Juvland v. Mattson
| Decision Date | 26 February 1971 |
| Docket Number | No. 42468,42468 |
| Citation | 289 Minn. 365,184 N.W.2d 423 |
| Parties | Joseph Raymond JUVLAND, et al., Appellants, v. Dr. Albert D. MATTSON and Peter Donald Mattson, Respondents. |
| Court | Minnesota Supreme Court |
Syllabus by the Court
In an automobile negligence action where the issue of the causal negligence of each driver is submitted in the form of special verdicts requiring an answer on the ultimate fact issue of causal negligence, followed by a comparative negligence question as authorized by Minn.St. 604.01, subd. 1, it is error to order a new trial limited solely to the issue of the percentage of negligence attributable to each driver because such issue is not distinct and separable, and a comparison of fault presupposes a determination of the particular respects in which each driver was causally negligent.
Chestnut, Jones, Brooks, Kennedy & Burkard, Minneapolis, for appellants.
Murnane, Murnane, Battis, deLambert & Conlin, St. Paul, for respondents.
Heard and considered en banc.
The sole issue presented on plaintiffs' appeal as permitted by leave of this court pursuant to Rule 105, Rules of Civil Appellate Procedure, is whether in this negligence action the trial court's order granting a new trial for insufficiency of evidence may properly be limited to a retrial of the single issue of the percentage of causal negligence attributable to each tort-feasor.
The issue arises out of a jury trial of an action for personal-injury damages resulting from a collision between two automobiles in an uncontrolled intersection in the city of St. Paul. The issues of negligence, causation, and the comparison of causal negligence attributable to each driver (plaintiff Joseph Raymond Juvland and defendant Peter Donald Mattson) were submitted in the form of a special verdict as authorized by our new comparative negligence statute. Minn.St. 604.01, subd. 1. 1 The jury awarded the injured plaintiff driver $11,000 damages and found both drivers causally negligent, attributing 90 percent to defendant driver and 10 percent to plaintiff driver. Thereafter, defendants moved the trial court for an order amending the apportionment of causal negligence between the drivers to 50 percent each, or in the alternative for a new trial limited solely to the 'issue of division of negligence' between the drivers. The trial court granted the latter alternative of defendants' motion upon the ground that the jury's apportionment of negligence was 'not justified by the evidence and is contrary to the overwhelming weight of the evidence.' Because the question is one of first impression which we deem should be resolved in the interest of the administration of justice, we granted plaintiffs' request for discretionary review. 2
We hold that the trial court erred in too narrowly limiting the issue to be retried and remand for a retrial of the general issue of liability.
The separate questions submitted in this case pertaining to the negligence of each driver were identically worded:
'At and immediately prior to the accident was (named driver) negligent in the operation of his automobile.'
The question called for a determination of the ultimate fact issue of negligence and did not, as is sometimes the practice, require answers to separate questions concerning each particular respect in which the evidence would support a finding of negligence, e.g., in the following form:
At and just prior to the collision, was (the driver of the vehicle) negligent with respect to:
(a) Lookout?
(b) Control?
(c) Speed?
Answer: _ _
Answer: _ _
Answer: _ _. 3
A similar question is then submitted concerning causation, followed by a comparative negligence question in the case of multiple tortfeasors. In Wisconsin, which has long been the recognized leader in applying the law of comparative negligence, this was the only authorized method of submission prior to 1961. Thereafter, the Wisconsin Supreme Court pursuant to its rule-making power amended a statute on the subject to give the trial court discretion to submit an ultimate fact question of the type employed in this case. Baierl v. Hinshaw, 32 Wis.2d 593, 146 N.W.2d 433.
In this case, defendant driver was approaching the intersection from the south, traveling in a northerly direction, and the plaintiff driver was approaching from defendant's right, driving in a westerly direction. Plaintiff's speed was 20 miles per hour and defendant's, 20 to 25. It was daytime, the day was clear and dry, and the collision occurred within the intersection. A perusal of the record indicates that there was evidentiary support for a permissible finding of causal negligence on the part of defendant driver with respect to lookout, failure to yield the right-of-way, failure to reduce speed, and possibly control; and as to plaintiff driver, with respect to lookout, control, and possibly speed.
Determination of the percentage of negligence attributable to each driver presupposes a determination of the particular respect in which each driver was causally negligent. The special verdict returned by the jury in this case in no way discloses that determination. Thus, on retrial, if the ultimate fact issue of causal negligence of each driver were to be given binding effect, the trial court would be limited in merely declaring that the causal negligence of each driver had been previously established without specifying in what particular respect each was causally negligent. It is thus clear that the issue of the percentage of negligence attributable to each driver is not separate and distinct from the issues of the particular negligence claimed and its causal effect. In our opinion, therefore, the order limiting the retrial to this narrow issue is neither feasible nor practical, in the sense of saving litigation time and expense. The question is not dissimilar to the one presented in Koenigs v. Werner, 263 Minn. 80, 85, 116 N.W.2d 73, 76, where the trial court ordered a new trial limited to the issue of proximate cause. Holding the order nonappealable of right, we observed:
'* * * (T)he practice of permitting a partial new trial should not be followed unless it clearly appears that the issue to be retried is distinct and separable and that the trial of that issue alone may be had without...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
Warshany v. Supermarkets General Corp.
...statute similar to this State and to the State of Wisconsin, appears to adopt a different view. In the case of Juvland v. Mattson, 289 Minn. 365, 184 N.W.2d 423 (1971), the Supreme Court of Minnesota was asked to consider the question of whether on a new trial a jury should be asked to cons......
-
Riley v. Lake
...have been mentioned, the percentage of causal negligence of the parties should be left to the jury. In the case of Juvland v. Mattson, 289 Minn. 365, 184 N.W.2d 423, 56 Minn.L.Rev. 973 (1971), we held that it was not proper to remand the case to the jury for the sole purpose of determining ......
-
Deike v. Sears, Roebuck and Co., 82-760
...an instruction would be prejudicial to a fair trial. (Caterpillar Tractor Co. v. Beck (Alaska 1981), 624 P.2d 790; Juvland v. Mattson (1971), 289 Minn. 365, 184 N.W.2d 423.) The prejudice would be aggravated in this case because the evidence was close on the question of liability. Liability......
-
Thielbar v. Juenke, s. 42664
...duplicitous findings of negligence which frequently arose to plague both the trial courts and this court.' See, also, Juvland v. Mattson, 289 Minn. 365, 184 N.W.2d 423. This is not to say that evidentiary fact questions should never be used. There may be situations where it would be appropr......