Juarez v. State of Minnesota

Decision Date16 June 2000
Docket NumberNo. 99-2755,RESPONDENT-APPELLEE,PETITIONER-APPELLANT,99-2755
Citation217 F.3d 1014
Parties(8th Cir. 2000) ALEXANDER JUAREZ,, v. STATE OF MINNESOTA, Submitted:
CourtU.S. Court of Appeals — Eighth Circuit

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Minnesota.

Before Murphy, Heaney, and Magill, Circuit Judges.

Murphy, Circuit Judge.

Alexander Juarez was convicted in Minnesota of attempted criminal sexual conduct, third degree criminal assault, and two counts of soliciting a minor to engage in prostitution. After his state appeals were decided, he filed this habeas petition pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 2254, raising claims of ineffective assistance of counsel, prosecutorial misconduct, denial of a fair trial, and sentencing errors. The district court 1 denied the petition, but granted a certificate of appealability on the issue of whether the admission of a statement Juarez made about a lawyer during his custodial interrogation deprived him of a fair trial. We affirm.

The evidence underlying Juarez's convictions was thoroughly set out by the Minnesota Supreme Court in State v. Juarez, 572 N.W.2d 286 287-90 (Minn. 1997). Juarez worked as a maintenance painter at St. Joseph's Home for Children, a facility for emotionally disturbed children. One of the programs at St. Joseph's allowed certain children to work with staff both at the facility and outside of it. Juarez had interaction with several children through this program, including three who testified at trial that Juarez fondled them and paid them money to allow him to fondle them. One child testified that Juarez had anal intercourse with him and that they watched pornographic movies together. Another child testified that Juarez had digitally penetrated his anus, had asked him if he could insert his "dingleberry" into his anus, and had threatened to put him in a "cuckoo house" if he told anybody what was going on. Another testified that Juarez made many sexual references in front of him, including once mentioning that he had a twelve inch penis. The jury also heard testimony from Juarez's foster son who stated that Juarez "touched [his] butt" on more than one occasion, tried to touch his "booty-hole" with his finger, and asked on one occasion "if he could put his dick in my butt." In addition to the victims, several police officers testified for the prosecution. During one of the officer's testimony, a tape of Juarez's custodial interrogation was played, including Juarez's statement "I'm gonna have to get a lawyer next."

The jury acquitted Juarez of first degree criminal sexual conduct against one of the children, but convicted him of attempted first degree criminal sexual conduct against that child. He also was convicted of third degree criminal sexual conduct against another child, and two counts of soliciting minors for prostitution. He was sentenced to consecutive terms of 86 months and 36 months and was ordered to pay eight hundred dollars in fines, to register as a sex offender, and to provide a DNA sample.

Juarez appealed to the Minnesota Court of Appeals, alleging that the trial court had abused its discretion in admitting evidence, in excluding defense evidence, and in sentencing him to an upward departure, and that the prosecutor had committed prejudicial misconduct. The Court of Appeals affirmed. See State v. Juarez, No. C2-96-404, 1996 WL 706832, at *2-3 (Minn. Ct. App. Dec. 10, 1996). The Minnesota Supreme Court later took up only the issue of whether the trial court's admission of Juarez's statement on the tape about a lawyer was error. The court used the occasion to clarify the Minnesota harmless error standard, explicitly adopting the federal standard outlined in Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 22-24 (1967), and Sullivan v. Louisiana, 508 U.S. 275, 278-82 (1993). The court then performed a thorough Chapman review of the record, concluding that the error was "harmless beyond a reasonable doubt" because based on the record as a whole there was no "'reasonable possibility that the evidence complained of might have contributed to the conviction.'" Juarez, 572 N.W.2d at 291-93 (quoting Chapman, 386 U.S. at 18, 23). Juarez subsequently filed this federal habeas petition. The district court adopted the magistrate judge's 2 report and recommendation and denied the petition, concluding, among other things, that admission of the taped statement was harmless error under Chapman and Sullivan. The court granted a certificate of appealability on this issue, however.

We review any findings of fact by the district court for clear error and its conclusions of law de novo, see Richardson v. Bowersox, 188 F.3d 973, 977 (8th Cir. 1999), cert. denied, 120 S. Ct. 1971 (2000), and we apply a presumption of correctness to findings of fact by state courts, see id.; 28 U.S.C. 2254(e)(1) (1994 & Supp. 2000).

Juarez contends that admission of his taped statement was not harmless error. The Chapman harmless error standard, requiring a reviewing court to find harmlessness beyond a reasonable doubt, is generally inapplicable in the context of collateral review. See Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 637 (1993). Instead, a "less onerous" standard of whether the error "'had substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining the jury's verdict'" is used for habeas review. Id. (quoting Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750, 776 (1946)). This court will nevertheless apply the stricter Chapman standard in the context of habeas review if the state court has not conducted its own harmless error analysis. See Beets v. Iowa Dep't of Corrections Servs., 164 F.3d 1131, 1134 n.3 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 120 S. Ct. 75 (1999).

Because the Minnesota Supreme Court conducted a through harmless error analysis under Chapman, we review Juarez's claim under the Brecht standard. In light of the overwhelming evidence presented at trial of Juarez's guilt, admission of the "I'm gonna have to get a lawyer next" statement did not have a "substantial and injurious effect or influence" on the verdicts. Brecht, 507 U.S. at...

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7 cases
  • U.S. v. Johnson, No. 4:97CR3002.
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — District of Nebraska
    • December 7, 2000
    ...of the trial process and thus are not amenable to harmless error analysis, but require automatic reversal." Juarez v. Minnesota, 217 F.3d 1014, 1017 (8th Cir.2000) (quoting McGurk v. Stenberg, 163 F.3d 470, 474 (8th Cir.1998)). Structural error renders the trial "fundamentally unfair." Beet......
  • Blum v. State, No. C98-1031-MWB (N.D. Iowa 7/30/2001), C98-1031-MWB.
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — Northern District of Iowa
    • July 30, 2001
    ...to a presumption of correctness unless the petitioner can clearly and convincingly show otherwise."); see also Juarez v. Minnesota, 217 F.3d 1014, 1016 (8th Cir. 2000) (same presumption); Whitmore v. Kemna, 213 F.3d 431, 432 (8th Cir. 2000) (same presumption); Richardson v. Bowersox, 188 F.......
  • State v. Rector
    • United States
    • United States Court of Appeals (Ohio)
    • October 1, 2003
    ...may not be required to reverse based on a structural error when the appeal is subject to plain error analysis); Juarez v. Minnesota (8th Cir.2000), 217 F.3d 1014, 1018 (appellate courts generally decline to address arguments raised for the first time on appeal). Although not citing to these......
  • Walker v. Ark. Dep't of Corr.
    • United States
    • United States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (8th Circuit)
    • October 11, 2016
    ...18 F.3d 1436, 1437 (8th Cir. 1994) (lack of transcript prevented meaningful review of issues raised by appellant); Juarez v. Minnesota, 217 F.3d 1014, 1017 (8th Cir. 2000) (court of appeals will not entertain arguments raised for first time on appeal). The judgment is affirmed. 1. The Honor......
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