Juarez v. State

• Decision Date: 11 December 2013
• Docket Number: No. 01–12–00061–CR.,01–12–00061–CR.
• Citation: 409 S.W.3d 156
• Parties: Ruben Escobedo JUAREZ, Appellant v. The STATE of Texas, Appellee.
• Court: Texas Court of Appeals

409 S.W.3d 156

Ruben Escobedo JUAREZ, Appellant

v.The STATE of Texas, Appellee.

No. 01–12–00061–CR.

Court of Appeals of Texas, Houston (1st Dist.).

July 2, 2013.

Discretionary Review Refused Dec. 11, 2013.

Cheri Duncan, Assistant Public Defender, Houston, TX, for Appellant.

Mike Anderson, District Attorney–Harris County, Clinton A. Morgan, Assistant District Attorney–Harris County, Houston, TX, for the State.

Panel consists of Chief Justice RADACK, and Justices SHARP and MASSENGALE.

OPINION

MICHAEL MASSENGALE, Justice.

After being indicted for killing a woman with his hand, appellant Ruben Escobedo Juarez was convicted of criminally negligent homicide and sentenced to confinement for 35 years. SeeTex. Penal Code Ann. § 19.05 (West 2011). On appeal he argues that (1) the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction, (2) the trial court abused its discretion in determining his statement to the police was voluntary, (3) the jury had insufficient evidence to determine that his statement was given voluntarily, and (4) the trial court abused its discretion in denying his motion for mistrial.

We affirm.

Background

Ruben Juarez met Roger Rowland and Linda Hartsough in the spring of 2010. A couple of weeks after they met, Juarez arranged to sleep on Rowland and Hartsough's couch in exchange for $20 a night in rent, with the understanding that it was a temporary arrangement because Juarez would be leaving for a job. During the few weeks Juarez stayed with them, the three smoked crack cocaine together.

One night around midnight, Juarez and Hartsough left the house together to go beg for money to buy beer. At a nearby gas station, Juarez raised some money and bought two beers. Juarez and Hartsough then went to buy some crack cocaine from a dealer who lived about a block away. Hartsough waited in some nearby woods while Juarez bought the drugs. After smoking the crack, Juarez and Hartsough had sex in the woods. While they were having sex, Juarez placed his hand on her neck for about three minutes. She began to convulse and foam at the mouth. Juarez stood up and found that she did not have a pulse. Juarez then went back to the house where Rowland was waiting.

When he returned to the house, Juarez told Rowland that he had sent Hartsough back with the beer while he bought the crack. After smoking crack with Juarez, Rowland started to worry about Hartsough and took a walk looking for her. The next day, Juarez left town for the job he had scheduled. Rowland continued to search for Hartsough and reported her disappearance to the police.

Six weeks later, a man entered the woods and saw human bones on the ground. The bones were later identified as belonging to Hartsough. After asking some bystanders about the bones, a police detective discovered that Rowland had reported that Hartsough was missing. Detective Eli Cisneros contacted Rowland and learned that Juarez had been with Hartsough on the night of her disappearance.

The police arrested Juarez based on an open warrant for a parole violation and brought him in for questioning. After Juarez was brought to an interview room, Detective Cisneros introduced himself and informed Juarez that he was investigating the skeletal remains. Cisneros turned on recording equipment in the room and informed Ruben of his constitutional and statutory rights against self-incrimination. Juarez then told the story of how he had gone to the store with Hartsough, had sex with her, put his hand on her throat, and she had died.

The next day, the police contacted the medical examiner's office to report that Juarez had said he had his hand on Hartsough's neck before she died. Based on this information and the findings of the forensic anthropologist who examined her bones, the assistant medical examiner determined that the cause of Hartsough's death was “homicidal violence.” The forensic anthropologist had found that a small bone in Hartsough's neck, her hyoid bone, had a small fracture in it. A fracture in the hyoid bone can be a result of strangulation, but the anthropologist could not determine with certainty whether this occurred before or after Hartsough's death.

The State indicted Juarez. Before trial Juarez moved to suppress his recorded statement, arguing that he had not knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waived his rights. During the suppression hearing, Detective Cisneros testified that he offered Juarez food, water, and restroom breaks. He did not promise anything in exchange for the statement, although the detective did say that he would “help him get through this,” which he testified meant to help Juarez get through the interview process. Juarez never asked for a lawyer or to terminate the interview. After listening to Detective Cisneros's testimony and the recording several times, the trial court denied the motion, determining that Juarez had said “yes” in response to the detective's question of whether he waived his rights against self-incrimination.

