Juneman v. Franklin

Decision Date18 February 1887
Citation3 S.W. 562
PartiesJUNEMAN <I>v.</I> FRANKLIN.
CourtTexas Supreme Court

Waul & Walker, for Juneman, appellant. Ballinger, Mott & Terry, for Franklin, appellee.

WILLIE, C. J.

This was a suit by Joseph Franklin to recover of Charles Juneman possession of a lot of ground on Galveston island. He claimed possession because he had rented the land to Juneman, and the time for which it was rented had expired, and Juneman refused on demand to deliver to him the premises. The property was alleged to be worth $2,000.

The defenses were a general demurrer; a special exception, setting up that there was no act of trespass alleged; pleas to the jurisdiction of the court, which alleged that the suit was one for forcible entry and detainer, and was exclusively within the jurisdiction of a justice of the peace; also that the amount in controversy was less than $500, and it could not be brought in the district court. He also claimed by special demurrer that the suit was one of trespass to try title; yet the interest of the plaintiff in the land was not set forth; that it was not indorsed so as to show that fact; that it did not allege a trespass upon the land by the defendant, or the amount in controversy, or any averment of damages. The plea of not guilty was also entered, and a special defense to the effect that defendant held the property, not as tenant of the plaintiff, but of Leroy Brewer, who was the true owner of the land, and the plaintiff had no title thereto. In a supplemental petition the plaintiff set forth the lease in full, and alleged that the defendant, by reason of his having entered and held the premises as tenant of the plaintiff, was estopped from denying his title. Upon the trial, the plaintiff proved that he had leased the premises to Juneman for 12 months, beginning seventh July, 1884, and ending seventh July, 1885, with the privilege granted Juneman to keep it another year if Franklin did not want the use of it himself; that early in July, 1885, plaintiff and defendant had some conversation about the lease for another year, which ended by plaintiff telling defendant to call at his office, and he thought they could arrange the matter. Juneman did not come, and, as soon as Franklin heard that he had taken a lease from Brewer, Franklin in writing demanded possession of the premises.

The land was proved by plaintiff to be worth $900. Juneman testified that, about the time his lease expired, he tried to renew it; but he and Franklin could not agree upon terms. He lived adjoining the premises, which were used by him as a pasture, being separated from his own place by a division fence; that, from the time his lease expired, he exercised no control over the lot, put no cattle upon it, left the outside gate open, and the place free to be trespassed upon by anybody's cattle. After his lease expired, he made inquiries as to the ownership of the lot, and found it belonged to Brewer, and on August 8, 1885, rented the place from him. He never made any formal surrender of the land; but it was at Franklin's disposal at any time after the lease expired.

The court below overruled all the demurrers of the defendant; held that it had jurisdiction of the cause; and gave judgment for the plaintiff for a recovery of the land and $10 rents, and awarded a writ of possession. From this judgment the present appeal is taken.

Our constitution provides that district courts shall have jurisdiction of all suits, complaints, or pleas whatever, where the matter in controversy shall be valued at or amount to $500. It is not contended in this court that the matter in controversy was not of sufficient amount to confer jurisdiction on the district court; but it is claimed that the suit is in effect one of forcible entry and detainer, and should have been prosecuted before a justice of the peace. It cannot be doubted that the cause of action set forth in the petition was one which entitled the plaintiff to relief in a court of justice. He was deprived of the possession of his land by the unlawful acts of the defendant. For this wrong he was entitled to an appropriate remedy, and one which would restore to him the...

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41 cases
  • Texas Dept. Parks and Wildlife v. Miranda
    • United States
    • Texas Supreme Court
    • April 2, 2004
    ...Todd, 71 Tex. 400, 9 S.W. 445, 446 (1888) (objecting that amount at issue fell below court's jurisdictional limits); Juneman v. Franklin, 67 Tex. 411, 3 S.W. 562, 562 (1887) (objecting that forcible entry and detainer action was not filed in justice 11. See, e.g., Cleveland v. Ward, 116 Tex......
  • James v. Davis
    • United States
    • Texas Court of Appeals
    • April 10, 1941
    ...315; Ramirez v. Bell, Tex.Civ.App., 298 S.W. 924, error refused; Tyler v. Davis, 61 Tex. 674; 35 C.J. page 1229, Sec. 570; Juneman v. Franklin, 67 Tex. 411, 3 S.W. 562; Lumpkin v. Woods, Tex.Civ.App., 135 S. W. 1139; Cox v. Kirby Lumber Co., Tex. Civ.App., 129 S.W.2d 376; Fowler v. Simpson,......
  • Lorino v. Crawford Packing Co.
    • United States
    • Texas Supreme Court
    • November 10, 1943
    ...suit in the justice court. McKie v. Anderson, 78 Tex. 207, 210, 14 S.W. 576; Thurber & Co. v. Conners, 57 Tex. 96; Juneman v. Franklin, 67 Tex. 411, 3 S.W. 562; Holcombe v. Lorino, 124 Tex. 446, 79 S.W.2d 307, 309; 19 Tex. Jur. p. 766, § 7. A defendant who is unlawfully in possession of pre......
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    • Texas Court of Appeals
    • September 17, 1953
    ...and the first landlord does not lose his possession. See: Cobb v. Robertson, 99 Tex. 138, 86 S.W. 746 and 87 S.W. 1148; Juneman v. Franklin, 67 Tex. 411, 3 S.W. 562; and see; McKie v. Anderson, 78 Tex. 207, 209, 14 S.W. 576; Stevenson v. Rogers, 103 Tex. 169, 172, 125 S.W. 1, 29 L.R.A.,N.S.......
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