Jurcisin v. Cuyahoga County Bd. of Elections

Decision Date10 February 1988
Docket NumberNo. 86-1727,86-1727
Parties, 1988 SERB 4-5 JURCISIN et al., Appellants, v. CUYAHOGA COUNTY BOARD OF ELECTIONS et al., Appellees.
CourtOhio Supreme Court

Syllabus by the Court

1. A ballot title of a proposed charter amendment consisting of clear, concise statements, without argument, descriptive of the substance of the proposed amendment, is valid.

2. Where a proposed charter amendment that would establish a police review board to investigate charges of police misconduct and recommend disciplinary action upon a finding of misconduct does not conflict with provisions of a collective bargaining agreement concerning wages, hours, and other conditions of employment, R.C. 4117.10(A), which gives collective bargaining agreements precedence over conflicting laws, does not apply.

3. Where an ordinance, passed by the council of a municipality, is declared to be an emergency measure in accordance with that municipality's laws and sets forth the reasons for the immediate necessity thereof, the legislative determination of the existence of an emergency is not reviewable by a court.

4. A court will not pass upon the validity of an ordinance or proposed charter amendment until after it has become effective.

In response to an increasing number of citizen complaints involving allegations of police misconduct, the Cleveland City Council passed an emergency ordinance, Ordinance No. 1397-84, on September 5, 1984, to place a proposed city charter amendment on the ballot at the November 6, 1984 election. The preamble to the ordinance stated that the ordinance was "an emergency measure providing for the immediate preservation of the public peace, property, health, and safety in that it must be certified to the election authorities immediately in order for the question to appear at a special election to be held on November 6, 1984 * * *." Section 5 of the ordinance declared that it was to be effective immediately upon passage.

The purpose of the charter amendment was to establish a police review board and to create the Office of Professional Standards within the office of the Director of Public Safety. The new office would have an administrator who would assist the police review board. The review board would "receive, cause investigation of, and recommend resolution of complaints" filed with it alleging police misconduct. The board would also be authorized to adopt rules and procedures for the processing of complaints. These rules and regulations, however, would be subject to the approval of the Director of Public Safety.

Under the charter amendment, the administrator of the Office of Professional Standards would be authorized to cause investigation of complaints filed with the board and to report the results of these investigations to the board. The police review board would then decide that the complaint warranted no further action, or that the complaint should be resolved by the Director of Public Safety. The board could alternatively decide that disciplinary action is warranted and make such a recommendation to the chief of police. With one exception described below, if the chief decided to initiate charges against a police officer (suspend the officer) and if the review board concurred, the existing disciplinary procedure would apply and the matter would go before the Director of Public Safety for hearing and "judgment." If the police review board did not agree with the chief's decision, then the board itself could initiate disciplinary action against the police officer. However, all charges initiated by the board would be certified to the Director of Public Safety, who is required to hold a hearing and render judgment. As is presently the case, the Director of Public Safety could decide that no discipline is warranted, or he could suspend, reduce in rank, or dismiss the officer.

The charter amendment would modify existing provisions of the charter to provide that all decisions by the chiefs of police and fire to suspend a police officer or firefighter for ten days or less [1988 SERB 4-6] would be final and, therefore, not reviewable by the Director of Public Safety. The Director of Public Safety could employ hearing officers to conduct disciplinary hearings on his behalf, but all authority to make disciplinary decisions would be retained by the director.

Finally, the charter amendment would clearly state that the city civil service commission would entertain appeals by suspended employees in the city's classified civil service only if the suspensions are for more than ten days. Suspensions of ten days or less are not appealable to the civil service commission under the existing provisions of the charter.

The ordinance, with the proposed charter amendments, was introduced and read for the first time at the city council's meeting on June 4, 1984. Subsequently, the public safety, legislation, and finance committees of council held public hearings on the ordinance. The ordinance was read again at the September 5 meeting. Council then voted fifteen to zero to suspend the rule requiring the ordinance to be read on three separate days. The ordinance was then read a third time and was passed by a vote of fifteen to zero.

