Williams v. St. Paul Companies

• Decision Date: 01 October 1997
• Docket Number: No. A97A1402,A97A1402
• Citation: 492 S.E.2d 560,228 Ga.App. 656
• Parties: , 97 FCDR 3627 WILLIAMS v. ST. PAUL COMPANIES et al.
• Court: Georgia Court of Appeals

Page 560

492 S.E.2d 560

228 Ga.App. 656, 97 FCDR 3627

WILLIAMS v. ST. PAUL COMPANIES et al.

No. A97A1402.

Court of Appeals of Georgia.

Oct. 1, 1997.

Certiorari Denied Apr. 10, 1998.

L.B. Kent, Columbus, for appellant.

Peter G. Williams, Columbus, pro se.

Tisinger, Tisinger, Vance & Greer, David F. Miceli, Carrollton, for appellees.

RUFFIN, Judge.

Attorney Peter Williams sued The St. Paul Companies ("St. Paul") alleging St. Paul tortiously interfered with his representation of clients in two separate lawsuits. The trial court granted St. Paul summary judgment, and Williams appeals. For reasons which follow, we affirm.

"To prevail at summary judgment under OCGA § 9-11-56, the moving party must demonstrate that there is no genuine issue of material fact and that the undisputed facts, viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, warrant judgment as a matter of law. OCGA § 9-11-56(c). A defendant may do this by showing the court that the documents, affidavits, depositions and other evidence in the record reveal that there is no evidence sufficient to create a jury issue on at least one essential element of plaintiff's case.... A defendant who will not bear the burden of proof at trial need not affirmatively disprove the nonmoving party's case; instead, the burden on the moving party may be discharged by pointing out by reference to the affidavits, depositions and other documents in the record that there is an absence of evidence to support the nonmoving party's case. If the moving party discharges this burden, the nonmoving party cannot rest on its pleadings, but rather must point to specific evidence giving rise to a triable issue. OCGA § 9-11-56(e)." (Emphasis in original.) Lau's Corp. v. Haskins, 261 Ga. 491, 405 S.E.2d 474 (1991).

Viewed in a light most favorable to Williams, the non-movant, the evidence in this case shows that Williams represented Myrtis Tinsley in a medical malpractice action against the Estate of George Norton, M.D. and an Alabama surgical clinic. Williams also represented Jessie and Bennie Wise in a separate medical malpractice action against the same defendants. St. Paul provided coverage to the defendants in both actions. In an effort to dispose of the two lawsuits, St. Paul proposed an aggregate settlement in which the settlement of each claim was contingent on settlement of the other. According to Williams' affidavit, he rejected the offer because "there was no way, short of violating the attorney-client privilege with Tinsley that [he] could discuss what Tinsley would or would not accept as settlement, with Wise. And, vice versa, [he] could not discuss with Wise what Tinsley would accept as settlement." Williams further asserted in his affidavit that "[i]t was impossible for [him] to perform [his] contract with either or both of [his] clients because of the way in which the settlement offer from Defendant was conditioned." Williams contends that St. Paul's settlement offer constituted a tortious interference with contract because it created this conflict of interest.

To establish a cause of action for tortious interference with existing and prospective contractual relations, a claimant must show " 'that the defendant (1) acted improperly and without privilege, (2) purposely and with malice with the intent to injure, (3) induced a third party or parties not to enter into or continue a business relationship with the plaintiff, and (4) for which the plaintiff suffered some financial injury.... [T]he term "malicious" or "maliciously" means any unauthorized interference or any interference without justification or excuse. [Cit.]' " Perry & Co. v. New South Ins. Brokers, etc., 182 Ga.App. 84, 89(4), 354 S.E.2d 852 (1987).

In his response to St. Paul's summary judgment motion, Williams failed to produce any evidence supporting any of the first three elements enumerated above. As to the first two elements, there is no evidence of any improper or malicious conduct by St. Paul in extending the aggregate settlement offer. We have long recognized that it is sound public policy to encourage parties to engage in settlement negotiations to the end that litigation may be avoided. See Justice v. Davidson Kennedy Co., 194 Ga.App. 585, 586...