Joyce v. Great N. Ry. Co.

• Decision Date: 01 March 1907
• Citation: 110 N.W. 975,100 Minn. 225
• Parties: JOYCE v. GREAT NORTHERN RY. CO. (two cases).
• Court: Minnesota Supreme Court

100 Minn. 225

110 N.W. 975

JOYCE

v.GREAT NORTHERN RY. CO. (two cases).

Supreme Court of Minnesota.

March 1, 1907.

Appeal from District Court, Ramsey County; Oscar Hallam, Judge.

Actions by Thomas S. Joyce against the Great Northern Railway Company. Verdict for plaintiff on the first cause of action, and case dismissed as to the second cause of action. From an order denying motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict, or a new trial, defendant appeals; and from an order denying a new trial as to the second cause of action, plaintiff appeals. Reversed on both appeals.

Syllabus by the Court

Rev. Laws 1905, § 5097, declaring it unlawful for two or more employers of labor to combine or confer together for the purpose of preventing any person from procuring employment, construed, and held a valid legislative enactment.

If one employer by conference with another employer prevents, without excuse or justification, a third person from procuring employment with such other employer, he is liable for damages under the statute to the person so interfered with.

A malicious motive or purpose is essential to give rise to a cause of action under the statute; not actual malice, but such as the law implies from the fact that the act complained of was unlawful and without justification.

Plaintiff had been in the employ of the Union Depot Company as a track repairer. He was injured while engaged in the discharge of his duties by being struck by a switch engine of defendant, then being operated in the depot company's yards. On recovering from his injury, he sought re-employment of the depot company. Defendant interfered, and by its act induced the depot company to refuse him further employment, except upon the condition that he release defendant from all claim for damages on account of his injury. The declined to release his claim, and the depot company, in consequence of the interference of defendant and plaintiff's refusal to release, refused to re-employ him. Held, that the act of defendant, on the evidence disclosed, was a violation of the statute, and constituted, unexplained by matters in justification, an actionable tort, and the question should have been submitted to the jury under the second cause of action.

Evidence presented in the record in support of plaintiff's first cause of action examined, and held insufficient to sustain the verdict of the jury to the effect that plaintiff's injury was caused by the negligence of defendant's servants in operating the engine which struck him at an excessive rate of speed. J. P. Kyle, for plaintiff.

M. L. Countryman, for defendant.

BROWN, J.

Plaintiff seeks to recover damages upon two separate causes of action, viz.: (1) For injuries to his person caused by the alleged negligence of defendant and its servants; and (2) for the wrongful and unlawful conduct of defendant in preventing him from obtaining employment from the Union Depost Company. The court, at the conclusion of plaintiff's case, dismissed the second cause of action on the ground that the evidence was insufficient to justify a recovery by plaintiff; but a verdict was returned in his favor on the first cause of action for $906. Defendant appealed from an order denying its motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict, or for a new trial; and plaintiff appealed from an order denying a new trial as to the second cause of action.

