Juanita A. v. Kenneth Mark N.

• Decision Date: 04 May 2010
• Citation: 15 N.Y.3d 1,904 N.Y.S.2d 293,930 N.E.2d 214
• Parties: In the Matter of JUANITA A., Respondent, v. KENNETH MARK N., Appellant.
• Court: New York Court of Appeals Court of Appeals

904 N.Y.S.2d 293

15 N.Y.3d 1

930 N.E.2d 214

In the Matter of JUANITA A., Respondent,

v.KENNETH MARK N., Appellant.

Court of Appeals of New York.

May 4, 2010.

Davison Law Office PLLC, Canandaigua (Mary P. Davison of counsel), for appellant.

Susan Gray Jones, Canandaigua, Law Guardian.

*3

OPINION OF THE COURT

PIGOTT, J.

The issue before this Court is whether a biological father may assert an equitable estoppel defense in paternity and child sup-port proceedings. Under the circumstances of this case, where another father figure is present in the child's life, we hold that he may assert such a claim.

*4 On June 25, 1994, the child, A., was born. At the time, mother was unmarried, but living with Raymond S., who was listed as A.'s father on her birth certificate. Mother and Raymond had a previous child together and, after the birth of A., had another child. When A. was seven years old, during a family dispute, she became aware that Raymond may not be her biological father. At that time, mother called Kenneth at his home in Florida and had him speak with A. The conversation lasted less than 10 minutes, during which time A. asked questions concerning his physical characteristics. Kenneth's attempt to speak with A. a second time was rebuffed by Raymond, who warned Kenneth not to speak to A. again. Kenneth has had no further contact with A.

In 2006, when A. was approximately 12 years old, mother filed the instant petition against Kenneth, seeking an order of filiation and child support. Kenneth appeared before Family Court for the first time by way of telephone. The Support Magistrate advised Kenneth, among other things, that he had the right to admit or deny that he was the father of A. However, he did not advise Kenneth that he had the right to assignment of counsel, or inquire whether he wished to consult with counsel prior to proceeding. Kenneth agreed to the ordered genetic marker testing, which indicated a 99.99% probability that Kenneth is indeed A.'s biological father.

At a hearing in January 2007, Kenneth, having now been as-signed counsel, appeared once again via telephone, but protested that he had yet to speak with the lawyer assigned to him. Counsel admitted that he had not spoken to his client, and that the "file fell through the cracks for me." Despite Kenneth's protest, the Support Magistrate proceeded with the hearing. When the issue of equitable estoppel was raised by Kenneth, the Magistrate, lacking the authority to hear that issue, transferred the case to a judge of the Family Court. That court, determining the issue on motion papers and oral argument, held that Kenneth was the father of A. and entered an order of filiation.

The Appellate Division affirmed, holding that the doctrine of equitable estoppel is applicable in paternity proceedings only where it is invoked to further the best interests of the child, and "generally is not available to a party seeking to disavow the allegation of parenthood for the purpose of avoiding child sup-port" (63 A.D.3d 1662, 1663, 880 N.Y.S.2d 406 [4th Dept.2009] ). The court also rejected Kenneth's contention that he was denied effective assistance*5 of counsel ( id.). We granted leave to appeal (13 N.Y.3d 830, 890 N.Y.S.2d 440, 918 N.E.2d 954 [2009] ) and now reverse.

In Matter of Shondel J. v. Mark D., 7 N.Y.3d 320, 820 N.Y.S.2d 199, 853 N.E.2d 610 (2006), we set forth the law applicable to equitable estoppel in paternity and child support proceedings. We noted that the

"purpose of equitable estoppel is to preclude a person from asserting a right

[930 N.E.2d 216, 904 N.Y.S.2d 295]

after having led an-other to form the reasonable belief that the right would not be asserted, and loss or prejudice to the other would result if the right were asserted. The law imposes the doctrine as a matter of fairness. Its purpose is to prevent someone from enforcing rights that would work injustice on the person against whom enforcement is sought and who, while justifiably relying on the opposing party's actions, has been misled into a detrimental change of position" ( id. at 326, 820 N.Y.S.2d 199, 853 N.E.2d 610).

We concluded that the "paramount" concern in such cases "has been and continues to be the best interests of the child" ( id.).

Equitable estoppel has been used, as it was in Shondel J., to prevent a man from avoiding child support by claiming that he is not the child's biological father ( id. at 328, 820 N.Y.S.2d 199, 853 N.E.2d 610). In such a case, the man has represented himself to be the child's father and the child's best interests are served by a declaration of father-hood. The doctrine in this way protects "the status interests of a child in an already recognized and operative parent-child relationship" ( Matter of Baby Boy C., 84 N.Y.2d 91, 102 n., 615 N.Y.S.2d 318, 638 N.E.2d 963 [1994] ). Here, Kenneth seeks to invoke the doctrine against mother, who led Kenneth to form the reasonable belief that he was not a father and that Raymond is A.'s father. He argues that it is not in A.'s best interest to have her current, child-father relation-ship with Raymond interrupted.

At the time the instant petition was brought, A. was 12 years old and had lived in an intact family with Raymond and her mother. His name appears on her birth certificate and he is the biological father of her older and younger siblings. For most of A.'s life, she referred to Raymond as father....