Justice v. Justice
| Decision Date | 23 February 2001 |
| Docket Number | 98-00916 |
| Parties | JOHN M. JUSTICE v. HOLLY HOLMBERG JUSTICEIN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF TENNESSEE AT NASHVILLE |
| Court | Tennessee Court of Appeals |
Appeal from the Circuit Court for Davidson County: No. 96D-2745
This appeal involves a dispute between a physician and a pharmacist regarding the provisions in their divorce decree for spousal support and legal expenses. In its decree ending their fourteen-year marriage, the Circuit Court for Davidson County directed the physician, among other things, to pay the pharmacist $50 per month in alimony in futuro until her death or remarriage, as well as $4,500 to partially defray the legal expenses she had incurred in the divorce proceeding. The physician asserts on this appeal that the spousal support award was punitive and that the pharmacist received sufficient assets as a result of the division of the marital estate to pay her own legal expenses. We have determined that the record supports the trial court's decisions regarding both the spousal support and the legal expenses and, therefore, affirm the judgment.
William C. Koch, Jr., J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which William B. Cain and Patricia J. Cottrell, JJ., joined.
Jack Norman, Jr. and Phillip Robinson, Nashville, Tennessee, for the appellant, John M. Justice.
Mary Arline Evans, Nashville, Tennessee, for the appellee, Holly Holmberg Justice.
OPINIONJohn M Justice and Holly Holmberg Justice were married in August 1984 in Columbia, Nebraska. Dr. Justice was beginning his third year of medical school, and Ms. Justice was beginning her final year of pharmacy school. Ms. Justice assumed the role as the family's breadwinner to allow Dr. Justice to focus on his last two years of medical school. While Dr. Justice was completing his education, Ms. Justice paid for most of the household expenses, including food, clothing, and automobile insurance. She also paid for Dr. Justice's medical textbooks and part of his tuition, as well as the fees for his medical board exams and interviewing expenses.
By choice, Dr. Justice's early medical career centered around clinical and academic medical research. After his graduation from medical school, the parties embarked on a series of moves built around Dr. Justice's career. They first moved from Nebraska to Michigan to enable Dr. Justice to complete a four-year internship and residency at the University of Michigan. Thereafter, the parties moved to Maryland where Dr. Justice held a fellowship at the National Institutes of Health. Eventually, in 1994, the parties moved to Nashville where Dr. Justice began a fellowship in interventional cardiology at Vanderbilt University.
The work that Dr. Justice pursued was only modestly remunerative. For example, he received only $37,000 from his Vanderbilt fellowship. He augmented his clinical stipend by working part-time assisting heart surgeons at two local hospitals. He earned approximately $19,000 per year for this work. In the meantime, Ms. Justice aggressively pursued her career as a pharmacist in order to supplement the parties' income because, by 1995, they had three children to support.1 In 1997, as result of working three jobs, occasionally from 6:30 A.M. to 11:00 P.M., Ms. Justice earned approximately $69,000. During the same year, Dr. Justice earned approximately $56,000. While Dr. Justice was pursuing his residencies and fellowships, he and Ms. Justice discussed how he expected to eventually start a private medical practice with an estimated $300,000 annual income. Their hope was that Ms. Justice would be able to stop working to concentrate on their family when Dr. Justice entered private practice.
Marital problems dashed the parties' hopes for a happy marriage and a well-rounded family life. Dr. Justice's alcohol abuse plagued them throughout most of the marriage. Ms. Justice described Dr. Justice as a "mean, nasty drunk" when he abused alcohol. To complicate the relationship even further, Dr. Justice also engaged in two extramarital affairs after the parties moved to Nashville. The first, brief affair occurred in 1995. The second, more serious affair started later and eventually prompted Dr. Justice to separate from Ms. Justice and to move out of the family home.
In September 1996, Dr. Justice filed suit in the Circuit Court for Davidson County seeking an irreconcilable differences divorce. Ms. Justice later counterclaimed for divorce on the grounds of adultery, habitual drunkenness, inappropriate marital conduct, and irreconcilable differences. She also counterclaimed for battery and deceit because she believed that she had contracted a sexually transmitted disease from Dr. Justice that he had picked up from his girlfriend. By the time of the trial, the parties had agreed that Ms. Justice was entitled to a divorce on the grounds of inappropriate marital conduct and adultery and that Ms. Justice should have sole custody of the parties' three children. They also agreed on most of the division of their marital estate. Thus, the trial focused on the issues of child support, spousal support, and Ms. Justice's battery claim.