1. The facts in reference to plaintiff's second cause of action are as follows: Defendant Great Northern Railway Company and the Union Depot Company are separate corporations, organized and existing under the laws of this state. The depot company owns and operates the Union Station in the city of St. Paul, including the station buildings, a train shed, and numerous railroad tracks leading to the same, over which the several railroad companies making use of the station, including the Great Northern Company, operate their trains in and out of the depot. The railway companies are tenants of the depot company, paying rentals for the use of its tracks and station, though the Great Northern Company has the exclusive use of three tracks leading thereto. The several roads own and operate their own switch engines in the depot yards in the movement of their trains and cars. At the time of the accident resulting in the injury of plaintiff, he was, and for some time prior thereto had been, in the employ of the depot company as a track repairer; his duty being to assist in the repair of the yard tracks, and other work which might from time to time be assigned him. The injury received by him necessitated a severance of those relations, and for all practical purposes of the case he has never since been in its employ. On recovering from his injury, he applied to the depot company for re-employment, was promised a position by the yard foreman of the company, and told to report for work the following Monday, subject to the approval of the superintendent. At about this time the claim agent of the Great Northern Company, after investigating the injury received by plaintiff and the cause thereof, it having been occasioned by one of the switch engines of that company, wrote and caused to be delivered to the superintendent of the depot company the following letter: ‘The Great Northern Railway Line. Great Northern Railway. Montana Central Railway. Duluth, Watertown & Pacific Railway. Wilmar & Sioux Falls Railway. Claim Department. St. Paul, Minn., July 18th, 1905. W. G. Bissell, Claim Agent. Mr. Jos. Strawhorn, Supt. St. P. Union Depot, City-Dear Sir: Referring to accident to laborer T. S. Joyce in St. Paul yards the 13th, beg to advise that I have made an investigation of this accident and fail to see that any one was to blame for same, unless it was the injured man. It appears that Joyce, when first seen, was about 100 feet from engine on engineer's side; that he apparently saw engine and stepped to other side of track out of view of engineer. Engineer was ringing bell, and fireman was shoveling coal, and neither knew that the man had been struck. Under the circumstances, the only thing that I can do in this case is to pay bills for medical and surgical attention and take release from him for same. I enclose release herewith, and would ask, before this man is allowed to resume work, that same be executed, securing two witnesses to it, and returning same to me for my file. Yours truly, W. G. Bissell, Claim Agent.’ Plaintiff reported for work in accordance with the suggestion of the yard foreman, and was referred to the superintendent, by whom he was informed that he would not be re-employed unless he released the Great Northern Company from all claim for damages on account of the injury heretofore referred to. He refused to release the railway company, and the depot company declined to re-employ him. The superintendent of that company, who had authority to employ and discharge men, testified on the trial that he refused plaintiff re-employment because of and in consequence of the suggestion from the claim agent of the railway company, and plaintiff's refusal to comply therewith. He did not demand that plaintiff sign any particular form of writing, either releasing the railway company upon payment of the medical and surgical bills referred to in the letter, or otherwise. He refused plaintiff employment simply because he would not release that company, and this by reason of the interference of the claim agent. The complaint alleges in this connection that the railway company is a rich, powerful, and influential corporation; that it has for many years used the railroad tracks and terminals of the depot company, paying a large rental therefor; that in consequence of the relations existing between the two companies the railway company has been able to, and does, influence and control the depot company in the operation and management of its affairs; and that it used such power and influence on the occasion in question wrongfully and unlawfully to prevent the plaintiff from obtaining employment with that company. The trial court dismissed this cause of action on the theory that the railway company had sufficient interest in the men employed by the depot company in and about the yards to justify it in making a request of the kind contained in the letter of the claim agent, and was justified in taking such interest and seeing that persons antagonistic to or having litigation with it should not be employed by the depot company in a capacity where their services involved duties toward the railway company.

2. That the wrongful and malicious interference by a stranger with contract relations existing between others, by causing one to commit a breach thereof, amounts to an actionable tort, is affirmed by nearly all the courts of the present day. The old rule that the remedy in such cases was an action against the party to the contract who committed the breach, and not against the wrongful intermeddler, is not now the law, either in this country or in England. That rule has been extended and enlarged, and an action ex delicto against the mischievous wrongdoer is now sustained by nearly all the courts (Queen v. Leatham, App. Cases [1901] 495; Lumley v. Gye, 2 El. & Bl. 216; Walker v. Cronin. 107 Mass. 555;London Guarantee Co. v. Horn, 206 Ill. 493, 69 N. E. 526,99 Am. St. Rep. 185;Perkins v. Pendleton, 90 Me. 166, 38 Atl. 96,60 Am. St. Rep. 252;Berry v. Donovan, 188 Mass. 353, 74 N. E. 603,108 Am. St. Rep. 499), though the old rule is still the law of some of the states (Chambers v. Baldwin, 91 Ky. 121, 15 S. W. 57,11 L. R. A. 545, 34 Am. St. Rep. 165;Glencoe Co. v. Hudson Com. Co., 138 Mo. 439, 40 S. W. 93,36 L. R. A. 804, 60 Am. St. Rep. 560). Some eminent judges and courts have insisted with persuasive argument that such wrongful interference for the purpose of preventing the formation of contracts is equally actionable. May v. Wood, 172 Mass. 14, 51 N. E. 191;Graham v. Ry. Co., 47 La. Ann. 214,16 South....