58 or § 58B does not equate to an ambiguous or otherwise impermissible bail revocation scheme. Cf. Commonwealth v. Ehiabhi, 478 Mass. 154, 159, 84 N.E.3d 13 (2017) (although two statutes criminalizing identical conduct "create uncertainty as to which crime may be charged and therefore what penalties may be imposed, they do so to no greater extent than would a single statute authorizing various alternative punishments" [citation omitted] ). Furthermore, although the Commonwealth may move to revoke under either § 58 or § 58B where an individual commits a crime while on release, it nonetheless must satisfy the distinct requirements of the statute upon which its motion is based. Compare G. L. c. 276, § 58 (revocation only where continued release "will seriously endanger any person or the community"), with G. L. c. 276, § 58B (revocation only where "there are no conditions of release that will reasonably assure the person will not pose a danger to the safety of any other person or the community; or the person is unlikely to abide by any condition or combination of conditions of release"). The Legislature is free to amend these statutes to provide a single means of revocation where an individual commits an offense while released on bail pursuant to § 58 ; however, the bail revocation scheme is not ambiguous in its current form, and therefore, the rule of lenity does not apply.³

b. Due process. The juvenile also claims that revoking bail under § 58B where an individual has been released on bail pursuant to § 58, and subsequently commits a crime while on release, violates due process.⁴ Because pretrial detention encroaches on a fundamental...