Later, during jury selection, the prosecutor referenced two levels of scrutiny when the voluntariness of a statement is challenged:

STATE: He doesn't waive his rights, we can't talk to him, okay? If somebody comes in, they're read their rights, they knowingly, voluntarily waive their rights and a statement is obtained, if we get to the point where we go to trial, there are two levels of scrutiny that a statement's going to go through, okay? The first level is the judge is going to look at it and she's going to have a hearing outside the presence of the jury—

DEFENSE COUNSEL: Judge, this is outside the presence of the jury itself and we object to it.

TRIAL COURT: Sustained.

STATE: She's going to have a hearing then after that hearing, if a statement gets to come in, she'll make a ruling, the jury then gets to see it-

DEFENSE COUNSEL: Judge, I object. This is way outside the presence of the jury's understanding.

TRIAL COURT: Sustained. Sustained.

DEFENSE COUNSEL: And I ask for a jury instruction.

TRIAL COURT: To disregard?

DEFENSE COUNSEL: Yes.

TRIAL COURT: All right. The jury will disregard. Please move on counsel.

DEFENSE COUNSEL: Move for a mistrial.

THE COURT: Denied.

During the trial, the State played the video recording of Juarez's statement before the jury. The jury charge included an instruction to disregard the recorded statement unless the jury found “from the evidence beyond a reasonable doubt that prior to and during such oral statement, if any, the defendant knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waived” his right against self-incrimination.

The jury convicted Juarez of criminally negligent homicide, and the trial court assessed punishment at 35 years in prison. On appeal, Juarez challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his conviction, the admission of his statement, and the denial of his motion for mistrial.

Analysis

I. Sufficiency of the evidence

In two issues, Juarez challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his conviction for criminally negligent homicide, emphasizing that the forensic evidence was not conclusive that Hartsough's hyoid bone had been fractured around the time of her death. Juarez also contends that the jury could not have determined beyond a reasonable doubt that he had voluntarily waived his right to remain silent in the face of police questioning.

When reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence, we view the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict to determine whether “any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” Montgomery v. State, 369 S.W.3d 188, 192 (Tex.Crim.App.2012). The jury is the sole judge of the credibility of witnesses and the weight to be given to their testimony, and we may not substitute our judgment for that of the jury. Id. We review to ensure that the evidence presentedsupports the jury's verdict and that the State presented a legally sufficient case of the offense charged. Id. “Circumstantial evidence is as probative as direct evidence in establishing the guilt of an actor, and circumstantial evidence alone can be sufficient to establish guilt.” Temple v. State, 390 S.W.3d 341, 359 (Tex.Crim.App.2013) (quoting Hooper v. State, 214 S.W.3d 9, 13 (Tex.Crim.App.2007)).

Our sufficiency review requires consideration of “all of the evidence in the record, both direct and circumstantial, whether admissible or inadmissible.” Dewberry v. State, 4 S.W.3d 735, 740 (Tex.Crim.App.1999); see also Winfrey v. State, 393 S.W.3d 763, 767 (Tex.Crim.App.2013). The rationale for this rule has been explained by the Court of Criminal Appeals as follows:

In the event a portion of this evidence was erroneously admitted, the accused may complain on appeal of such error. If his complaint has merit and the error is reversible [ seeTex.R.App. P. 44.2], a new trial should be ordered. But jurors do not act irrationally taking such evidence into account, since they are bound to receive the law from the trial judge. All evidence which the trial judge has ruled admissible may therefore be weighed and considered by the jury, and a reviewing court is obliged to assess the jury's factual findings from this perspective.

Thomas v. State, 753 S.W.2d 688, 695 (Tex.Crim.App.1988); see also Moff v. State, 131 S.W.3d 485, 488–90 (Tex.Crim.App.2004). The Court has also endorsed a further explanation by Professors Dix and Dawson:

This rule rests in large part upon what is perceived as the unfairness of barring further prosecution where the State has not had a fair opportunity to prove guilt. A trial judge's commission of trial error may lull the State into a false sense of security that may cause it to limit its presentation of evidence. Erroneous admission of hearsay evidence, for example, may cause the State to forego offering other evidence that would ultimately prove admissible.

Moff, 131 S.W.3d at 490 (quoting 43A George E. Dix & Robert O. Dawson, Texas Practice: Criminal Practice and Procedure § 43.531, at...