Jurewicz v. Jurewicz

• Decision Date: 04 January 1945
• Citation: 317 Mass. 512,58 N.E.2d 832
• Parties: MARY JUREWICZ v. GEORGE JUREWICZ.
• Court: United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court

317 Mass. 512

58 N.E.2d 832

MARY JUREWICZ v. GEORGE JUREWICZ.

Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, Essex.

January 4, 1945

December 7, 1944.

Present: FIELD, C.

J., QUA, DOLAN RONAN, & WILKINS, JJ.

Fraud. Equity Jurisdiction, Rescission.

Equity Pleading and Practice, Decree.

Evidence reported in a suit in equity did not show to be plainly wrong findings by the trial judge that a husband defrauded his wife when having obtained from her money toward the purchase of real estate by representing to her that title would be taken in her name alone, he, without her knowledge or consent, took title by a deed creating a tenancy by the entirety.

In a suit in equity by a wife against her husband to rescind a transaction whereby he fraudulently obtained money from her for the purchase of real estate and she received, instead of sole title thereto, an interest as a tenant by the entirety, the decree should have provided that repayment of the money to the plaintiff should be on condition that she execute such conveyance as might be necessary to transfer her interest in the real estate to the defendant, and should order the defendant to join in such conveyance.

BILL IN EQUITY filed in the Superior Court on November 3, 1943. The case was heard by Baker, J.

In this court the case was submitted on briefs. M. A. Cregg, for the defendant.

F. C. Zacharer, for the plaintiff.

WILKINS, J. The plaintiff is the wife of the defendant. The bill of complaint alleges that on or about May 23, 1932, the defendant desiring to purchase for $5,500 certain real estate at 97 North Street, Methuen, fraudulently obtained from the plaintiff $1,800 toward the purchase price; that he represented that title would be taken solely in her name; and that "intending and contriving to defraud and to cheat the said plaintiff of her savings" he took title instead in the names of the plaintiff and the defendant, who were described in the deed as "husband and wife . . . as joint tenants and not as tenants in common." There was a prayer for an order for the repayment of $1,800 and interest. The trial judge in "findings and order for decree" found in substance that the facts were in accordance with the above summary of the allegations of the bill of complaint except that the amount obtained by fraud was only $1,000. A final decree was entered ordering the defendant to pay the plaintiff this sum with interest from May 23, 1932. The defendant alone appealed, and the case is here with a report of the testimony.

It is our duty to examine the testimony and reach our own conclusions upon it, accepting the findings of the trial judge which are based upon the credibility of oral evidence and are not plainly wrong, but drawing our own inferences from facts admitted or found, whatever may have been those drawn by the trial judge. Malone v.

Walsh, 315 Mass. 484 , 490. New England Trust Co. v. Commissioner of Corporations & Taxation, 315 Mass. 639 , 643-644. Cooperstein v. Bogas, ante, 341, 345.

The deed as actually delivered conveyed a tenancy by the entirety. Franz v. Franz, 308 Mass. 262 . If title was so taken through fraud of the husband, equity may give relief. Powell v. Powell, 260 Mass. 505 , 508. Cram v. Cram, 262 Mass. 509 , 513. Charney v. Charney, 316 Mass. 580 , 582-583.

1. The defendant attacks numerous findings of the trial judge as being plainly wrong. While the material evidence is meager, we are unable to reach the conclusion that any finding was plainly wrong. Certain of the findings do not need to be considered, as it is unquestioned that the plaintiff paid the $1,000. It is immaterial whether the defendant was in need of this sum, or whether it was at his request that the money was withdrawn from a bank, or whether the parties were at home or in a lawyer's office when the money was paid. The fundamental fact is that the plaintiff from her own funds paid this sum toward the purchase price. The finding to this effect is amply supported by the evidence. The findings that "the plaintiff was illiterate, being scarce [sic] able to recognize her own name," and that "the defendant was somewhat further developed in this regard," rest peculiarly upon the observation of the parties as witnesses and there was also some direct testimony in these respects. Whether the plaintiff was "inexperienced in real estate transactions" or whether "the defendant previously had experience in buying real estate" does not affect the basic issue. The vital findings are: The "plaintiff paid the $1,000 toward the purchase price with the intention, and because she believed, that the real estate then being purchased would stand in her name only as the sole owner. . . . [At] the first interview between the parties to this action which preceded the transaction, their attorney was told that the plaintiff was to be named in the deed as the grantee. . . . [When] the proposed deed drawn by the grantor's attorney was brought to the law office where the transaction was consummated, `the grantee' space therein was blank; . . . as a result of conversation which then took place, in which the defendant took part and the plaintiff did not, the names of both the plaintiff and the defendant were written in the deed . . . `as joint tenants and not as tenants in common.' . . . [The] plaintiff was ignorant of what occurred and did not know or understand that she and the defendant were grantees as `joint tenants' and did not know the defendant was named as a grantee in any manner. . . . [The] $1,000 which was paid by the plaintiff when the deed was passed was improperly obtained from her by taking advantage of her ignorance and inability to read and failure to understand what actually had been done. . . . [When] the plaintiff paid over the $1,000 to her husband . . . she thought a deed was being received in which she was the sole grantee and . . . did not intend to receive a deed to the property in which the defendant was part owner, or in which...