The clerk of council forwarded a certified copy of the ordinance to the Cuyahoga County Board of Elections on September 7, 1984. The clerk later sent a proposed ballot title summarizing the charter amendment question to the board of elections on September 17, 1984. On October 5, 1984, the board of elections evidently approved the ballot summary language and adopted a resolution placing the proposed charter amendment on the next ballot. The ballot title language 1 was subsequently approved by the Secretary of State, and the charter amendment was adopted by the voters of the city of Cleveland on November 6, 1984.

Prior to the election, appellants, Paul Jurcisin and the Cleveland Police Patrolmen's Association ("CPPA") and Joseph Musarra and the Fraternal Order of Police, Lodge 8 ("FOP"), sought an injunction in Cuyahoga County Common Pleas Court against the submission of the proposed charter amendment to the voters. Appellants further sought equitable relief to prevent the implementation of the charter amendment. The trial court refused to cancel the election on the proposed charter amendment. The court, however, did grant the appellants' alternative request and restrained the board of elections from certifying the results of the election on the amendment to the Secretary of State pending a final determination on the merits of appellants' claims.

In its memorandum opinion, the trial court held that the council had enacted the ordinance in conformity with all applicable charter requirements and that the ballot title of the amendment conformed to law. The court, however, declared the unofficial election results null and void, enjoined certification of the election results by the board of elections, and enjoined the amendment from becoming part of the charter, ruling that, under R.C. 4117.10(A), it would conflict with the city's collective bargaining agreements with the appellant unions and was therefore void.

Appellees, city of Cleveland, Cleveland City Council, and the Cuyahoga County Board of Elections, then appealed to the Eighth District Court of Appeals which reversed the trial court's judgment. Appellants cross-appealed, arguing that the ballot title language did not properly describe the proposed charter amendment and that the council had not lawfully passed the amendment as an emergency measure. The court of appeals held that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to enter a declaratory judgment against the prospective adoption and implementation of the amendments.

Appellants appealed to this court. Appellants requested and were granted an ex parte order staying the judgment of the court of appeals and enjoining the city "from establishing or otherwise implementing a Police Review Board * * *, until further order of this Court." On June 4, 1986, this court sua sponte allowed the appeal in order to issue a mandate to the court of appeals reversing and remanding its judgment for failure to comply with App.R. 12(A).

On remand to the court of appeals, the appellate court agreed with the first appellate panel that the trial court had exceeded its authority by declaring a proposed law void prior to its enactment. The court of appeals also held that there was no conflict between the charter amendment and the collective bargaining agreements. It further noted that R.C. 4117.10(A) does not invalidate laws which conflict with provisions of a collective bargaining agreement. Rather, the statute [1988 SERB 4-7] provides that, in the event of a conflict between a law and a particular collective bargaining agreement, the agreement rather than the law governs the relationship between that particular bargaining unit and the employer. For these reasons, the court of appeals held that the trial court erred by declaring the proposed amendment void. The court of appeals also affirmed the trial court's decision that the city had complied with all applicable requirements in passing the ordinance as an emergency measure. The court of appeals also affirmed the trial court's ruling that the ballot title language submitted to the voters properly described the substance of the proposed amendment.

This court granted appellants' motion for an injunction pending further order enjoining the city from implementing the police review board created by the charter amendment and preventing the new and amended charter sections from becoming law.

The cause is now before this court upon the allowance of a motion to certify the record.

Chattman, Garfield, Friedlander & Paul, Gerald B. Chattman, Douglas J. Paul and Richard G. Ross, Cleveland, for appellants Paul Jurcisin and Cleveland Police Patrolmen's Ass'n.

Gold, Rotatori, Schwartz & Gibbons Co., L.P.A., Susan L. Gragel and Kent R....

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