Judge v. State
Decision Date | 06 June 1996 |
Docket Number | No. 24423,24423 |
Citation | 321 S.C. 554,471 S.E.2d 146 |
Parties | Ernest Lee JUDGE, Respondent, v. STATE of South Carolina, Petitioner. |
Court | South Carolina Supreme Court |
This case concerns the circumstances under which a petitioner is entitled to Post Conviction Relief when he claims his trial counsel was ineffective in advising him to reject a plea agreement.
Ernest Lee Judge was tried for murder in Berkeley County in January 1990. Immediately before trial, the solicitor's office for Berkeley County offered to allow Judge to plead guilty to voluntary manslaughter with a recommendation of a seven- year sentencing cap. On the advice of his counsel, Judge rejected the offer and elected instead to go to trial. The jury convicted Judge of murder, and he was sentenced to life imprisonment.
On appeal, Judge argued only that the trial court had erred in admitting certain impeachment evidence. This Court affirmed his conviction in a per curiam opinion. See State v. Judge, No. 91-MO-194 (S.C.1991) (memo).
In his application for Post Conviction Relief (PCR), Judge asserted both ineffective assistance of counsel and prosecutorial misconduct. The primary basis for his ineffective assistance claim was his counsel's advice to reject the plea agreement offered by the solicitor's office. His claim of prosecutorial misconduct was based on the failure of the prosecutor's office to give his attorneys certain materials as required by Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 83 S.Ct. 1194, 10 L.Ed.2d 215 (1963). Importantly, his attorneys advised him to reject the plea agreement before they had received or had had any opportunity to review all the materials they had requested.
The PCR court granted Judge's application for Post Conviction Relief, finding that Judge's trial lawyers had lacked sufficient information to advise him effectively regarding the proposed plea agreement. We granted certiorari to review the PCR court's order.
The State contends the PCR court erred in finding that trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance during plea negotiations. 1 We agree.
For a petitioner to be granted Post Conviction Relief as a result of ineffective assistance of counsel, he must show both (1) that his counsel failed to render reasonably effective assistance under prevailing professional norms, and (2) that he was prejudiced by his counsel's ineffective assistance. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984); Butler v. State, 286 S.C. 441, 334 S.E.2d 813 (1985), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1094, 106 S.Ct. 869, 88 L.Ed.2d 908 (1986). The United States Supreme Court has held that a defendant who has pled guilty to a crime and later asserts ineffective assistance of counsel must establish that there is a reasonable probability that he would not have pled guilty but for counsel's performance. Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 106 S.Ct. 366, 88 L.Ed.2d 203 (1985). However, neither the United States Supreme Court nor this Court has defined fully the scope of a defendant's Sixth Amendment rights when the defendant asserts ineffective assistance of counsel that resulted in the defendant's refusal to accept a plea bargain.
Most federal and state courts addressing the issue have held that the Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance of counsel in a criminal proceeding applies not only to a defendant's decision to plead guilty but also to the decision to reject an offered plea bargain. See, e.g., Toro v. Fairman, 940 F.2d 1065, 1067 (7th Cir.1991) (), cert. denied, 505 U.S. 1223, 112 S.Ct. 3038, 120 L.Ed.2d 907 (1992); accord Johnson v. Duckworth, 793 F.2d 898 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 937, 107 S.Ct. 416, 93 L.Ed.2d 367 (1986); United States ex rel. Caruso v. Zelinsky, 689 F.2d 435 (3d Cir.1982); Beckham v. Wainwright, 639 F.2d 262 (5th Cir. Unit B 1981); Turner v. Tennessee, 664 F.Supp. 1113 (M.D.Tenn.1987), aff'd, 858 F.2d 1201 (6th Cir.1988), vacated on other grounds, 492 U.S. 902, 109 S.Ct. 3208, 106 L.Ed.2d 559 (1989).
Nevertheless, some have argued that petitioners should not be entitled to post conviction relief based on claims of ineffective assistance of counsel during the plea bargaining stage, when the plea bargain ultimately is rejected and the defendant proceeds to trial. Such an argument stems from the view that Turner v. Tennessee, 664 F.Supp. 1113, 1119 (M.D.Tenn.1987) (citations omitted), aff'd, 858 F.2d 1201 (6th Cir.1988), vacated on other grounds, 492 U.S. 902, 109 S.Ct. 3208, 106 L.Ed.2d 559 (1989).
Our research has not found any federal court that has accepted this argument. The United States District Court for the Middle District of Tennessee has provided a thorough and thoughtful analysis of the issue in Turner, supra. There, the district court concluded that the above argument "takes an unrealistic and fragmented view of this most critical stage in the criminal process." Id. The court said:
This narrow view of the right to counsel has at least two flaws. One is that Sixth Amendment protection of the ineffectively counseled decision to plead guilty, but non-protection of the ineffectively counseled decision to go to trial, would ignore the reality that these two decisions are alternative outcomes of the same attorney-client interaction....
To accept or reject a plea offer presents a binary choice at a fork in the road; providing constitutional protection against an incompetent shove in one direction, but not against an equally incompetent shove in the other, may produce unwanted skewing of the results. Like the character in the short story, criminal defendants facing this choice under asymmetrical constitutional protection may begin to see one alternative as the lady and the other as the tiger. Unforeseeable and undesirable effects on the overall functioning of the plea-negotiation process could ensue.
The second flaw in the asymmetrical approach is that it ignores the full implications of an ineffectively counseled decision to go to trial. A defendant in Turner's position has not merely rejected a plea offer; he has made a decision to go to trial "with a grave misconception as to the very nature of the proceeding and possible consequences."
The plea-rejection process thus necessarily implies a corollary election to go to trial. If the adversary system of plea negotiation has worked well, defense counsel's advice on the "choice among the alternative courses of action open to the defendant," has reflected a balancing of the more certain outcome under a guilty plea, the degree of uncertainty of result at trial, and the worst possible penalties that could result from trial.
Id. at 1120 (citations omitted). We agree with the reasoning of the district court in Turner and thus hold that the Sixth Amendment protects criminal defendants against ineffective assistance of counsel during the plea bargaining process, even if the plea offered ultimately is rejected.
Of course, a petitioner still must prove both ineffective assistance in counsel's advice to reject a plea agreement, as well as prejudice resulting from that ineffectiveness.
In the context of rejected plea agreements, it is often quite difficult to determine whether counsel failed to provide reasonably effective assistance under prevailing professional norms. Nevertheless, courts have found certain omissions by counsel constitute incompetence almost per se. For example, in United States ex rel. Caruso v. Zelinsky, supra, the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit held that "in the ordinary case, a failure of counsel to advise his client of a plea bargain would constitute a gross deviation from accepted professional standards." Zelinsky, 689 F.2d at 438. But see Johnson v. Duckworth, supra ( ). Similarly, advice by counsel to a defendant to reject a plea agreement when such advice is not based on an evaluation of the merits of the case and of the risks borne by the defendant, but on counsel's desire for trial publicity, generally constitutes professional incompetence. See, e.g., Larson v. State, 104 Nev. 691, 766 P.2d 261 (1988) ( ).
In contrast, counsel's advice to reject a plea agreement does not fall below the reasonably effective assistance standard simply because, in hindsight, the advice was wrong or the attorney's trial tactics...
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