Following a hearing in March 1998, the trial court entered a final divorce decree awarding Ms. Justice a divorce on the grounds of inappropriate marital conduct and adultery. The trial court also gave sole custody of the parties' three children to Ms. Justice and directed Dr. Justice to pay $1,393 in monthly child support and awarded Ms. Justice approximately 75% of the parties' $217,000 marital estate. In addition, the trial court ordered Dr. Justice to pay Ms. Justice $50 per month in long-term spousal support until her death or remarriage and directed Dr. Justice to pay Ms. Justice an additional $4,500 to defray the legal expenses she had incurred in the divorce proceeding. Finally, the trial court dismissed Ms. Justice's battery claim. On this appeal, Dr. Justice takes issue with the award for spousal support and the additional award for Ms. Justice's attorney's fees.
We turn first to Dr. Justice's contention that the trial court improperly awarded monthly spousal support to Ms. Justice. There are no hard and fast rules for spousal support decisions. Anderton v. Anderton, 988 S.W.2d 675, 682 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1998); Crain v. Crain, 925 S.W.2d 232, 233 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1996). Instead, trial courts have broad discretion to determine whether spousal support is needed and, if so, its nature, amount, and duration. Crabtree v. Crabtree, 16 S.W.3d 356, 360 (Tenn. 2000); Sannella v. Sannella, 993 S.W.2d 73, 76 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1999). Appellate courts are generally disinclined to second-guess a trial court's spousal support decision unless it is not supported by the evidence or is contrary to the public policies reflected in the applicable statutes. Kinard v. Kinard, 986 S.W.2d 220, 234 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1998); Young v. Young, 971 S.W.2d 386, 390 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1997).
Tenn. Code Ann. §36-5-101(d)(1) (Supp. 2000) reflects a preference for temporary, rehabilitative spousal support, as opposed to long-term support. Crabtree v. Crabtree, 16 S.W.3d at 358; Goodman v. Goodman, 8 S.W.3d 289, 293 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1999); Herrera v. Herrera, 944 S.W.2d 379, 387 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1996). The purpose of rehabilitative support is to enable the disadvantaged spouse to acquire additional job skills, education, or training that will enable him or her to be more self-sufficient. Smith v. Smith, 912 S.W.2d 155, 160 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1995); Cranford v. Cranford, 772 S.W.2d 48, 51 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1989). On the other hand, the purpose of long-term spousal support is to provide support to a disadvantaged spouse who is unable to achieve some degree of self-sufficiency. Loria v. Loria, 952 S.W.2d 836, 838 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1997). The statutory preference for rehabilitative support does not entirely displace other forms of spousal support when the facts warrant long-term or more open-ended support. Aaron v. Aaron, 909 S.W.2d 408, 410 (Tenn. 1995); Isbell v. Isbell, 816 S.W.2d 735, 739 (Tenn. 1991).
Decisions whether to award spousal support, as well as decisions regarding the amount and duration of spousal support, hinge on the unique facts of each case and require a careful balancing of the factors embodied in Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-5-101(d)(1). Watters v. Watters, 22 S.W.3d 817, 821 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1999); Sannella v. Sannella, 993 S.W.2d at 76. In most cases, the two most important factors listed in Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-5-101(d)(1) are the disadvantaged spouse's need and the obligor spouse's ability to pay. Anderton v. Anderton, 988 S.W.2d at 683; Umstot v. Umstot, 968 S.W.2d 819, 823 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1997). Of those two factors, the disadvantaged spouse's needs are the threshold consideration. Aaron v. Aaron, 909 S.W.2d at 410; Watters v. Watters, 22 S.W.3d at 821.
As far as Dr. Justice is concerned, Ms. Justice is not entitled to spousal support because her income has equaled or exceeded his throughout the marriage. He asserts that the essentially undisputed evidence regarding the parties' incomes between 1984 and 1997 demonstrates that Ms. Justice does not need spousal support. Based on his belief that Ms. Justice does not need spousal support, Dr. Justice complains that the trial court was plainly punishing him by ordering him to pay Ms. Justice $50 per month. While we do not condone punitive spousal support awards, Anderton v. Anderton, 988 S.W.2d at 682; Kinard v. Kinard, 986 S.W.2d at 234, we do not share Dr. Justice's belief that this particular spousal support award was punitive.
Dr. Justice's argument that Ms. Justice has absolutely no need for spousal support cannot withstand scrutiny. While it may be true that her earnings exceeded his in 1997, the spreadsheet does not tell the whole story. In 1997, Ms. Justice was working at three jobs, sometimes as many...
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