Juvenile Appeal (Anonymous), In re

• Decision Date: 24 June 1980
• Court: Connecticut Supreme Court
• Parties: In re JUVENILE APPEAL (ANONYMOUS) (two cases).

Page 345

435 A.2d 345

181 Conn. 292

In re JUVENILE APPEAL (ANONYMOUS) (two cases).

Supreme Court of Connecticut.

Argued May 8, 1980.

Decided June 24, 1980.

Cornelius F. Tuohy, Asst. Atty. Gen., with whom on the brief, was Carl R. Ajello, Atty. Gen., for appellant (commissioner of children and youth services).

Michael J. Mannion, Danbury, with whom, on the brief, was Karin Ne-Jame, law student intern, for appellee (Superior Court).

Before COTTER, C. J., and BOGDANSKI, PETERS, HEALEY and PARSKEY, JJ.

PER CURIAM.

The commissioner of children and youth services appeals from orders of the Superior Court for Juvenile Matters in the judicial district of Danbury. Since the pertinent facts and the legal issues in both cases are identical we decide both in one opinion.

After holding hearings on petitions of alleged delinquency, the court, Moraghan, J., in these cases adjudged the juveniles who are the subject of these appeals delinquent and ordered the children to be placed with the commissioner of children and youth services (hereinafter the commissioner). In its order concerning docket No. 9429, the court directed placement in the security wing of Long Lane School until placement at Connecticut Junior Republic, Woods Lane School or Mount St. John School, or until some other appropriate placement could be found. The court in its order further required that no placement out of Long Lane School be made without the consent of the Superior Court. ¹

The commissioner has appealed from those portions of the orders which prescribe and, to use his words, "(require) him to comply with the Superior Court's treatment plan(s)." The commissioner argues that the Superior Court exceeded its authority in issuing orders of commitment which direct him to comply with "treatment plans" for children adjudicated delinquent and committed to the department of children and youth services. Furthermore, the commissioner contends that the court's orders violated the separation of powers provision of the Connecticut constitution.

A preliminary question raised in these appeals is whether the commissioner has standing to raise his challenges on appeal. It is settled law that the right to appeal is purely statutory and is allowed only if the conditions fixed by statute are met. Zachs v. Public Utilities Commission, 171 Conn. 387, 394, 370 A.2d 984; Prevedini v. Mobil Oil Corporation, 164 Conn. 287, 293, 320 A.2d 797. Appeals of juvenile matters from the Superior Court are governed by General Statutes § 46b-142(b) which provides in pertinent part: "any party at interest aggrieved by any final judgment or order of the court may appeal to the supreme court...."

The term "party at interest" is not defined in the General Statutes nor has this phrase been construed by this court in the present context. The commissioner does not claim to have been a party to or even a participant at the proceedings prior to or at the time of the entry of the court's adjudications of delinquency and the orders at issue here. The delinquency petitions were brought by Michelle Wittstein, a probation officer. Probation officers are appointed by the judges of the Superior Court; General Statutes § 46b-123; and thus cannot be considered members of the department of children and youth services.

The commissioner, however, urges that this court look to its rules of practice concerning juvenile matters to define "party at interest." Practice Book, 1978, § 1023(l ) defines the term "party" to include: "(1) The child who is the subject of the proceeding.... (2) 'Equitable party at interest': Any person whose interest in the matter before the court is not of such a nature and kind as to entitle him to legal service as a prerequisite to the court's jurisdiction over the proceeding but whose participation therein, at the discretion of the court, may promote the interests of justice.... (3) 'Legal party at interest': Any person, including a parent, whose legal relationship to the matter pending before the court is of such a nature and kind as to mandate the receipt by him of proper legal notice as a condition precedent to the establishment of the court's jurisdiction."

The commissioner is clearly not within the first category....