Justice v. Davidson Kennedy Co.

• Decision Date: 05 February 1990
• Docket Number: No. A89A1852,A89A1852
• Citation: 194 Ga.App. 585,391 S.E.2d 414
• Parties: JUSTICE v. DAVIDSON KENNEDY COMPANY et al.
• Court: Georgia Court of Appeals

Page 414

391 S.E.2d 414

194 Ga.App. 585

JUSTICE v. DAVIDSON KENNEDY COMPANY et al.

No. A89A1852.

Court of Appeals of Georgia.

Feb. 5, 1990.

Rehearing Denied Feb. 21, 1990.

Certiorari Denied April 5, 1990.

Kenneth J. Rajotte, for appellant.

Daniel C. Kniffen, Atlanta, for appellees.

CARLEY, Chief Judge.

After he was awarded workers' compensation income benefits, Donald Justice entered into a proposed lump-sum settlement agreement with appellees employer and insurer. On the day following submission of the settlement agreement for approval by the Board of Workers' Compensation (Board), Justice died in an automobile collision unconnected with his employment. Before the Board could act on their lump-sum settlement agreement with the late Justice, appellees withdrew their consent thereto. Justice's appellant-widow nevertheless sought to have the Board enforce the withdrawn settlement agreement. When the Board refused, appellant appealed unsuccessfully to the superior court. Pursuant to this court's grant of appellant's application for a discretionary appeal, she appeals from the superior court's affirmance of the Board's refusal to enforce the withdrawn settlement agreement.

"Ordinarily persons sui juris may adjust their differences upon such terms as they may be able to mutually agree upon. The policy of the law is to encourage such compromises, to the end that litigation may be avoided. This freedom of contract, however, does not exist with reference to claims for compensation arising under the work[ers'] compensation act, since the right of employers and employees to adjust their differences is limited and restricted by the terms of the statute. The statute provides: 'Nothing ... contained [in this chapter] shall be construed so as to prevent settlements made by and between the employee and employer, but rather to encourage them, so long as the amount of compensation and the time and manner of payment are in accordance with ... this [chapter]. A copy of [any] such settlement agreement shall be filed by the employer with the [Board], and no such settlement shall be binding until approved by the [Board].' [OCGA § 34-9-15]. This provision of the statute, in unmistakable terms, imposes two conditions which are essential to a valid settlement between employer and employee: First, that the time and manner of payment must be in accordance with the provisions of the work[ers'] compensation act; and, second, that the agreement must be approved by the [Board]. The section just quoted manifestly refers to settlements entered upon before any award of compensation is made by the [Board], but the same rule applies after such an award is made.... [Moreover, OCGA § 34-9-222] not only restricts the right of the parties to contract for a lump-sum settlement of an award of compensation, but in express terms provides that such contracts must be approved by the [Board]. The sections of the act just referred to are binding upon both employer and employee." Tillman v. Moody, 181 Ga. 530, 531-32(1), 182 S.E. 906 (1935).

"OCGA § 34-9-15 provides the sole method by which claims arising under the Workers' Compensation Act may be settled." Caldwell v. Perry, 179 Ga.App. 682,...